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CHAPTER I
Multinationals, Offshoring and the Decline of U.S.
Manufacturing
with Christoph E. Boehm and Aaron Flaaen
1.1 Introduction
One of the most contentious aspects of globalization is its impact on national labor mar-
kets. This is particularly true for advanced economies facing the emergence and integration
of large, low-wage and export-driven countries into the global trading system. Contribut-
ing to this controversy, the United States has experienced steep declines in manufacturing
employment in the last two decades, paired with extraordinary expansions of multinational
activity by U.S. firms.
While a large body of research has studied the intersection of international integration and
employment, particularly in developed countries, the results and policy prescriptions have
been mixed. There are several factors underlying the conflicting results of this research,
but prominent among them are gaps in the coverage and detail of the requisite firm-level
data to disentangle competing views. Data constraints pertaining to multinational firms in
the U.S. have been particularly severe, limiting research on their role in the manufacturing
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employment decline.
This paper uses a novel dataset together with a structural model to show that U.S. multi-
nationals played a leading role in the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment. Our data
from the U.S. Census Bureau cover the universe of manufacturing establishments linked to
transaction-level trade data for the period 1993-2011. Using two directories of international
corporate structure, we augment the Census data to include, for the first time, longitu-
dinal information on the direction and extent of firms’ multinational operations. To the
best of our knowledge, this data permits the first comprehensive analysis of the role of U.S.
multinationals in the aggregate manufacturing decline in the United States.
We begin by establishing three new stylized facts. First, U.S. multinationals averaged 30
percent of overall employment but accounted for 41 percent of the aggregate employment
decline. Second, U.S. multinationals had a 3 percentage point per annum lower employment
growth rate relative to a narrowly-defined control group sharing similar industry, size, and
age characteristics. Finally, we use an event-study framework to compare the employment
dynamics in plants which become part of a firm with multinational operations to a control
group of non-transitioning plants. These transitioning plants experienced substantial job
losses relative to the control group. Together, these three exercises show that U.S. multina-
tionals contributed disproportionately to the manufacturing employment decline.
We next examine the trading patterns of multinational and other manufacturing firms in
our data. We find that foreign sourcing of intermediate inputs is a striking characteristic of
multinationals. Over 90% of overall U.S. intermediate imports in our sample are imported by
multinationals. Further, the fraction of U.S. multinationals sourcing inputs from developing
countries has nearly doubled from 1993 to 2011. To illustrate the link between these high and
increasing intermediate imports by multinationals and the observed employment declines,
we return to the event study. We show that the relative employment declines in transitioning
plants are accompanied by large increases in imports of intermediates by the parent firm.
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The increase in imports is largest when the plant is shut down.
While suggestive, these stylized facts are not sufficient to establish whether foreign sourc-
ing is a complement or a substitute for domestic employment. To understand the causal
mechanism underlying these facts and to quantify their impact in the aggregate we present
a model of firm sourcing decisions in the spirit of Antra`s et al. (2014). In the model firms
choose the location (home, North and South) and mode (inter or intra-firm) through which
they source their intermediate inputs for production. The firm’s optimal sourcing strategy
balances the gains from access to cheaper intermediate inputs against higher fixed costs.
The impact of foreign sourcing on U.S. employment is determined by two opposing forces.
First, greater foreign competitiveness implies that firms sourcing from abroad have access
to cheaper intermediates. As a result, their unit costs fall and their optimal scale increases.
This effect raises their U.S. employment. On the other hand, firms reallocate intermediate
production towards the location with increased competitiveness. This reduces U.S. employ-
ment.
We show that the value of a single structural constant—the elasticity of firm size with
respect to production efficiency—completely determines which of the two forces dominates.
Existing views in the literature on the value of this constant vary substantially. The existing
range of estimates is large enough that foreign sourcing could be either complementary or
substitutable with domestic employment. We therefore estimate this constant structurally
using our data on the universe of U.S. manufacturing firms. Our data on cost shares of the
firm from all locations and modes, as well as firm revenues and wage payments to labor is
sufficient to identify the structural constant. The intuition behind this result is related to
the finding in Blaum et al. (2015) that domestic cost shares and revenues are sufficient to
identify changes in firm unit costs due to imported inputs in a large class of models.
Our estimation demonstrates that increased foreign sourcing is a strong substitute for
U.S. employment at the firm-level. This result is robust to a number of alternative estimation
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methods and subsamples. As a final step, we evaluate what the firm-level results imply for
aggregate manufacturing employment. We implement a general equilibrium version of the
model, and calibrate it using our structural parameter estimates and observed foreign sourc-
ing shares. Our model implies a quantitatively significant employment decline in response
to foreign sourcing. It generates an aggregate employment decline in U.S. multinationals
of 28%, and an overall employment decline of 13%, which is larger than the direct contri-
bution by multinationals. The latter result is due to general equilibrium effects: decreased
demand from multinational firms for intermediates from other U.S. firms further reduces
manufacturing employment.
This paper contributes to a growing literature documenting the impact of international
integration on labor markets. Data constraints have limited previous work on the role
of multinationals in the U.S. manufacturing decline. Some exceptions are Harrison and
McMillan (2011), Ebenstein et al. (2014), Ebenstein et al. (2015) and Kovak et al. (2015)
who have studied foreign sourcing by multinationals using BEA data. Since these data only
include multinationals, they do not permit analysis of multinationals’ behavior relative to
a non-multinational control group. To study plant closure in multinationals, Bernard and
Jensen (2007) made use of a temporary link between the BEA and the Census. However,
they did not focus on offshoring.
In contrast to the limited studies on the impact of foreign sourcing by multinationals,
a larger literature has examined the impact of international trade on labor markets more
generally. In particular, a number of recent papers have studied the impact of import
competition from China (Autor et al., 2013, 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2014). Unlike our paper,
these studies use industry-level data. In a firm-level study, Pierce and Schott (2013) find
lower employment growth in industries that were most affected by the recent reduction in
trade-policy uncertainty with China. Several papers have focused on the wage or inequality
effects of trade. For instance, Hummels et al. (2014) find negative wage effects of offshoring
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for low skilled workers using firm-level data from Denmark.
Our finding of the substitutability between foreign sourcing and domestic manufactur-
ing employment contributes to another active debate in the literature. A number of papers
have found little to no employment substitution in various countries, including Desai et al.
(2009) [U.S.A], Braconier and Ekholm (2000) [Sweden], Konings and Murphy (2006) [Eu-
rope], Slaughter (2000) [U.S.A.], Barba-Navaretti et al. (2010) [Italy and France] and Hijzen
et al. (2011) [France].
In contrast, and consistent with our results, several recent papers with data from other
countries have found that firms treat foreign and domestic employment as substitutes in
production. In particular, Muendler and Becker (2010) find evidence for substitutability
between home and foreign employment using German data in a structural model. As in
our paper, they emphasize the role of the extensive margin (in the case of that paper, of
new foreign locations). We find it critical to account for the extensive margin of domestic
plant deaths when calculating the employment effects of foreign operations. Other papers
finding evidence for substitution are Simpson (2012) [United Kingdom], and Debaere et al.
(2010) [South Korea]. Monarch et al. (2013) also find that offshoring firms in Census data
experience declines in employment.
Finally, the structural model we develop in this paper draws on Antra`s et al. (2014),
who develop a tractable model of foreign sourcing. Our model allows for a more general
form of technology transfer between the parent firm and its suppliers. We also distinguish
explicitly between inter and intra-firm imports in the model, as our focus is on multinationals.
Moreover, our data shows that these firms’ imports at arms-length are often accompanied by
substantial imports from related-party suppliers. Whether firms source within or outside the
firm has been extensively studied by a large empirical and theoretical literature, including
Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Hanson et al. (2005), Antra`s (2005), Antra`s and Helpman
(2004), Antra`s and Chor (2013), and Costinot et al. (2013).
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The next section presents empirical evidence establishing the role of multinationals in the
aggregate U.S. manufacturing employment decline, and linking this to their import patterns.
Section 3 develops the partial equilibrium model, lays out the structural estimation and
discusses the results. Section 4 implements the general equilibrium model and performs
quantitative exercises. Section 5 concludes. Details of our data and various robustness
exercises are contained in the Appendix.
1.2 Data and Stylized Facts
This section presents a set of stylized facts key to understanding the role of multinationals
in the decline in U.S. manufacturing. To uncover these facts, we rely on a new dataset that
contains production and trade information of the universe of U.S. manufacturing firms,
augmented with multinational ownership and affiliate information. With this data, we show
that:
1. U.S. multinationals were responsible for a disproportionate share of the aggregate man-
ufacturing decline,
2. U.S. multinationals experienced lower employment growth than a narrow control group
of establishments with similar characteristics,
3. establishments transitioning into U.S. multinational status experienced prolonged job
losses while the parent firm increased imports of intermediates.
1.2.1 Data
Much of this paper relies on a number of restricted-use Census datasets that we have
augmented with indicators of multinational affiliate and ownership status. Studying the
manufacturing sector over a period of time that spans two distinct industrial classification
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systems is a challenging task. To create a consistent definition of manufacturing for the period
1993-2011, we apply a new concordance between the SIC/NAICS classification changes that
is described in Fort and Klimek (2015). We supplement this concordance with our own
set of fixes to account for known data issues, and apply it to the Longitudinal Business
Database (LBD), a longitudinally-consistent dataset comprising the universe of all business
establishments in the U.S. See Appendix A.1.1 for more details on the construction of the
consistent manufacturing sample.
To identify multinational firms in the Census data, we use a new set of variables describing
the international activity and ownership characteristics of U.S. firms. This information comes
from a year-by-year link to a set of directories of international corporate structure. To ensure
that the multinational identifiers are consistent across time, we develop a series of checks
and corrections to minimize any spurious switching of firm status during our sample. For
a description of these methods, as well as a summary of the data linking methodology, see
Appendix A.1.1
The final core piece of our data is annual information on imports and exports at the firm
level. We use the Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transactions (LFTTD) dataset, which contains
the universe of U.S. trade transactions, linked to the firms engaged in such trade. Information
in the LFTTD includes the date, value, quantity, and detailed product information (HS10)
along with whether the particular transaction was conducted between related parties or
at arms-length. To analyze the scope for U.S. firms to transfer portions of their domestic
supply chain abroad, we utilize a novel procedure for classifying firm-level imports into those
1A growing literature has used alternative data sources to identify multinationals operating in the U.S.
A number of papers including Ebenstein et al. (2015) and Ramondo et al. (2014) have used data from the
BEA to study multinationals. This is a survey and does not contain non-multinational firms. Most studies
of offshoring in the U.S. have been at the industry level. Bernard et al. (2010) use firm level trade data from
the U.S. Census Bureau and identify firms as multinationals based on their related party imports. This does
not permit a distinction between U.S. and foreign multinationals, and rules out non-trading multinationals
by assumption. Other approaches include using Orbis data (Cravino and Levchenko, 2014), and data from
Dun and Bradstreet (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009).
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intended for further manufacture (intermediate goods) and those destined for consumption
(final goods). See Boehm et al. (2014a) or Appendix A.1.4 for more details on this procedure.
1.2.2 Facts on Foreign Sourcing and Employment Decline
An aggregate picture of the decline in manufacturing emerges from basic statistics per-
taining to our sample. The number of establishments we classify as manufacturing falls from
nearly 355,000 in 1993 to under 259,000 in 2011. Table 1.1 shows that the annual rates of
decline have been highest in U.S. multinationals and purely domestic, non-trading establish-
ments. The only group to have experienced an increase in net establishments during this
period is foreign multinational firms. This group serves as a reminder that supply chain
restructuring could also stimulate U.S. employment.2
The employment counts in Table 1.2 show a similar picture of aggregate decline. Total
manufacturing employment in our sample decreases from nearly 16 million workers in 1993
to 10.26 million in 2011. U.S. multinational establishments constituted 33.3% of the 1993
manufacturing employment but contributed 41% of the subsequent overall decline. While
employment at other exporting and importing establishments grew in the first decade of
the sample, U.S. multinationals have experienced a steady secular decline throughout our
sample.
Concurrent with this employment decline has been a large increase in the participation
of trade by U.S. firms. We document the fraction of firms participating in intermediate
input sourcing, separately based on whether it occurs at arms length or intra-firm, in Table
1.4. We split the firms into U.S. multinationals and other firms (this group includes the few
foreign multinationals in our sample). The fraction of U.S. multinationals participating in
arms-length input sourcing from developing countries has increased by nearly 30 percentage
2Table 1.3 shows that the decline in multinational firms has not been as severe as the decline in
multinational-owned establishments. In the next section, we will show that the extensive margin of establish-
ment shutdown plays an important role in understanding the decline of employment in U.S. multinationals.
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points, and the fraction sourcing related party inputs from these countries has doubled.
In contrast, the share of firms sourcing from developed countries has only increased about
10 percentage points during our sample period. This fact motivates our analysis in later
sections, which will look at sourcing patterns for developing and developed country groups
separately.
1.2.2.1 Overall Employment Growth Differential of Multinationals
A number of establishment characteristics have been shown to be correlated with employ-
ment growth rates.3 To the extent that any of these well-known characteristics are correlated
with multinational status, attributing the decline in employment to the presence of offshore
operations would be misleading. Therefore, to account for these establishment-level charac-
teristics, we construct a set of dummy variables from the interactions of firm age, industry,
establishment size, and year. More specifically, each dummy variable takes the value one
if an establishment belongs to a cell defined by the interaction of the approximately 250
4-digit manufacturing industries in a year, 10 establishment size categories, and 4 firm-age
categories. The setup implies around 16000 cells in the specifications pooling across years
1993-2011.4 We fit the following regression:
eit = α + βMit + ΓXit + uit (1.1)
where eit is the establishment growth rate, Mit is an indicator for establishments owned by
a U.S. multinational, and Xit is the vector of dummy variables identified above.
5
3See Haltiwanger et al. (2013) for a recent example. In Appendix A.2.1 we decompose the within-group
employment patterns into job creation/destruction rates, separated by intensive and extensive margins.
4If no multinational establishment exists in a particular cell, we drop that cell from the analysis. We
also drop cells that contain only multinational establishments. Our establishment size categories are 0-4,5-
9,10-24,25-49,50-99,100-249,250-499,500-999,1000-1999 and 2000 and above and the firm-age categories are
0-1,2-5,6-12 and greater than 12. We obtain firm-age from the LBD firm-age panel. The age of a firm is
defined as the age of its oldest establishment.




Table 1.5 presents the results from this specification, pooled across all years of our sam-
ple. The inclusion of records of zero employment before births and after deaths determines
whether the measured effect captures the establishment level entry and exit margin. When
pooling across years (1994-2011), and focusing only on the intensive margin, we find that
multinational establishments have a slightly positive growth rate differential of 1.9 percentage
points relative to non-multinational establishments. Once the extensive margin is accounted
for, however, this differential changes sign and becomes significantly negative. This is con-
sistent with the strong negative net job-destruction rates at the extensive margin in the
analysis in Appendix A.2.1, and points to establishment closure as key to understanding
employment declines in multinationals.
To understand the impact of this establishment-level result on overall employment within
a firm, we run the same pooled specification with the firm as the unit of analysis. Here, we
find coefficients that are significant and strongly negative: considering only the intensive
margin, a multinational firm has a 1-2 percentage point lower employment growth rate than
a non-multinational firm. This negative differential increases to 3 percentage points once
the extensive margin (firm entry and exit) is included. Clearly, the effects of establishment
closure within the multinational firm dominate any increases in employment at existing
establishments, leading to aggregate decline.6
Table A.6 displays results from this specification with different subsamples and additional
controls for robustness. We conclude this set of stylized facts by examining employment and
trade of establishments which become part of a multinational firm around the transition
time.
6A simple aggregation exercise based on our employment weighted regression results tells us the number
of jobs lost in U.S. multinational firms relative to the control group. The growth rates implied by the
employment weighted specification can be directly applied to multinational employment in the sample year
by year, to arrive at this number. Our estimates imply 2.02 million jobs were lost in these firms relative to
a narrowly defined control group. Further details are provided in Appendix A.2.
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1.2.2.2 Evidence Using an Event-Study Framework
While previous sections established the role of multinationals in the U.S. manufacturing
decline, this section links this fact to their importing patterns. We analyze the change in
outcomes (employment or trade) of establishments that transition into multinational sta-
tus relative to a predefined control group. Using this event-study framework, we find new
multinational plants are characterized by significantly lower employment growth and higher
intermediate input imports.
We first divide establishments into four mutually exclusive groups: purely domestic and
non-exporting, exporting, owned by a U.S. multinational or owned by a foreign multinational.
An establishment’s state is then defined by the group it belongs to. We next explore whether
changes in establishment state are an important feature of our data. To calculate the average
transition rates of establishments, we divide the number of establishments transitioning from
one state to another in year t+1 (including those that retain state) by the total establishments
of that type in year t. Table 1.6 reports the results.
While infrequent, the transition of establishments into a multinational status provides an
opportunity to assess the relationship between multinational structure and establishment-
level employment dynamics in an event-study framework.7 There have been several other
recent papers that have analyzed such events for other countries, such as Barba-Navaretti
et al. (2010) [Italy and France], Hijzen et al. (2011) [France], and Debaere et al. (2010) [South
Korea].89
7Table 1.6 shows that multinationals have relatively high exit rates, and there are low transition rates
into and out of multinational status overall. However, the large number of establishments per year in our
sample provides sufficiently many transitions for our analysis.
8The estimated effects on employment vary across these papers, which likely reflects in part differences in
data construction and sample period. For example, Hijzen et al. (2011) looks at a 6 year window (t-2,t+3),
forces a balanced panel (removing extensive margin effects), and constructs the control variables based on
t − 2 firm-level characteristics. Barba-Navaretti et al. (2010) look only at effects during the t + 1 to t + 3
period, use the Orbis dataset for the control group, and use t− 1 for the control variables.
9For an application of a similar methodology to private equity transactions, see Davis et al. (2014).
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Consider a set of establishments that transition into a multinational firm between y and
y + 1, and define a control group of similar establishments that do not transition into a
multinational firm in that year.10 For a transitioning establishment, this control group is
defined as non-transitioning establishments within the same narrowly defined cells of firm
age, establishment size, and 4-digit industry we utilized above. We then compare the time-
path of employment growth rates of the transitioning establishments to their control group.11
As is clear from the table of transitions, we have relatively few multinational transitions
in a given year. To gain statistical power, we therefore pool the available transitions across
years and stack the datasets with ”treatment” and control groups corresponding to each year













where the variable T yik is equal to one for transitioning establishment i in year k relative to
the year of transition y. (We exclude the transition year k = 0.) The vector Xyi corresponds
to the interaction of controls utilized above, and is fixed at time k = −1 for each event year
so that the comparison groups remain the same over time. Note that the control groups are
defined within an event year (i.e. differ across event years).
An establishment can appear multiple times in this specification. If the establishment
exists for several years as a non-multinational until it transitions into multinational status,
the establishment would show up in (potentially) several different event years: First as part
of a control group for some other transitioning establishment, and then, once, as part of a
10Note that a non-multinational establishment could either be acquired by an existing multinational firm,
or the firm owning the establishment could open up operations abroad. Our results are broadly similar when
considering each of these groups separately.
11These cells are defined in the year prior to transition, and remain constant for a given transitioning
establishment across years. We drop any establishments in the control group that exit in year y, to match
the implied conditioning of the survival of the treated establishments in that year. In addition, we require
the establishment to have existed for at least one year prior to the potential transition, for a total minimum
establishment age of 3 years.
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“treated” group of plants in the year of its own transition. This fact has implications for the
way that standard errors are calculated. It implies the need to cluster in cells that include
the event year — in order to account for potentially correlated errors across the event — in
addition to clustering by plant. We utilize the methodology for two-way clustering described
in Cameron et al. (2011), which also allows for high-dimensional fixed effects.12
We use this same structure to measure the effect of multinational transitions on trading




ik. Such trade can
be separately analyzed based on whether it is intra-firm, or composed of intermediate/final
goods.13
Figure 1.2 shows the estimates of δk. Establishments that transition into multinational
status experience a relative increase in their employment growth rates in the first two years.
This behavior is consistent with the notion that an expansion of international activity is
positively correlated with business outcomes for that firm. Subsequent years, however, show
a persistently negative effect in employment growth, on the order of roughly 3-6 percentage
points relative to the control group. This slight increase followed by a persistently lower
employment growth rates could be explained by an initial domestic growth that coincides
with (and serves to support) multinational expansion. Such growth could include time spent
by the firm learning to replicate processes within the establishment abroad. Following a
successful expansion, the firm may then choose to shut down or downsize duplicated firm
activities.14 In future work, we will attempt to disentangle these competing explanations.
Our results point to the importance of studying a long horizon to understand the conse-
12The results are robust to clustering by firm instead of plant.
13A transitioning establishment associated with a complete firm identifier change could be associated with
a level shift in the value of trade, a feature which would present significant challenges in interpreting the
results. To prevent this complication, we restrict the sample in the analysis of trading outcomes to only
those establishments that retain the same firm identifier from years t− 1 to t+ 1. Conducting the identical
employment analysis using this reduced sample yields similar results.
14An alternative explanation involves transactions where the establishment is acquired by a multinational
firm. Such cases often include mandatory periods where the employees cannot be laid off. In short, it might
take a few years to wind down an establishment.
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quences of offshoring. We find stronger negative effects on employment than similar analyses
for other countries. This discrepancy may reflect differences in the length of time under study
(the papers cited above look only at the first 2-3 years following a foreign expansion), or
the extent to which other studies adequately account for the extensive margin of plant/firm
closings in their analysis.
To examine the role of import substitution in this decline, we estimate equation (1.2)
after replacing the left hand side with firm-level intermediate imports (split by related party
and arms-length). Figure 1.3 shows estimates of δk pertaining to imports. The figure demon-
strates that transitions are associated with sizeable increases in both related-party and arms-
length intermediate imports. This evidence suggests significant substitution between foreign
imports and domestic employment.1516
In order to attach a causal interpretation to these results, one would need to assume that
the assignment to treatment (transitioning to a multinational status) is random conditional
on the large set of observables we use in constructing the controls. On the one hand, after
conditioning on this set of size, industry, and age categories, the residual variation may be
small enough to make this assumption plausible. On the other hand, there may yet be
unobserved covariates that are correlated with the treatment allocation, and thus we prefer
to characterize these results as highly suggestive rather than directly causal.
1.2.2.3 Why multinationals?
The stylized facts above demonstrated that multinationals have a consistent negative
employment growth rate differential, and that establishments transitioning into multinational
15Although the pre-transition levels are slightly higher for the arms-length imports, which suggests that
the set of controls does not completely equivalize characteristics between the transitioning and control plants,
the differences are small and trends are flat prior to the period of transition. As most transitions into
multinational plants are by plants that belong to exporting/importing firms, and we do not condition on
export status in creating a control group, the slight difference in arms-length imports is unsurprising.
16We demonstrate the robustness of this result to alternative specifications of firm-level trade in Appendix
A.2.
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status reduce their employment while their parent firms increase their imports. But is it
the ownership (partial or total) of establishments abroad that leads to such employment
declines? Or is it simply supply chain restructuring through foreign sourcing of inputs?17 In
other words, why multinationals?
To assess the role of supply chain restructuring overall relative to that occurring within
multinationals, we re-run our analysis in Section 1.2.2.2, but consider non-multinational
importer transitions instead of the multinational transitions. Intuitively, if the presence of
any arms length imports are a sufficient indicator of significant supply chain restructuring,
employment in these transitioning establishments should display a similar time-path to the
multinational transitions in Figure 1.2. The results for employment growth differentials
relative to a control group – consisting of non-multinational domestic firms based on the
narrowly-defined cells of establishment characteristics as before – are shown in Figure 1.4.
Clearly, these establishments do not display such persistent relative employment differentials.
This evidence rules out the hypothesis that the presence of some arms-length imports is
sufficient to predict relative employment declines. Further, we note that multinationals
import the vast majority (over 90% on average) of intermediate inputs in our sample, as
shown in Table 1.11 and discussed in the next section.18 The importing transitions here
therefore assess employment outcomes at firms that are primarily importing final goods, or
importing small quantities of intermediates. This could account for the lack of employment
differentials, as the degree of supply chain restructuring is minimal.19 In fact, the tight
overlap between foreign sourcing of intermediates and multinationals does not permit us to
separately identify a multinational employment effect from the employment effects of foreign
sourcing.
17In supply chain restructuring, we include restructuring within firms sourcing only at arms-length.
18This pattern is robust to excluding foreign multinationals from our sample.
19We do not separate the non-multinational importer transitions into new importers of intermediates and
new importers of final goods, as we did not base the core analysis around multinational transitions along
these lines.
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Why is foreign sourcing of intermediates concentrated in multinationals? Our data per-
mit a closer look at whether there is a relationship between inter and intra-firm imports
which lead to a greater degree of overall global production sharing in multinationals. While
the share of related-party imports of multinationals is not significantly different to that of
arms-length (roughly 53 vs 47 percent on average in our sample), perhaps there exist comple-
mentarities between intra- and inter-firm imports. We explore this hypothesis by estimating
the following regression for the sample period 1993-2011:
log IMPALijkt = αijt + γkt + β log IMP
RP
ijkt + ijkt. (1.3)
Here i is the firm, j is the partner country, k is the product code, and t is time. Hence,
the αijt are firm-country-time fixed effects and the γkt are product-time fixed effects. The
β coefficient then captures the extent to which a firm’s AL and RP imports scale together,
after absorbing common time-varying firm-by-country, or product shocks.
The results from this regression confirm that sourcing inputs within the firm in a partic-
ular foreign location induces more arms-length sourcing as well — even in narrowly defined
product categories. This complementarity helps explain the concentration of imports within
multinationals in our sample (see Table 1.7), and is presumably the reason their supply chain
restructuring is large enough to show large employment effects. Underlying explanations for
this finding could include network effects that enable firm sourcing closely related products
from suppliers in the same countries both at arms-length or intra-firm, or lower fixed costs of
joint arms-length/related-party imports than of each approach separately. We incorporate
the last dimension in our structural model in the following section.
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1.2.2.4 Linking firm-level employment to imports
In the next section, we will specify a structural model to causally link employment out-
comes to foreign sourcing at the firm-level. Why do we not explore this mechanism using
a reduced form specification with firm level employment regressed on imports, with appro-
priate instruments to capture foreign supply shocks? The reason is simple: given our data,
it is difficult to construct an instrument with predictive power for firm-level imports that is
also uncorrelated with firm size. For instance, a commonly used instrument is the “World
Export Supply” measure, which captures supply shocks in a partner country (see Acemoglu
et al. (2014) for an application to U.S. industries and Hummels et al. (2014) for a firm-level
application in Denmark). Constructing this instrument with predictive power at the firm-
level requires weights based on variation in the products and countries from which the firm
sources. However, such weights induce a correlation with firm size because size is tightly
linked to firm sourcing patterns.20 Similar arguments apply to other commonly used instru-
ments such as transport costs (larger firms with more sourcing destinations will source from
farther away) and tariffs (larger firms are more likely to import from countries outside of a
free trade agreement). One could use these instruments with the hope that firm size controls
purge the instrument of this correlation, but whether this is so would remain questionable.
1.3 A Framework of Offshoring
We next build a structural model featuring firms’ choices of supply chain structure to
explore whether foreign sourcing can explain the observed changes in employment. Firms
can select a sourcing location for their intermediates, as well as a sourcing mode: whether to
produce intra-firm or to source from outside the firm. Intra-firm production abroad is the
20Hummels et al. (2014) do not face this problem as they have detailed worker-level information within
firms, which identifies their wage effects. Unfortunately, we do not have worker-level information.
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defining characteristic of a multinational in this model, reflecting the vertical supply chain
structure of U.S. multinationals in our data. Much of the literature assumes perfect technol-
ogy transfer within a firm or to its suppliers, but empirical evidence for this assumption is
lacking. We therefore adopt a more general specification that allows for imperfect technology
transfer across sourcing locations and modes.
We show that the model’s predictions for the relationship between domestic employment
and imports of intermediates depends only on a single structural constant, which is a function
of two elasticities. We estimate this structural constant using the microdata at our disposal
and find strong evidence that imports of intermediates substitute for domestic employment.
Note that the model in this section is partial equilibrium in the sense that it describes only
the manufacturing sector in the Home (U.S.) economy. The next section embeds this partial
equilibrium framework in a multi-country general equilibrium model.
1.3.1 Demand for Manufacturing Goods
The consumer derives utility from a constant elasticity of substitution bundle of differ-
entiated manufacturing goods and allocates a fraction of income E to the purchase of this
bundle. Let x (ω) and p (ω) denote the quantity and price of a variety ω. Taking prices as










subject to the constraint ∫
ω∈Ω
p (ω)x (ω) dω = E.
The parameter σ is the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing goods, Ω is the set
of varieties produced in the country and s (ω) is a variety-specific weight. Notice that the
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final manufacturing varieties are not traded. From the first order conditions of this problem,
we obtain the demand functions
x (ω) = s (ω)EP σ−1X p (ω)
−σ (1.5)




s (ω) p (ω)1−σ dω
 11−σ . (1.6)
1.3.2 Firms
There is a mass M of monopolistically competitive firms. We assume that these firms are
heterogeneous along three dimensions: the weight assigned to their variety s, the vector of
fixed costs f (discussed further below), and the scalar ϕ, which broadly captures the firm’s
productivity. We refer to ϕ as the firm’s type, and discuss the precise mapping between ϕ
and firm productivity below.21 A firm is therefore fully described by the tuple (ϕ, f , s).22
Each firm uses a unit continuum of intermediates, indexed ν, in the production of their
unique variety. The production function is
x (ϕ, f , s) =
 1∫
0







Hence, the intermediates are imperfect substitutes with production elasticity of substitution
ρ. Letting p (ν, ϕ, f , s) denote the price of variety ν for firm (ϕ, f , s), cost minimization in
21Note that type here does not refer to quality. Rather, we use it as an index of a firm that is related to
firm productivity.
22Each firm produces a variety ω, so the tuple describes the variety ω. For brevity, we suppress the index
ω for the rest of this section.
19
competitive markets implies that the unit cost of x (ϕ, f , s) is
c (ϕ, f , s) =
 1∫
0





The demand shifter s does not impact the firm’s supply chain structure and therefore we
drop this index unless it is necessary for clarity.
1.3.2.1 Supply chains
As we observe both significant arms-length and intra-firm intermediate input imports
in the data, we allow firms the choice of integrated or arms-length sourcing within each
location decision. Sourcing inside the firm is indicated by I and sourcing outside the firm
by O. Consistent with our classification above, we distinguish among three possible sourcing
locations, Home (H), developing (S), and developed (N). Hence, the elements of the set J
of possible sourcing locations and modes for any variety are
1. inside the firm, at home (HI),
2. from a domestic supplier (HO),
3. at arms length from a developed country (NO),
4. inside the firm in a developed country (NI),
5. at arms length from a developing country (SO),
6. inside the firm in a developing country (SI).
We model the firm’s problem as follows. First, the firm chooses its sourcing strategy
J (ϕ, f), a subset of J . For each intermediate ν, the firm receives a price quote from each
element in this set. The benefit of a larger sourcing strategy is therefore a wider range
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of price quotes resulting in lower input costs. On the other hand, each sourcing strategy
requires an ex-ante fixed cost payment. Given their type, firms select the best option among
these combinations of production efficiencies and fixed cost payments. The optimal choice
of sourcing strategy will be discussed in greater detail below. For now we assume that the
set J (ϕ, f) is given.
Intermediate goods production Let j denote an element of firm (ϕ, f)’s sourcing strat-
egy J (ϕ, f). Intermediates in sourcing location/mode j are produced with production func-
tion23
xj (ν, ϕ) =
hj (ϕ)
aj (ν)
lj (ν, ϕ) . (1.9)
The function hj (ϕ) determines the mapping from the firm’s type ϕ to the productivity of its
supplier in j. To allow for maximal generality, we initially make no assumption on the forms
of hj, j ∈ J (ϕ, f), except that they are weakly increasing. We refer to hj as the technology
transfer functions. Notice that our specification nests the common assumption of perfect
idiosyncratic technology transfer (hj (ϕ) = ϕ), for all j ∈ J .
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), the input efficiencies 1/aj (ν) are drawn from the Frechet
distribution with location parameter Tj and dispersion parameter θ. That is, Pr (aj (ν) < a) =
1−e−Tjaθ . While we do not explicitly model contracting frictions or other reasons that affect
whether firms integrate or source at arms-length, we allow the parameters Tj to vary across
sourcing modes.24 This assumption accommodates a number of real-world features, for in-
stance, that arms-length suppliers in the South may have poorer quality than those that
would commonly integrate with a U.S. multinational. In that case TSO < TSI , implying, on
average, lower productivity draws 1/aSO (ν) than 1/aSI (ν).
23We assume that labor is the primary input into production. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas function of
capital and labor would not affect our results.
24See for instance Antra`s (2005), Antra`s and Helpman (2004) and Antra`s and Chor (2013) among others
for theories of intra-firm production.
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Suppose the inverse productivity draws aj (ν) have materialized. Then, taking prices as




− lj (ν, ϕ)wj (1.10)
subject to the production function (1.9). Here, wj and τj denote wages and iceberg transport
costs. If the quantity demanded is positive and finite, optimality requires that the potential
producer sets price equal to marginal cost




We assume that wHI = wHO = wH and τHI = τHO = 1.
1.3.2.2 Basic model implications
Faced with price quotes from every location/mode in their sourcing strategy J (ϕ, f),
firms select the cheapest source for each intermediate ν. The distributional assumption
together with basic algebra implies that the share of intermediates sourced from j is the
same as the cost share of inputs from j, and equals







Clearly locations/modes with greater Tj will have larger sourcing shares. Note that χj (ϕ, f)
depends on the firm’s type ϕ as long as hj 6= hk for some j, k ∈ J (ϕ). We present evidence for
systematic relationship between the sourcing shares and firm type below. Since the sourcing
shares depend on the sourcing strategy J (ϕ, f), they also depend on the fixed cost draws f
that a firm must pay to set up its supply chain.
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Optimal input sourcing also implies that the unit cost function (1.8) becomes
c (ϕ, f) = (γ)
1










1−ρ and Γ is the gamma function, and






Equation 1.14 summarizes the firm’s efficiency at producing its unique variety. We refer to
this term as the firm’s (overall) production efficiency. As is intuitive, firms of higher types
and firms with more sourcing locations/modes have greater values of Φ and lower unit costs.
Notice that neither the cost shares (1.12) nor the unit costs depend on the quantity the firm
produces.
We next turn to the problem determining the firm’s optimal size. Given its unit costs,
the firm chooses the price for its product to maximize flow profits
p˜i (ϕ, f) = p (ϕ, f)x (ϕ, f)− c (ϕ, f)x (ϕ, f) (1.15)
subject to the demand function (2.8). The firm optimally sets its price to a constant markup
over marginal cost, p (ϕ, f) = σ
σ−1c (ϕ, f). It is then possible to express revenues as










θ E is a constant. In particular, the elasticity of firm revenues (a
measure of firm size) with respect to production efficiency Φ is σ−1
θ
. As we will see below,
this structural constant is critical for the employment consequences of foreign sourcing.
23
1.3.2.3 The choice of the firm’s sourcing strategy
Prior to selecting its sourcing strategy the firm learns its type ϕ and its vector of fixed cost
draws f . In this partial equilibrium version of the model, we assume that domestic sourcing
(HI and HO) does not require a fixed cost payment. In contrast, selecting a sourcing strategy
J 6= {HI,HO} requires payment of a fixed cost fJ . The vector f is comprised of 16 fixed cost
draws, one for each J in the power set of {NO,NI,SO,SI}.
After learning ϕ and f , the firm selects its sourcing strategy J ⊂ J to maximize expected




P σ−1X [Φ (ϕ, f)]
− 1
θ − wHfJ . (1.17)
Here, wH is the wage in the Home country and fixed costs are expressed in units of labor. E is
the expectations operator over the distribution of s. Recall that s is a firm-specific demand
shifter. We assume that the realization of s is unknown at the time the firm chooses its
sourcing strategy. This assumption captures the uncertainty a firm faces between setting up
its production structure and selling its product to the final consumer. The demand shifter s
helps interpret the structural error in the estimation below. We assume that s is independent
of both the firm’s type ϕ and its fixed costs f . We also assume that ϕ and f are independent.
The solution to this problem is the firm’s optimal sourcing strategy J (ϕ, f) which depends
on its type and its fixed cost draws. Figure ?? illustrates the stages of the firm’s problem.
1.3.3 Implications for Domestic Employment
We next turn to the model’s predictions for the relationship between firms’ domestic
employment and foreign sourcing. It is easily shown that the labor demanded by firm
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(ϕ, f , s) with sourcing strategy J (ϕ, f) is








Φ (ϕ, f)︸ ︷︷ ︸













θ . Since the model is Ricardian in nature, intermediates that are
produced at Home inside the firm reflect the firm’s “comparative advantage” of interme-
diate production relative to other sourcing options within its sourcing strategy. The term
lHI (ϕ, f , s) is the labor required for this production.
Consider an increase in foreign competitiveness, for instance through greater values of
Tj or lower wages wj, j 6= HI,HO. In partial equilibrium, that is, for fixed expenditures
E on manufacturing goods, a constant Home wage wH , and a fixed manufacturing price
index PX , this increase in foreign competitiveness affects lHI (ϕ, f , s) only through a change
in Φ. Whether domestic employment rises or falls depends on the relative strength of two
channels.
First, increased foreign competitiveness shifts a greater fraction of intermediate produc-
tion towards that location — a reallocation effect. This decreases χHI and reduces labor
demand. On the other hand, greater foreign competitiveness increases the firm’s optimal size
through an increase in production efficiency Φ. This has a positive effect on labor demand.
While the elasticity of χHI with respect to production efficiency Φ is −1, the elasticity of firm
size with respect to Φ is σ−1
θ
, as is also evident in the expression for revenues (equation 1.16).
The net effect on employment therefore depends on the sign of σ−1
θ
− 1. If it is negative, the
model implies that the reallocation effect dominates and employment declines.
Notice that the same condition characterizes the firm’s labor demand after a change
in its sourcing strategy, perhaps due to lower fixed costs. If the firm adds an additional
location/mode to its set J (ϕ, f), Φ rises and the firm’s labor demand falls if and only if
25
σ − 1− θ < 0.
Hence in partial equilibrium, the sign of σ−1−θ completely characterizes the within-firm
domestic employment response. If σ− 1− θ > 0, one would expect recent productivity gains
in emerging markets to increase U.S. manufacturing employment in firms that source from
abroad. In contrast, if σ − 1 − θ < 0, these same productivity gains should have led to job
losses within these firms. We next estimate the value of this key structural constant using
microdata on firm sourcing patterns.
1.3.4 Structural Estimation
Combining equations (1.12) and (1.18), the firm’s labor demand at home (scaled by
wHI/χHI and logged) can be expressed as
ln
wHI lHI (ϕ, f , s)
χHI (ϕ, f)
= Ψj − σ − 1
θ
lnχj (ϕ, f) + (σ − 1) lnhj (ϕ) + ln s, j ∈ J ⊂ J (1.19)
Here, Ψj is a fixed effect that contains only constants independent of the firm characteristics
(ϕ, f , s).
The intuition behind the estimating equation (1.19) is closely related to the scale and
reallocation effects discussed above. Since the model predicts that the reallocation effect is
independent of parameters (recall that the elasticity of lHI with respect to χHI is one), it
is sufficient to estimate the scale effect. We can do so by focusing on wHI lHI
χHI
rather than
labor demand directly. It is easily verified that this ratio is proportional to firm revenues.
Note that the intuition behind this estimating equation is closely related to the key insight
of Blaum et al. (2015), who show that knowledge of firm domestic expenditure shares and
revenues is sufficient to measure decreases in unit costs due to imported inputs in a large class
of models of importing firms.25 Here our equation implies that knowledge of the cost shares
25Our model falls in this class, and we extend this insight further to all cost shares of a particular firm.In
contrast to Blaum et al. (2015), our estimation strategy uses all the cost shares of the firm rather than only
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of the firm and firm revenues (or expenditure on domestic labor) is sufficient to estimate the
scale effect.
Suppose for the moment that hj (ϕ) was observed. Then, under the assumptions made
on s, (in particular, that it is independent of type ϕ, and fixed costs f , and that it is revealed
to the firm only after sourcing decisions are made,) the parameters in equation (1.19) could
be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares. Controlling for the remaining variables,
−σ−1
θ
captures the scale effect. Intuitively, a smaller share χj reflects greater production
efficiency resulting in greater firm scale. In contrast, large shares imply a smaller scale.
Unfortunately, hj (ϕ) is not observed and the estimation of (1.19) when hj (ϕ) is subsumed
into the error term yields a biased estimate of −σ−1
θ
. If χj (ϕ, f) is positively correlated with
hj (ϕ), then the estimate of −σ−1θ is biased upward. Conversely, if χj (ϕ, f) is negatively
correlated with hj (ϕ), the estimate of −σ−1θ is biased downward.
The model implies that, conditional on a particular sourcing strategy J , the terms
χj (ϕ, f) and hj (ϕ), j ∈ J cannot all be positively or all be negatively correlated. The
reason is that the sum of a firm’s shares over all locations/modes in its sourcing strategy
must be one. Therefore, if there exists a sourcing location/mode j ∈ J (ϕ, f) for which the
share χj (ϕ, f) is increasing in firm type ϕ, some other share, say χk (ϕ, f), k ∈ J , k 6= j,
must be decreasing in ϕ. The estimation of (1.19) by OLS therefore does deliver useful
information about σ−1
θ
. If we condition on a particular sourcing strategy J and estimate
(1.19) for all j ∈ J , the true value must (asymptotically) lie between the highest and the
lowest estimate.
This bounding procedure can be refined further, and provides us with a range for the
structural constant. We discuss the relevant details in Appendix A.3. Our first approach to
learn about σ−1
θ
is to compute the tightest possible bounds, which are reported in the next
section.
the domestic cost share, which helps us bound σ−1θ in the absence of known firm productivity.
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While the bounds we obtain are useful, a point estimate of σ−1
θ
is naturally preferable.
Indeed, under certain conditions it is possible to express ϕ in terms of observables in equation
(1.19) and to estimate σ−1
θ
directly. By dividing two sourcing shares from m and k, m 6= k,













We next define ηm,k (ϕ) = hm (ϕ) /hk (ϕ). If ηm,k is invertible, a point we return to below,
then it is possible to rewrite (1.19) for all j and m 6= k as
ln
wHI lHI (ϕ, f)
χHI (ϕ, f)
= Ψj− σ − 1
θ














This estimation equation is an instance of a partially linear model. It contains the linear
component with regressor lnχj (ϕ, f) and a second component of unknown functional form
which only depends on the observed ratio χm (ϕ, f) /χk (ϕ, f).
A number of semiparametric methods have been developed to consistently estimate σ−1
θ
in equation (1.21).26 Below we report the results for two approaches. First, we approximate
the unknown function of χm (ϕ) /χk (ϕ) by a truncated series expansion (see, e.g. Andrews,
1991), using polynomials as basis functions. Second, we approximate the unknown function
of χm/χk with a step function.
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A necessary condition in the derivation of equation (1.21) is that the function ηm,k (ϕ) =
hm (ϕ) /hk (ϕ) is invertible. If this were not the case, the ratio of shares χm/χk would not
provide useful information about the firm’s type. It turns out that although hm and hk are
26Notice that the constant σ−1θ is identified when we control nonparametrically for the function hj (ϕ).
Clearly, under the assumptions made above, the error term ln s is orthogonal to the regressors. Additionally,
if fixed costs vary across firms, the share χj (ϕ, f) is not collinear with hj (ϕ).
27More precisely, we partition the range of χm/χk into fifty percentiles and define fifty indicator variables
taking the value one if χm/χk falls between two consecutive percentiles. We then replace the unknown
function of χm/χk in equation (1.21) by a step function based on these fifty indicator variables.
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unknown, our prior analysis allows us to tell whether ηm,k is invertible. To see this, consider
the following procedure. First, fix a particular sourcing strategy J . Next, estimate equation
(1.19) separately for all j ∈ J . Denote by m the sourcing location/mode for which the largest
(most upward-biased) estimate of −σ−1
θ
is obtained and by k the sourcing location/mode
for which the smallest (most downward-biased) estimate of −σ−1
θ
is obtained. It then must
be that the ratio χm/χk is strictly increasing in ϕ and that ηm,k (ϕ) is invertible (equation
1.20). Notice that if the highest and lowest estimates of −σ−1
θ
from the procedure above are
very close together, then ηm,k is not invertible, but the bias of −σ−1θ is negligibly small.
Finally, we discuss two practical issues regarding the estimation of −σ−1
θ
. To allay con-
cerns about measurement error in the shares χj, we estimate several specifications using
the firm’s shares from the previous year as instruments. For robustness, we also estimate
equations (1.19) and (1.21) after replacing the left hand side variable with the log of firm
revenues (recall that the model predicts that revenues are proportional to wHI lHI
χHI
).
Linking the Model and the Data
The structural estimation requires data on firm revenues and cost shares from the various
sourcing methods j ∈ J (ϕ). Revenues and cost share information are constructed from the
Census of Manufacturers (CMF) merged with import information from the LFTTD. For
revenues, we use the total value of shipments of the firm’s manufacturing establishments.
Total costs are constructed from information on the cost of materials inputs, firm inter-
plant transfers and total machinery expenditures of the firm. We identify intermediate input
imports of the firms using a product-level classification method based on the firm’s industry.
This method is discussed in detail in appendix A.1.4 and in Boehm et al. (2014a).
We use lagged values of the cost shares as instruments in robustness exercises. As the
Census is quinquennial and only available in 1997, 2002 and 2007, the lagged values have
to be constructed using data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) in 1996,
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2001 and 2006. The ASM includes information on all large manufacturing establishments,
but is not a complete sample of the smaller plants. Therefore we first construct a firm
level total cost using establishments sampled in the ASM, and then scale up this variable
using the information on total employment captured within the ASM relative to the total
employment in our baseline sample. As our baseline sample is built from the LBD, it contains
information on all manufacturing establishments of a firm in a year. The assumption implicit
in this procedure is that the firm’s cost function is the same across the establishments not
captured by the ASM as it is in the surveyed portion of the firm.28 Table 1.10 contains mean
cost shares for multinationals sourcing from all locations for the three Census years in our
sample.
1.3.4.1 Results and Discussion
We estimate the model in three separate cross-sections in 1997, 2002 and 2007. We find
that our estimates of σ−1
θ
are remarkably robust both to the method used and to the time
period. Table 1.8 presents the bounds on σ−1
θ
by year. As discussed in detail in Appendix
A.3 our procedure implies a large number of bounds. To reduce the likelihood of statistical
outliers, we report the 80th percentile lower and upper bounds.29 The widest interval for
σ−1
θ
is (0, 0.86] in 2002, implying the true parameter value is likely in the range where foreign
sourcing is a substitute for domestic employment in a firm.
Prior to estimating σ−1
θ
using a semi-parametric regression, we must first show that there
indeed exists a function ηm,k that is invertible. In Appendix A.3, we show that χHO is strictly
increasing and χHI is strictly decreasing in ϕ. This implies that ηHO,HI is invertible. When
28The survey methodology of the ASM assigns lower sampling weights to the smallest manufacturing
plants. Therefore, if the unit costs of the firm differ across its establishments in a manner correlated with size,
this assumption would be invalid. As this assumption only affects the value of instruments for cost shares,
it will not bias our results as the instrument remains valid – the cost shares of the missing establishments
are unlikely to be systematically correlated with the structural error in the model.
29This primarily affects the lower bound, as the upper bound in all estimates is always zero from the
theoretical restriction on σ−1θ .
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estimating equation (1.21), we therefore control for the unknown term using polynomials or
step functions in χHO
χHI
.
Table 1.9 presents the baseline results for 1997, 2002 and 2007 using (a) polynomials as
basis functions and (b) fifty dummy variables representing size bins. The lower panel of the
table contains results for the same specifications with the cost shares instrumented by lagged
values.30 The point estimates obtained for each year and specification lie within the bounds
in Table 1.8. The estimates range from 0.08 to 0.23, confirming that foreign sourcing is a
strong substitute for domestic employment for the firms we study. The results are robust to
using revenues instead of scaled payroll as a dependent variable (see Table A.3.3). We further
estimate σ−1
θ
by industry, to allow for sector-level differences in the scale effect. A kernel
density of the estimates is shown in Figure 1.6. While the industry level estimates vary, for
our sample of manufacturing industries they are never larger than one, implying that foreign
sourcing is a substitute for domestic employment for all manufacturing industries.
In contrast to our estimates, Antra`s et al. (2014) find that σ−1
θ
is larger than one. While
closely related, their model includes a much larger set of sourcing locations, and does not
distinguish between arms-length and related party imports. Further, they estimate σ and
θ separately within their framework. Our model implies that estimation of the ratio σ−1
θ
is
sufficient for understanding the role of foreign sourcing on employment, and our more aggre-
gated structure offers a parsimonious method to estimate this structural constant. Antra`s
et al. (2014) also include data from several non-manufacturing sectors in their estimation
procedure, which likely contributes to the difference in findings. Non-manufacturing sectors
might have a stronger scale effect, which could result in complementarity between foreign
sourcing and domestic employment.31 We note that there is a large literature that has es-
30We also include estimates for 1993, which is not a Census year. Due to incomplete LFTTD data for
1992, we are unable to instrument the 1993 regressions.
31In future work, we hope to explore the differences in the impact of foreign sourcing on manufacturing
and services sectors.
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timated both parameters separately in various contexts, and the range of estimates is wide.
Our estimates, as well as those in Antra`s et al. (2014) are consistent with earlier findings.32
1.3.5 Aggregation
We briefly explore the aggregate implications of our empirical model (1.21) in partial
equilibrium. To do so, we consider the population of U.S. manufacturing firms in 1997 and
predict the aggregate employment decline implied by the difference in their sourcing shares
between 1997 and 2007 and our estimates of σ−1
θ
. We use an estimate of 0.2, which is at
the upper end of our range of estimates. In this exercise we predict employment changes
within firms sourcing from abroad, and first-order effects on their U.S. arms-length suppliers
(sourcing from HO).
This procedure requires that we observe firms in both 1997 and 2007. It therefore cannot
account for the declines in employment due to offshoring in firms that exited before 2007.
Further, it underestimates the intensive margin effect in continuing firms, as some firm
identifiers in the data change even though these firms continue to exist.
All else equal, this exercise suggests that 1.3 million jobs were lost due to foreign sourcing.
Of this, 0.55 million jobs were lost within multinationals, and the remainder of the losses are
due to declines in multinational demand for arms-length sourcing in the U.S. (0.58 million),
as well as foreign sourcing by non-multinational firms. To account for general equilibrium
effects such as firm entry and changes in aggregate demand, we next turn to a simple general
equilibrium extension of our model.
32In particular, Eaton and Kortum (2002) estimate θ = 8.28 as a baseline. Other estimates include
Caliendo and Parro (2015), whose estimates range from 0.37 to 51.08 using sector-level data on manufac-
turing. In these papers, θ is also the trade elasticity. In our setup, the trade elasticity has a more complex
expression. Estimates of σ as the markup in monopolistic competition models usually center around 4 (Hall ,




1.4.1 A general equilibrium extension
The simple model in this section aims to capture general equilibrium features such as firm
entry and exit as well as adjustments in aggregate demand driven by changes in the price
index of manufactured goods. We should note that we do not present a quantitative trade
model that can capture several real-world features such as increases in foreign demand for
U.S. manufactured goods. Given the data availability on foreign multinationals, particularly
in developing countries, such a model would be extremely hard to calibrate. Rather than
fitting the aggregate employment decline, our goal in this section is therefore to explore
the quantitative importance of foreign sourcing of intermediates using the simplest possible
framework.
Consistent with the sourcing structure in partial equilibrium, we assume a three country
world, with the countries labeled Home (H), North (N) and South (S). Since the North
and the South have the same economic structure, we only present the optimization problems
for the North. In addition to the manufacturing sector X, there is a large absorbing sector
which produces a freely traded good Z in each country. We normalize its price to unity.
Home country
Households The representative household in the Home country derives utility from the
consumption of X and Z. It supplies LH units of labor inelastically. The household max-
imizes utility ZβHX
1−β subject to its budget constraint wHLH = PXX + ZH . Here, ZH
is Home consumption of the numeraire good. The Cobb-Douglas utility function implies
that the Home consumer spends E = (1− β)wHLH on the manufacturing good X and the
remainder on Z.
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Firms in the Z sector Firms in the freely-traded sector produce with linear technology
QZH = AHL
Z
H . Profit maximization in competitive markets implies that wH = AH as long as
QZH is strictly positive and finite.
Firms in the X sector Firms in the X sector set up supply chains and produce as
described in Section 2.4. In this general equilibrium extension we assume that the number of
firms is endogenous and determined by the following entry problem which has three stages.
In the first stage, there is an unbounded mass of potential entrants who can pay fixed costs
fE to learn their type ϕ. In equilibrium, the number of entrants M is determined by a zero
expected profit condition. Second, after learning their types, entrants must pay an additional
fixed cost fH to set up production in the Home country. Only firms with sufficiently high
types ϕ find it profitable to do so. The lowest type that enters is ϕLB. Finally, those firms
that produce in the Home country face the problem discussed in Section 2.4.








[lHI (ϕ, s) + lHO (ϕ, s)] dGϕ (ϕ) dGs (s)





Labor demand on the right hand side consists of demand from the Z sector, demand from
the X sector (the first integral) and the labor demand stemming from the various fixed costs.
This notation assumes that f{HI,HO} = 0.
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North
The representative household in the North derives utility only from the freely traded
good Z, and supplies LN units of labor inelastically.
33 Its budget constraint is wNLN = ZN .
As in the Home country, the production function for good Z is linear, QZN = ANL
Z
N . Labor








[lNI (ϕ, s) + lNO (ϕ, s)] dGϕ (ϕ) dGs (s) . (1.23)
We close the model with the market clearing condition for good Z,








While the model permits very general sourcing patterns across locations/modes, we find
that only a few of these are prevalent in the data. In fact, similar to Antra`s et al. (2014),
there are regularities in sourcing locations/modes of the following form. First, very few
firms source from abroad. Of the ones that do, most firms only import from the North at
arms-length. Second, if a firm sources intra-firm from the North, then it is likely to also
source from the North at arms-length. A similar pattern can be observed for imports from
the South. Firms that source from all locations are typically the largest in terms of revenues.
Given these regularities and the fact that we are interested in sourcing decisions of multi-
nationals, we restrict the equilibrium sourcing strategies to the set
J˜ = {(HO,HI) , (HO,HI,NO) , (HO,HI,NO,NI) , (HO,HI,NO,NI,SO) , (HO,HI,NO,NI,SO,SI)}.
33We make this assumption for simplicity as we are primarily interested in manufacturing employment in
the Home country. There is no final goods trade in the X sector.
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Table 1.11 shows the fraction of firms in the data that source according to each of these
strategies. Despite this restriction we capture almost all firms (92.6% in 1997) and almost
all trade (95.3% in 1997).34
Our calibration procedure proceeds in two steps. We first set a number of parameters
equal to their direct analogues in the data or to conventional values in the literature. Second,
we choose the remaining parameters to match key features of employment and imports in
the manufacturing sector.
The productivity parameters AH , AN , and AS are chosen to match skill-adjusted wages
for the U.S., the average country in the North, and the average country in the South. Wage
data are obtained from the ILO and skill adjusted using the method in Eaton and Kortum
(2002). We define the South as countries with GDP per capita of less than 10 percent of the
U.S. in 2000. This threshold implies that China, India, and Brazil belong to the South. The
labor endowment in all three countries are set to match the skill-adjusted labor force, taken
from the same source.
We next assume that firm types have a Pareto distribution with a lower bound of unity
and curvature parameter αϕ. The demand elasticity σ is set to 2.3 and the dispersion
parameter θ to 6. These values imply that (σ − 1) /θ is 0.217, roughly consistent with the
upper end of our point estimates. We also set τH = 1 and τN = τS = 1.15. Although these
parameters are not important for any of the model’s predictions, we note that ρ is set to
1.5 and E [s] to 1.0025. Finally, we must assume a functional form for hj (ϕ). We choose a
simple exponential, hj (ϕ) = ϕ
κj . We note that this choice provides a reasonable fit to the
mid-range of the firm size distribution (see Appendix A.3 for a discussion). We set κHI to
one, and choose values for κj, j 6= HI that are close to κHI .35 Table 1.12 summarizes the
34This restriction of sourcing strategies greatly facilitates the numerical solution and calibration of the
model because it implies a complete ordering of the sourcing strategies and that higher types choose more
complex sourcing strategies.
35The exponential assumption is only an approximation to the true functional form of hj . We therefore
have minimal guidance on calibrating these parameters. Choosing values close to 1 ensures these parameters
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values of the preset parameters.
The remaining parameters of the model are chosen to match key features of our data in
1997. These parameters are Tj, j ∈ J , j 6= HI, the fixed cost parameters fJ , J ⊂ J˜ , fE,
and fH , the Pareto curvature parameter αϕ as well as the expenditure share β. The targets
and the fit of the model in equilibrium are summarized in Table 1.13.
1.4.3 Quantitative exercises
We consider two types of quantitative exercises. First, we compute the employment
changes in the model when we change various productivity and fixed cost parameters indi-
vidually, by an infinitesimal amount. Second, we fit the model to aggregate trade patterns
and firm sourcing strategies in 2007, and compute the implied change in the size of the
manufacturing sector relative to 1997.
The first panel of Table 1.14 reports the percent change of manufacturing employment
and multinational employment when the technology parameters Tj, j ∈ {NO,NI, SO, SI}
are changed by one percent, one at a time. In response to changes in each of these parameters,
aggregate manufacturing employment falls.
The general equilibrium effects of these parameter changes are evident in the response
of the manufacturing price index, the changes in the mass of firms M and the movement of
firms between different sourcing strategies (not shown). As expected, the price index always
falls in response to a technological improvement that lowers the unit costs of firms whose
sourcing strategy includes that location/mode. Better technology in one particular sourcing
location/mode also induces transitions of firms into sourcing strategies that include that
location/mode. Similar to the standard Melitz (2003) model, firms of the lowest types face
lower demand as a result of the lowered cost for higher type firms. Therefore, the net effect on
will not significantly influence the quantitative analysis. For robustness, Appendix A.4, presents the results
from the quantitative exercises with alternate choices for κj .
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the mass of firms M is ambiguous. Importantly, for our calibration the general equilibrium
effects do not overturn the partial equilibrium result that foreign sourcing substitutes for
domestic employment.
Turning to multinational employment, two offsetting effects are in play. As shown in the
partial equilibrium model in Section 2.4, production of intermediates is reallocated towards
the location/mode with the technological improvement. However, this effect can be offset by
the movement of firms into or out of strategies with that sourcing location/mode. The net
effect is therefore ambiguous. For our calibration the second effect implies that multinational
employment rises as TNI increases.
The second panel of Table 1.14 shows the employment change in response to lowered
fixed costs for each sourcing strategy fJ . With the exception of fNI , the sign of the response
of employment is the same as in the case of a technological improvement. Here, the result is
driven by the extensive margin: firms enter the sourcing strategy that has lower fixed costs,
reducing domestic employment in response. As above, in most cases general equilibrium
effects do not change the predictions in partial equilibrium.36 The changes in multinational
employment are governed by the transition of firms between sourcing strategies. In the case
of a decrease in fNI non-multinational firms enter multinational status, leading to an increase
in multinational employment. In contrast, decreases in fSO and fSI largely induce firms to
switch between sourcing strategies while maintaining their multinational status.
In our second exercise, we first fix the parameters αϕ and β. We then choose the remaining
parameters Tj, j ∈ {HO,HI,NO,NI, SO, SI}, fJ , J ∈ J , and fH to match 2007 import
patterns, firm shares and the mean share of intermediates sourced from HO for the group
of multinationals sourcing from all locations. Notice, we do not include any employment
targets – our goal is to understand the decline in manufacturing generated by the model
36In response to a decrease in fNI , the fraction of firms with J = {HO,HI,NO,NI} increases substantially.
However, the mass of firms also increases in equilibrium, and the lower bound for entry falls (so entering
firms are less productive). The net result is an increase in overall employment.
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simply by matching observed import patterns. Table 1.13 illustrates the fit of our model to
our calibration targets for 1997 and 2007.37
To match the observed trade patterns in 2007 the technology parameters Tj, j ∈ {HO,HI,NO,NI, SO, SI}
uniformly increase. This is shown in Table 1.15. TSO and TSI increase the most, reflecting
the fact that imports from the South grew rapidly over the period 1997 - 2007. Although the
fraction of multinationals increased over this time period, fixed costs of sourcing strategies
increase between our two calibrations. In this model, firms respond to better technology
abroad by entering the sourcing strategies that include foreign sourcing. To match the data
– where the fraction of firms in these sourcing strategies has only shown small increases –
the model has one counterbalancing force. Fixed costs increase to prevent the fraction of
multinationals from rising beyond what is observed in the data. While this might appear
counterintuitive, we note that this rise in fixed costs might reflect more complex production
structures, which are harder to initially offshore. Further, in this model an increase in Tj
is not separable from a decrease in τj or wj. Therefore, the calibrated technology increases
reflect a composite change in foreign wages and the variable costs of offshoring.
Targeting 2007 trade patterns results in an employment loss within multinational firms
by 28%, slightly larger than that observed in the data (see Table 1.16). Total manufacturing
employment falls by 13% which accounts for roughly half of the observed decline between
1997 and 2007.38 In addition to the direct employment loss within multinationals, increased
foreign sourcing reduces the demand for intermediates from domestic suppliers. Confronted
with less demand for their products these suppliers scale down production and thereby
contribute to the employment decline as well.
We advice some caution should be taken in the application of these general equilibrium
37Note that in the base year 1997, THI is not chosen and normalized to 1. In the second calibration to
meet the 2007 targets, THI is also allowed to increase.
38We present the declines in the data both for our full sample and for the period 1997 - 2007. As some
of the parameters in our model are calibrated using data available only in census years (years ending in 2 or
7), we present the 1997 - 2007 decline and the 1993 - 2011 decline as an additional point of comparison.
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results. This exercise quantifies the decline in manufacturing employment due to increased
foreign sourcing alone, and does not account for other factors – such as increased foreign
demand for U.S. goods, or foreign multinationals – that could serve to mitigate the overall
negative employment results. Indeed as we have shown in 1.2.2, both the number and
employment of foreign multinationals in the U.S. increased during our sample. Finally,
our analysis has focused on the effects on manufacturing, and it is important to note that
one might suspect U.S. multinationals have increased their non-manufacturing employment.
We hope to explore these effects in future research. In Appendix A.4, we discuss some
counterfactual exercises where we only allow techonology parameters or fixed costs to change.
1.5 Conclusion
We present new stylized facts showing that a disproportionately large share of the manu-
facturing employment decline in the U.S. can be attributed to U.S. multinationals. Moreover,
we find evidence that supply chain fragmentation and offshoring of intermediate input pro-
duction to developing countries has played an important role in this decline. To closely
examine this channel, we illustrate a tight link between domestic employment and firm-level
foreign sourcing in a model of endogenous firm sourcing decisions. A key elasticity – of
firm size with respect to production efficiency – governs the employment impact of changes
in foreign sourcing in this framework. Structural estimation of this elasticity shows that
offshoring is a strong substitute for domestic employment.
In our data, offshoring is concentrated within multinational firms, so our finding helps
explain the role of these firms in the aggregate manufacturing decline. In general equilibrium,
our estimates generate a quantitatively significant decline of the U.S. manufacturing sector.
Note that this does not imply aggregate U.S. welfare decreases, as the gains from cheaper
manufacturing goods accrue to the consumer. Further, our focus is on manufacturing alone
40
– it is possible (and indeed, likely) that foreign sourcing is complementary to employment in
services in the U.S. This finding has several policy implications. In particular, it emphasizes
that policy changes encouraging globalization and integration should take into account the
differential impact on manufacturing workers, other workers and the consumer. Such policies
can be designed to smooth the transitions for displaced manufacturing workers.
The observed concentration of both arms-length and related-party sourcing of inputs
within multinationals could be attributed to several competing channels. In future work, we
will assess the underlying reasons behind this strong empirical finding.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Establishment Counts by Type: 1993-2011
Domestic Exporter Importer Exporter & U.S. Foreign
year Only Only Only Importer Multinational Multinational Total
1993 252,965 41,353 6,911 30,237 17,119 6,178 354,763
2011 159,133 39,034 6,513 31,391 13,488 8,952 258,511
Average Annual Percent Change
1993-2011 -2.41 -0.30 -0.31 0.20 -1.25 1.97 -1.65
1993-2001 -1.76 0.49 0.81 1.92 -1.18 1.62 -0.98
2002-2011 -2.97 -0.70 -1.87 -0.87 -1.12 2.84 -2.13
Source: LBD-LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This table reports the establishment counts pertaining to the “constant” manufacturing sample used in section
3.3.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Employment Counts by Type: 1993-2011
Domestic Exporter Importer Exporter & U.S. Foreign
Only Only Only Importer Multinational Multinational Total
1993 3,433,510 2,133,327 267,090 3,663,103 5,314,411 1,102,240 15,913,681
2011 1,751,504 1,358,061 181,716 2,614,260 2,975,786 1,380,804 10,262,131
Average Annual Percent Change
1993-2011 -3.48 -2.35 -2.01 -1.76 -3.01 1.19 -2.28
1993-2001 -1.72 -0.44 0.74 0.89 -1.69 2.93 -0.49
2002-2011 -4.68 -3.19 -3.89 -3.22 -3.67 0.80 -3.19
Net Change: 1993-2011
Counts -1,682,006 -775,266 -85,374 -1,048,843 -2,338,625 278,564 -5,651,550
Percent
Contribution
0.30 0.14 0.02 0.19 0.41 -0.05 1.00
Source: LBD-LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This table reports the employment counts pertaining to the “constant” manufacturing sample used in section 3.3.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics: Firm Counts by Type: 1993-2011
year Non U.S. Multinationals U.S. Multinationals Total
1993 302,669 2,539 305,208
2011 218,572 2,036 220,608
Average Annual Percent Change
1993-2011 -1.54 -1.10 -1.54
1993-2001 -1.17 -0.17 -1.16
2002-2011 -2.02 -2.06 -2.02
Source: LBD-LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This table reports the firm counts pertaining to the “constant” manufacturing
sample used in section 3.3.
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Table 1.4: Percentage of Firms Participating in Foreign Input Sourcing: 1993-2011
Non U.S. Multinationals U.S. Multinationals
year Arms Length Related Party Arms Length Related Party Arms Length Related Party Arms Length Related Party
Low Income Low Income High Income High Income Low Income Low Income High Income High Income
1993 1.88 0.39 5.71 1.30 44.35 24.62 72.63 48.17
2011 7.41 1.42 8.25 2.01 73.18 49.02 81.83 58.69
Percent Change
1993-2011 294 264 44.5 54.6 65 99 12.7 21.8
Source: LBD-LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This table reports the fraction of U.S. multinationals and non U.S. multinationals that sourced inputs from foreign countries. These are
non-exclusive shares of the total number of firms in 1.3. Non U.S. multinationals includes foreign multinationals and other trading firms.
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Table 1.5: Pooled Regression Results
Establishment Level
Intensive Extensive and Intensive
Unweighted Employment Weighted Unweighted Employment Weighted
β 0.019*** 0.007*** -0.03*** -0.03***
S.E. (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Clusters 16,616 16,616 17,528 15,606
Firm Level
Intensive Extensive and Intensive
Unweighted Employment Weighted Unweighted Employment Weighted
β -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03***
S.E. (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Clusters 8,028 8,028 9,118 9,118
Source: LBD-LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This table reports the pooled regression results from 1.1 at the establishment and firm level.
Table 1.6: Average Establishment-Level Transition Probabilities: 1993-2011
t\t+1 Dom Exp U.S. Mult For Mult Exit
Dom 85% 5% 0% 0% 10%
Exp 13% 80% 1% 1% 5%
U.S. Mult 0% 2% 91% 1% 6%
For Mult 0% 2% 2% 90% 6%
Entry 84% 13% 1% 2%
Source: LBD, DCA, and UBP
This table reports average probability of transition from state i
in t to j in t + 1 where {i, j ∈ D,X,MH,MF,Entry,Exit}. The
average number of establishments corresponding to each type is in
Table 1.1.
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Table 1.7: Inter-Firm and Intra-Firm Sourcing
Country Level Industry & Country Level
RP Indicator Log RP Imports RP Indicator Log RP Imports
Coef. 1.84*** 0.39*** 1.765*** 0.49***
Std. Err. (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Fixed Effects
Firm X time Yes Yes No No
Country X Time Yes Yes No No
Industry X Time No No Yes Yes
Firm X Country X Time No No Yes Yes
R2 0.51 0.61 0.52 0.64
Observations 1,776,800 380,400 5,012,000 1,033,000
Source: LFTTD
This table reports the results from equation 1.3. The dependent variable is the log of a firm’s inter-firm
imports from a particular country or industry within a country.
Table 1.8: Estimation Results: Bounding







Source: LBD,LFTTD, CMF and ASM
This table reports bounds on σ−1θ implied by the bounding proce-
dure in section 1.3.4. The upper bound is the 80th percentile of
all lower bounds calculated by applying the procedure to different
sourcing strategies, as discussed in appendix A.3.
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Table 1.9: Estimation Results: Semiparametric Regressions
Year 1993 1997 2002 2007
σ−1
θ
0.16*** 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.06***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Higher order F.E. YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Size percentiles NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Instrumented NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 72,700 72,700 79,600 79,600 67,400 67,400 71,800 71,800
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
σ−1
θ
0.17** 0.23*** 0.10 0.22*** 0.19* 0.14***
(0.068) (0.011) (2.718) (0.010) (0.095) (0.009)
Higher order F.E YES NO YES NO YES NO
Size percentiles NO YES NO YES NO YES
Instrumented YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 76,000 76,000 64,000 64,000 67,400 67,400
Source: LBD,LFTTD, CMF and ASM
This table reports point estimates for σ−1θ from the polynomial approximation and size bin approaches dis-
cussed in 1.3.4.We use fifty size bins for the approximation. The lower panel displays results where the cost
shares are instrumented with lagged values.
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Table 1.10: Cost Shares for Firms with J = {HO,HI,NO,NI, SO, SI}
year χHO χHI χNO χNI χSO χSI
1997 0.51 0.32 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03
2002 0.48 0.34 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04
2007 0.50 0.29 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05
Source: LBD, LFTTD and CMF
This table reports the average cost shares from different
sourcing locations/modes for firms that source from all
possible locations and modes.
Table 1.11: Firm Sourcing Patterns
Year {HO,HI} {HO,HI, {HO,HI, {HO,HI,NO, {HO,HI,NO, Other
NO} NO,NI} NI,SO} NI,SO,SI}
Fraction of firms with sourcing strategy:
1997 74.5% 9.9% 2.6% 2.6% 3.1% 7.4%
2002 66.8% 11% 2.9% 3.4% 4.6% 11.3%
2007 61.6% 9.6% 2.1% 3.5% 6.3% 16.9%
Fraction of imports in sourcing strategy:
1997 0% 0.6% 1.4% 4.2% 89.1% 4.7%
2002 0% 0.5% 1.6% 3.3% 91.0% 3.7%
2007 0% 0.2% 0.8% 3.4% 92.0% 3.5%
Source: LBD, LFTTD and CMF
This table reports the fraction of firms sourcing from five of the most promi-
nent sourcing strategies, as well as the fraction of imports accounted for by
firms in each of these sourcing strategies.“Other” includes sourcing strategies J ∈
{{HO,HI, SO}, {HO,HI, SI}, {HO,HI,NI}, {HO,HI,NO, SO}, {HO,HI,NO, SI}, {HO,HI,NI, SI},
{HO,HI,NI, SO}, {HO,HI, SI, SO}, {HO,HI,NO,NI, SI}, {HO,HI,NO, SO, SI}, {HO,HI,NI, SO, SI}}.
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Table 1.12: Calibration Stage 1
Parameter Value Note
σ 2.3 Demand elasticity
θ 6 Frechet shape parameter
bφ 1 Lower bound of the Pareto distribution
AH 14.32 Skill-adjusted wages in Home, from the ILO
AN 8.29 Average skill-adjusted wages in North from the ILO
AS 1.02 Average skill-adjusted wages in South from the ILO
LH 0.301 Skill-adjusted labor force in Home, from the ILO
LN 0.822 Total skill-adjusted labor force in North from the ILO
LS 2.35 Total skill-adjusted labor force in South from the ILO
τH 1 Domestic transport costs
τN 1.15 Transport costs from North
τS 1.15 Transport costs from South
ρ 1.5 Elasticity of substitution of tasks
E [s] 1.0025 Expected value of demand shifter
κHI 1 Home within firm technology transfer parameter
κHO 1.1 Home outside supplier technology transfer parameter
κNI 0.98 North within firm technology transfer parameter
κNO 0.95 North outside supplier technology transfer parameter
κSI 0.97 South within firm technology transfer parameter
κSO 0.93 South outside supplier technology transfer parameter
This table summarizes the first stage of the baseline calibration.
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Table 1.13: Quantitative Exercises: Model Fit
1997 2007
Targets Model Targets Model
NO imports/Manuf sector sales 0.020 0.011 0.024 0.017
NI imports/Manufacturing sector sales 0.035 0.035 0.051 0.051
SO imports/Manufacturing sector sales 0.017 0.019 0.044 0.045
SI imports/Manufacturing sector sales 0.015 0.017 0.030 0.033
Fraction of trade with J = {HO,HI,NO,NI} 0.015 0.024 0.008 0.016
Fraction of trade with J = {HO,HI,NO,NI, SO} 0.044 0.023 0.035 0.013
Fraction of trade with J = {HO,HI,NO,NI, SO, SI} 0.935 0.902 0.954 0.917
Fraction of firms with J = {HO,HI} 0.804 0.814 0.741 0.786
Fraction of firms with J = {HO,HI,NO} 0.107 0.088 0.116 0.108
Fraction of firms with J = {HO,HI,NO,NI} 0.028 0.008 0.025 0.006
Fraction of firms with J = {HO,HI,NO,NI, SO} 0.028 0.005 0.042 0.003
Fraction of firms with J = {HO,HI,NO,NI, SO, SI} 0.033 0.085 0.076 0.097
Mean χHO with J = {HO,HI,NO,NI, SO, SI} 0.514 0.514 0.500 0.500
Home multinational/total manufacturing employment 0.307 0.305 - 0.317
Manufacturing employment share 0.168 0.169 - 0.130
This table summarizes the fit of the model to calibration targets in 1997 and 2007.
Table 1.14: Quantitative Exercises: Local Effects
1 % change in: manufacturing employment multinational employment









This table summarizes the responses of key variables to one percent increases in
foreign technology parameters or one percent decreases in fixed costs of foreign
sourcing.
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Table 1.15: Quantitative Exercises: Parameter changes
Technology THI THO TNI TNO TSI TSO
Change 273 % 275 % 555% 495 % 712 % 923 %
Fixed Costs {HO,HI} {HO,HI, {HO,HI, {HO,HI,NO, {HO,HI,NO,
NO} NO,NI} NI,SO} NI,SO,SI}
Change 112 % 184 % 193 % 222 % 216 %
This table summarizes changes in the technology and fixed cost parameters between
the baseline calibration (1997) and the final calibration (2007).
Table 1.16: Quantitative Exercises: Manufacturing Decline
Data (1993- 2011) Data (1997- 2007) Model
Manufacturing -0.36 % -0.25 % -0.13 %
Employment
Multinational -0.44 % -0.27 % -0.28 %
Employment
Non-MN Employment -0.31 % -0.24 % -0.07 %
Employment
This table summarizes the decline in aggregate manufacturing employment within
the model. We show the declines in the data over two periods – the full sample
and a shorter period between the census years 1997 and 2007, as some of our
calibration targets are only available in census years and have been chosen to
match data in 1997 and 2007.
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Figure 1.1: Share of Trade and Firm Participation in Trade, by Type
Value of Trade by Firm Type
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
These figures report the value of intermediate and final goods trade by firm type, as well as the
share of intermediate inputs imported from low income countries by U.S. multinationals.
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Figure 1.2: Employment Growth Differential of Multinational Transitions
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This figure plots the pre and post annual deviations in the employment growth rate of establishments
that transition into part of a multinational firm in year (t = 0), relative to a control group based on
interacted effects of firm age, establishment size, and industry (in year t = −1). The control group
consists of establishments that are not part of a multinational firm in year t = 0. See equation 1.2.
The shaded area corresponds to a 95 percent confidence interval.
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Figure 1.3: Importing Differentials of Multinational Transitions
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This figure reports the related-party and arms-length intermediate input imports of the parent firm
of an establishment that transitions into part of a multinational firm in year (t = 0), relative to
a control group based on interacted effects of firm age, establishment size, and industry (in year
t = −1). See equation 1.2, modified to reflect firm-level imports as dependent variables. The shaded
area corresponds to a 95 percent confidence interval.
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Figure 1.4: Employment Growth Differential of Importer Transitions
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This figure plots the pre and post annual deviations in the employment growth rate of establishments
that begin importing from abroad year (t = 0), relative to a control group based on interacted
effects of firm age, establishment size, and industry (in year t = −1). The control group consists of
establishments that are not part of a multinational firm in year t = 0, nor have recorded positive

























































Figure 1.5: Stages of the Firm’s Problem
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(sigma−1)/theta
Source: CMF-LFTTD as explained in text.
This figure plots the kernel density of the results of the estimation of σ−1θ using
equation 1.21 by industry in 1997. The results are similar for other estimation
years 2002 and 2007.
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CHAPTER II
Input Linkages and the Transmission of Shocks:
Firm-Level Evidence from the 2011 To¯hoku
Earthquake
with Christoph E. Boehm and Aaron Flaaen
2.1 Introduction
The spillover effects of trade and financial linkages has been a preeminant topic in in-
ternational economics in recent decades. The large expansions in trade and foreign direct
investment (FDI) in the past twenty years have generated much discussion on whether they
increase volatility (di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2012), increase comovement (Frankel and
Rose, 1998; Burstein et al., 2008) or lead to less diversified production and specialization
(Imbs , 2004). Identifying the micro-foundations underlying the role of these linkages in
the increased interdependence of national economies is challenging. Advanced economies
are highly connected, and most variables influenced by any candidate mechanism are often
correlated with other developments in the source and destination countries. There is often
little in the way of exogenous variation to isolate any particular mechanism from a host of
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confounding factors. Moreover, the requisite data to examine these issues at the necessary
detail and disaggregation have been, until recently, unavailable.
This paper provides empirical evidence for the cross-country transmission of shocks via
the rigid production linkages of multinational firms. The principal mechanism at work is
not new; the idea of input-output linkages as a key channel through which shocks propagate
through the economy dates back to at least Leontief (1936) or Hirschmann (1958). Two
advances in this paper permit a new quantitative evaluation of the nature and magnitude
of these linkages. First, we utilize a novel dataset that, for the first time, links restricted
U.S. Census Bureau microdata to firms’ international ownership structure. This information
permits a forensic focus on particular firms and their underlying behavior. Second, we
utilize the March 2011 To¯hoku earthquake and tsunami as a natural experiment of a large
and exogenous shock disrupting the production linkages originating from Japan.
We study the role of imported intermediate inputs in the transmission of this shock to
the United States economy. Because disruptions to imports of final goods would be unlikely
to affect U.S. production, we develop a new methodology for isolating firm-level imports of
intermediate inputs. We show that the U.S. affiliates of Japanese multinationals are the most
natural source of this transmission, due to their high exposure to imported intermediates
from Japan. The scope for shocks to these imported inputs to pass through and affect the
firm’s U.S. production depends on how substitutable they are with inputs from alternative
sources. In other words, the role of imported inputs in the transmission of shocks is governed
by the elasticity of substitution with respect to domestic factors of production.
We estimate this elasticity using the relative magnitudes of high frequency input and
output shipments in the months following the To¯hoku earthquake/tsunami. This proceeds
in two steps. First, reduced form estimates corresponding to Japanese multinational affiliates
on average show that output falls, without a lag, by a comparable magnitude to the drop
in imports. These results suggest a near-zero elasticity of imported inputs. Second, we
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structurally estimate a firm-level production function that allows for substitution across
different types of inputs. The structural estimation procedure we use is uniquely tailored to
the experiment. In an initial period prior to the To¯hoku disruption, we infer information on
the firm’s productivity and optimal input mix. Then, applying this production function to
the period of the disruption, we estimate the elasticity parameters based on how changes in
the firm’s input mix translate into changes in output.
This estimation strategy has a number of attractive features. Most importantly, it relies
on very few assumptions. Direct estimation of the production function circumvents the many
difficulties associated with specifying a firm’s optimization problem in the period after the
shock. Second, it yields transparent parameter identification. This is an advantage over
traditional estimation strategies as it does not suffer from omitted variables and endogeneity
concerns arising from correlated shocks. Third, it allows for the estimation across different
subgroups of firms.
The structural estimates are broadly in agreement with the results from our reduced form
exercise. For Japanese multinationals, the elasticity of substitution across material inputs
is 0.2 and the elasticity between material inputs and a capital/labor aggregate is 0.03. For
non-Japanese firms using inputs from Japan, the estimates of the elasticity of substitution
across material inputs are somewhat higher at 0.42 to 0.62. While the high cost share and
particularly low elasticity for Japanese affiliates explains their predominant contribution to
the direct transmission of this shock to the U.S., the elasticity estimates for non-Japanese
firms are still substantially lower than typical estimates used in the literature. We argue
that the substantial share of intra-firm intermediate trade implies greater complementarities
in aggregate trade than is currently recognized.
There are a number of important implications for such low values of the elasticity of
substitution. This parameter appears in various forms in a wide span of models involving
the exchange of goods across countries. As discussed by Backus et al. (1994) and Heathcote
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and Perri (2002) among others, this parameter is critically important for the behavior of
these models and their ability to match key patterns of the data. Prior estimates of this
parameter were based on highly aggregated data that naturally suffered from concerns about
endogeneity and issues of product composition.1 Reflecting the uncertainty of available
estimates for the elasticity of substitution, it is a common practice to evaluate the behavior
of these models along a wide range of parameter values.
It is well known that a low value for this parameter (interpreted as either substitution be-
tween imported and domestic goods in final consumption or as intermediates in production)
improves the fit of standard IRBC models along several important dimensions. In particular,
the elasticity of substitution plays a role in two highly robust failings of these models: i) a
terms of trade that is not nearly as variable as the data, and ii) a consumption comovement
that is significantly higher than that of output, whereas the data show the opposite relative
ranking.2
To understand the relationship between the elasticity and comovement, it is helpful to
recall that these models generate output comovement by inducing synchronization in fac-
tor supplies, a mechanism that by itself generally fails to produce the degree of comove-
ment seen in the data. Complementarities among inputs together with heterogeneous input
shocks will generate direct comovement in production, augmenting the output synchroniza-
tion based on factor movements. Burstein et al. (2008) show that a low production elasticity
of substitution between imported and domestic inputs reduces substitution following relative
price movements, and thereby increases business cycle synchronization.3 It is also relatively
straightforward to see how a lower elasticity increases volatility in the terms of trade. When
1For a very useful compendium of this research from this era, see Stern et al. (1976). More recently, work
by Halpern et al. (2011) and Goldberg et al. (2010) demonstrate that materials inputs from foreign countries
are imperfectly substitutable with domestic inputs for Hungary and India respectively.
2Due to the robust nature of these shortcomings, Backus et al. (1995) refer to them as the “price anomaly”
and “quantity anomaly” respectively.
3Although they do not estimate this parameter, the value they advocate (0.05) is indeed close to our
estimates.
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two inputs are highly complementary, deviations from the steady state mix are associated
with large changes in their relative prices. In the words of Heathcote and Perri (2002, page
621): “greater complementarity is associated with a larger return to relative scarcity.”
The estimates in this paper have implications for the role of trade in firm-level and aggre-
gate volatility. Other research has argued that firms can diversify risk arising from country
specific shocks by importing (Caselli et al. (2014)) or that firms with complex production
processes of several inputs are less volatile as each input matters less for production (Koren
and Tenreyro (2013)). On the other hand, there is a well-established fact that complemen-
tarities and multi-stage processing can lead to the amplification of shocks as in Jones (2011)
and Kremer (1993). We discuss the potential for measured amplification in our context in
Section 2.5.
This paper is also a contribution to the empirical evidence on the role of individual firms
in aggregate fluctuations, emanating from the work of Gabaix (2011). Other related evidence
comes from di Giovanni et al. (2014), who use French micro-data to demonstrate that firm-
level shocks contribute as much to aggregate volatility as sectoral and macroeconomic shocks
combined. The so-called granularity of the economy is very much evident in our exercise;
though the number of Japanese multinationals is small, they comprise a very large share
of total imports from Japan, and are arguably responsible for a measurable drop in U.S.
industrial production following the To¯hoku earthquake (see Figure 2.3).
The strong complementarity across material inputs implies that non-Japanese input use
falls nearly proportionately, thereby propagating the shock to other upstream (and down-
stream) firms in both the U.S. economy and abroad. Many suppliers were thus indirectly
exposed to the shock via linkages with Japanese affiliates that had i) high exposure to
Japanese inputs and ii) a rigid production function with respect to other inputs. Network
effects such as these can dramatically magnify the overall transmission of the shock (both
across countries and within). And while such effects are commonly understood to exist, this
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paper provides unique empirical evidence of the central mechanisms at work.
As is the case with most research based on an event-study, some care should be taken
in generalizing the results to other settings. Although we have already highlighted the
aggregate implications of the effects we estimate, one might worry that the composition
of Japanese trade or firms engaged in such trade is not representative of trade linkages
more broadly. We believe the results we obtain are informative beyond the context of this
particular episode for two reasons. First, the features of Japanese multinationals that are
underlying the transmission of this shock are common to all foreign multinational affiliates in
the United States.4 Second, estimates corresponding to all firms in our sample also exhibit
substantial complementarities, and as a whole these firms account for over 70 percent of
total U.S. manufacturing imports.
The next section describes the empirical strategy and data sources used in this paper,
section 2.3 presents reduced form evidence in support of a low production elasticity of im-
ported inputs for Japanese multinational affiliates. In Section 2.4, we expand the scope of
parameters we identify with a structural model of cross-country production linkages. We es-
timate the parameters of this model across several different subgroups. Section 2.5 discusses
the implications of these estimates, and details a number of checks and robustness exercises.
The final section offers concluding thoughts.
2.2 Empirical Strategy and Specification
This section outlines the empirical approach of using an event-study framework sur-
rounding the 2011 To¯hoku event to estimate the production elasticity of imported inputs.
We discuss the relevant details of this shock, document the aggregate effects, and then outline
the empirical specification for the firm-level analysis.
4Intra-firm trade accounts for a large majority of the trade of Japanese affiliates. More generally, the
intra-firm share of imported intermediates for all foreign affiliates in the U.S. is 71 percent.
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2.2.1 Background
The To¯hoku earthquake and tsunami took place off the coast of Northeast Japan on
March 11, 2011. It had a devastating impact on Japan, with estimates of almost twenty
thousand dead or missing (Schnell and Weinstein (2012)) and substantial destruction of
physical capital. The magnitude of the earthquake was recorded at 9.0 on the moment
magnitude scale (Mw), making it the fourth largest earthquake event recorded in the modern
era.5 Most of the damage and casualties were a result of the subsequent tsunami that
inundated entire towns and coastal fishing villages. The effects of the tsunami were especially
devastating in the Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures. The Japanese Meteorological
Agency published estimates of wave heights as high as 7-9m (23-29ft), while the Port and
Airport Research Institute (PARI) cite estimates of the maximum landfall height of between
7.9m and 13.3m (26-44ft).
Figure 2.1 shows the considerable impact of the To¯hoku event on the Japanese economy.
Japanese manufacturing production fell by roughly 15 percentage points between February
and March 2011, and did not return to trend levels until July. Much of the decline in economic
activity resulted from significant power outages that persisted for months following damage
to several power plants – most notably the Fukushima nuclear reactor.6 Further, at least six
Japanese ports (among them the Hachinohe, Sendai, Ishinomaki and Onahama) sustained
significant damage and were out of operation for more than a month, delaying shipments to
both foreign and domestic locations. It should be noted, however, that the largest Japanese
ports (Yokohama, Tokyo, Kobe) which account for the considerable majority of Japanese
5Since 1900, the three earthquakes of greater recorded magnitude are: the 1960 Great Chilean earthquake
(magnitude 9.5), the 1964 Good Friday earthquake in Prince William Sound, Alaska (magnitude 9.2); and
the 2004 Sumatra-Andaman earthquake (magnitude 9.2).
6For precautionary reasons, all nuclear power plants were immediately shut down following the earth-
quake, and remained largely offline until 2014 or later. Because the electricity infrastructure exists on two
separate grids (a 60Hz to the south and west, and 50Hz to the north and east), the reduction in power supply
in Northeast Japan was not easily remedied, and power outages persisted for months.
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trade, re-opened only days after the event.
As expected, the economic impact of the event was reflected in international trade statis-
tics, including exports to the United States. Figure 2.2 plots U.S. imports from Japan around
the period of the To¯hoku event, with imports from the rest of the world for comparison. The
large fall in imports occurs during the month of April 2011, reflecting the several weeks of
transit time for container vessels to cross the Pacific Ocean. The magnitude of this drop in
imports is roughly similar to that of Japanese manufacturing production: a 20 percentage
point drop from March to April, with a full recovery by July 2011.
More striking is the response of U.S. industrial production in the months following the
event. Figure 2.3 demonstrates that there is indeed a drop in U.S. manufacturing production
in the months following the Japanese earthquake. Although the magnitudes are obviously
much smaller — roughly a one percentage point drop in total manufacturing and almost two
percentage points in durable goods — the existence of a measurable effect is clear.7
Though tragic, the To¯hoku event provides a glimpse into the cross-country spillovers
following an exogenous supply shock. This natural experiment features many characteristics
that are advantageous for this type of study. It was large and hence measurable, unexpected,
and directly affected only one country. The shock was also short-lived, which rules out im-
mediate supplier restructuring and allows for an estimate of the elasticity for a given supply
chain.8 On the other hand, the short duration of the shock presents a challenge for mea-
surement as it limits the available datasets with information at the required frequency. We
utilize a novel firm-level dataset to uncover the mechanisms at work behind the transmission
of this shock.
7At the level of total U.S. GDP, both Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs revised 2nd quarter U.S.
estimates down by 50 basis points explicitly due to the events in Japan.




Several restricted-use Census Bureau datasets form the core of our firm-level analysis.
The Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) collects the employment, payroll, and major
industry of all establishments operating in the United States, and is maintained and updated
as described by Jarmin and Miranda (2002). Longitudinal linkages allow the researcher to
follow the establishment over time, and the annual Company Organization Survey (COS)
provides a mapping from establishments to firms. All of the analysis in this paper will be at
the firm-level.
The Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transactions Database (LFTTD), which links individual
trade transactions to firms operating in the United States. Assembled by a collaboration
between the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Customs Bureau, the LFTTD contains in-
formation on the destination (or source) country, quantity and value shipped, the transport
mode, and other details from point-of-trade administrative documents. Importantly for this
study, the LFTTD includes import and export trade transactions at a daily frequency, which
is easily aggregated to monthly-level trade flows. A number of important papers have utilized
this resource, such as Bernard et al. (2007) and Bernard et al. (2006).
We utilize two novel extensions to this set of Census data products. First, a new link
between a set of international corporate directories and the Business Register (BR) of the
Census Bureau provides information on the international affiliates of firms operating in the
United States. These directories provide information, for the first time, to identify those U.S.
affiliates part of a foreign parent company, as well as those U.S. firms with affiliate operations
abroad. This information is an important resource for identifying the characteristics of U.S.
firms affected by the To¯hoku event. For information on these directories and the linking
procedure used, please see Appendix B.2.1.
The second novel data resource is a system to classify firm-level import transactions as
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intermediate or final goods. Although intermediate input trade represents as much as two-
thirds of total trade (see Johnson and Noguera (2012)), the LFTTD does not classify a trade
transaction based on its intended use. To overcome this limitation, we use information on the
products produced by U.S. establishments in a given industry to identify the set of products
intended for final sale for that industry.9 The remaining products are presumably used
by establishments in that industry either as intermediate inputs or as capital investment.
Details on this classification procedure are available in Appendix B.2.2. In the aggregate,
this firm-level classification procedure yields estimates of the intermediate share of trade
that are consistent with prior estimates: 64 percent of manufacturing imports are classified
as “intermediates” in 2007.
Finally, we utilize geographic information on the severity of the earthquake/tsunami that
is compiled by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). By geocoding the Japanese addresses of
firms with U.S. operations, we construct an earthquake intensity measure for each Japanese
affiliate location. We then apply such information to the U.S. operations as a way to further
measure the sample of firms plausibly affected by the shock. Please see Appendix B.2.3.2
for details. Figure 2.4 shows the geographic distribution of one such USGS measure — the
modified mercalli index (MMI) — along with the geocoded affiliate locations.
The ideal dataset to evaluate the transmission of the To¯hoku event on U.S. firms would
consist of high frequency information on production, material inputs, and trade, separated
out by geographic and ownership criteria. Unfortunately, Census data on production and
material inputs at the firm-level is somewhat limited. The Annual Survey of Manufacturers
(ASM) contains such information, but at an annual frequency and only for a subset of
manufacturing firms. On the other hand, firm-level trade information is available at a nearly
daily frequency, and covers the universe of firms engaged in exporting/importing. For the
9Note that products intended for final sale for a given industry may still be used as intermediates for
other firms in a different industry. Alternatively, such “final goods” can be sold directly to consumers for
ultimate consumption.
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purposes of characterizing the shock to firm-level imports of intermediate goods, the LFTTD
(and supplements identified above) is ideal. There remain significant gaps in information on
a firm’s domestic input usage, a limitation we discuss in subsequent sections.
Because of the challenges of high-frequency information on firms’ U.S. production, we
utilize a proxy based on the LFTTD — namely the firm’s exports of goods to North America
(Canada and Mexico). The underlying assumption of this proxy is that all firms export a
fixed fraction of their U.S. output to neighboring countries in each period. The advantage
of this approach is the ability to capture the flow of goods at a specific point in time. There
are few barriers to North American trade, and transport time is relatively short. Moreover,
exporting is a common feature of these firms, of which exports to North America is by far
the largest component. The obvious disadvantage of this approach is that it conditions on a
positive trading relationship between firms in the U.S. and Canada/Mexico. We will assess
the quality of this measure as a proxy for output in section 2.5.3.1.10
2.2.3 Basic Theory
Before moving to our firm-level analysis, it is useful to describe the basic theoretical
structure of the features of firm-level production that we estimate. The transmission of
shocks within a firm’s production chain is governed by the flexibility of production with
respect to input sourcing. Rather than model these complex networks directly, the literature
typically summarizes this feature with the well-known elasticity of substitution within a
C.E.S. production function. Our identification of this elasticity will rely on the relative
impacts on output and imported inputs following the shock. To be concrete, consider the
10Another consideration with the use of this proxy is whether it more accurately reflects production or
sales, as the two are distinct in the presence of output inventories. In our case, this depends on whether the
inventories are held in the U.S. or Canada/Mexico. Without further evidence, we interpret the proxy to be
















where output consists of combining a domestic bundle of factors FD (e.g. capital and labor)
with a foreign imported input IM . The parameter µ reflects the relative weight on the
input IM in production, conditional on prices and a given elasticity value. Suppose the firm
purchases its inputs in competitive markets with prices pD and pM , respectively, and sells its
good at price px. Our approach in this section will be to estimate the parameter ψ governing
the degree of substitution between these inputs, using information on the output elasticity
with respect to imported inputs, ∂ ln pxx
∂ ln pMM
, in the months following the shock.











where F ∗D and IM
∗ denote the optimal quantities of inputs. We would like to show the
theoretical foundations underlying the intuitive result that a one-for-one drop in output
with the fall in imported inputs implies an elasticity of zero. To do this, we make the
following assumptions, all of which we will relax to some degree in the estimation framework
in Section 2.4:
1. Imported inputs shipments are disrupted, such that the firm receives a suboptimally
low quantity of IM : IM < IM∗;
2. The firm is unable to adjust domestic inputs F ∗D or its price px after learning that it
receives IM ;
3. The firm does not shut down.
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Given these assumptions, the following result holds:

















)ψ−1 ∈ (0, 1) (2.3)
for any ψ ∈ (0,∞).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.1 for details.
An immediate implication of this result is that the output elasticity is unity only when





ψ → 0 (recall that IM < IM∗) and hence
limψ→0
∂ ln pxx
∂ ln pM IM
= 1. Hence, observing a one-for-one drop in the value of output with the
value of imported intermediates, we infer that ψ is close to zero. It is also straightforward to
show that conditional on a value for ψ ∈ (0,∞), the output elasticity in (2.3) is increasing
in the parameter µ. That is, conditional on a given drop in the imported input, a larger
weight on this input leads to a larger percent response in output.
Our use of the natural experiment is critical for observing the effects of suboptimal input
combinations (F ∗D, IM). To see this, suppose the firm could freely adjust FD after learning it
will receive IM < IM∗. Then, it would choose FD such that FDIM =
F ∗D
IM∗ and the firm would
contract one-for-one with the drop in imports. It is a well-known fact that constant returns
to scale production functions in competitive environments lead to indeterminate firm size.










11There is a second case which we do not examine, where ψ → ∞ and pM < pD and thus the firm only
uses IM . We discard this scenario because such a firm would not show up in our data (i.e. this case implies
zero U.S. employment).
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In this case it is not possible to learn anything about ψ from the joint behavior of output and
the value of intermediate inputs. We provide evidence below that firms did not significantly
adjust their domestic labor force following the disruption, so that a constant FD is indeed
a reasonable assumption in this simple framework. To be sure, there are a number of
alternative frameworks where such behavior would not hold. We discuss some of these in
Appendix A, and show that the mapping limψ→0
∂ ln pxx
∂ ln pM IM
= 1 is more general.
2.3 Reduced Form Evidence
This section will provide intuitive reduced-form evidence on the elasticity of substitution
corresponding to the U.S. affiliates of Japanese multinationals. We discuss our strategy for
understanding this elasticity via firm-behavior in the months following the To¯hoku event,
and then report the results.
2.3.1 Framework
Our analysis of the production function (2.1) above demonstrates that a natural measure
to evaluate the potential conduits of the To¯hoku shock to the United States would be the
degree of reliance on Japanese imported inputs. This is best expressed as the cost share of
inputs from Japan, and can be constructed in a Census year by taking a firm’s Japanese
imported inputs and dividing by all other inputs (which includes production worker wages
and salaries, the cost of materials, and the cost of new machinery expenditures). Exposure
to Japanese imported inputs is heavily concentrated among Japanese affiliates. In the year
2007, which is the closest available Census year, this cost share was nearly 22% on average
for Japanese affiliates (see Table 2.1), compared to just 1% for other firms. For more detail
on the heterogeneity across and within these firm groups, we construct a density estimate of
such an exposure measure for the Japanese affiliates and non-Japanese multinationals. The
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results, shown in Figure 2.5, show little overlap between these distributions: there are few
Japanese affiliates with low exposure to Japanese inputs, and few non-Japanese firms have
substantial exposure.12
We now estimate the relative impacts on imported inputs and output for the Japanese
affiliates as a group. To do this, we implement a dynamic treatment effects specification in
which a firm is defined as being treated if it is owned by a Japanese parent company.13 The
effect on these firms can be inferred from the differential impact of the variable of interest
relative to a control group, which soaks up common seasonal patterns and other demand-
driven factors in the U.S. market. While there are a number of competing methodologies
for this type of estimation, we use normalized propensity score re-weighting due to the
relatively favorable finite-sample properties as discussed in Busso et al. (2014), as well as for
its transparent intuition. Consistent estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated
requires the assumption of conditional independence: the treatment/control allocation is
independent of potential outcomes conditional on a set of variables. As the average Japanese
firm differs considerably from other firms in the data, we use other multinational firms
– both US and non-Japanese foreign- as our baseline control group prior to reweighting.
To compute the propensity scores for reweighting, we control for size and industry, which
ensures the control group has a similar industrial composition and size distribution as our
treated sample.14 Table 2.2 reports summary values for the sample, including statistics on
the balancing procedure using the normalized propensity score.
12The exposure measure used in Figure 2.5 is from 2010 and does not include the cost of domestic material
usage.
13We could have also used a threshold of Japanese input usage for the classification of treatment status.
Doing so yields estimates that are very similar, which is due to the patterns evident in Figure 2.5. We have
also tried conditioning on our geographic information (i.e. the firm-level Japanese MMI index) in defining
a Japanese firm as being treated. The results are largely unchanged from those we report here, and for the
sake of clarity we report results pertaining to the full sample.
14Using the predicted values (p) from the first stage regression, the inverse probability weights are 11−p
for the control group and 1p for the treated group. To normalize the weights such that the treated firms have
weights equal to one, we then multiply each set of weights by p.
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The magnitude of the shock for a representative Japanese multinational is captured by
the effect on total imported intermediate products at a monthly frequency.15 Including non-
Japanese imported intermediates is important for applying the control group as a counter-
factual, and the shares by source-country gives the necessary variation for identification: as
shown in Table 2.2 the share of imported inputs from Japan is 70% of the total for Japanese
firms and only 3.5% for non-Japanese multinationals. Let V Mi,t be the value of intermediate
imports of firm i in month t, after removing a firm-specific linear trend through March 2011.
We fit the following regression:






βpEpJPNi,p + ui,t (2.5)
where αi are firm fixed-effects, γp are monthly fixed effects (with the indicator variables
Ep corresponding to the calendar-months surrounding the event), and ui,t is an error term.
The baseline sample will consist of January 2009 to December 2011. We denote March 2011
as t=0.
The βp coefficients are of primary interest. The JPNi,t is an indicator variable equal to
one if the firm is owned by a Japanese parent company. Interacting these indicator variables
with each month of the panel allows for a time-varying effect of Japanese ownership on a
firm’s overall intermediate input imports, particularly during and after the To¯hoku event.
The βp coefficients will estimate the differential effect of the To¯hoku event on Japanese
multinational affiliates in the U.S., compared to the control group of non-Japanese firms. A
useful interpretation of the {EpJPNi,p} variables is as a set of instruments that captures the
exogeneity of imports during these months, reflecting the source-country share of imports
from Japan as evident in Table 2.2. To evaluate the differential impact on production for
Japanese firms, we simply replace the dependent variable in equation (2.5) with the firm’s
15We consider Japanese and non-Japanese intermediate imports separately in section 2.4.
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North American exports, denoted V NAi,t .
It is important to highlight that equation (2.5) is in levels. There are several reasons
for doing so, as opposed to using log differences or growth rates. First, allowing for the
presence of zeros is important when the data are at a monthly frequency, particularly given
the magnitude of the shock to imports for Japanese firms. The second reason is more
conceptual. Because we are interested in calculating the average effect of these firms that
represents (and can scale up to) the aggregate impact on the U.S. economy, it is appropriate
to weight the firms based on their relative size. The levels specification does exactly this: the
absolute deviations from trend will be greater for the bigger firms and hence will contribute
disproportionately to the coefficient estimates.16 In section 2.4, we evaluate this framework
with the results one would obtain when estimating the effect on a firm-by-firm basis.
In addition to the Conditional Independence Assumption highlighted earlier, the βp co-
efficients are valid estimates of the mean effect for Japanese affiliates only in so far as the
control group is not itself impacted by the shock. This Stable Unit Treatment Value As-
sumption (SUTVA) implies that general equilibrium effects or peer effects (e.g. strategic
interaction) do not meaningfully effect the estimates. The share of imported inputs from
Japan is low for the control group, and thus the shock is unlikely to have a measurable effect
on imported inputs as a whole. We discuss strategic interaction in section 2.5.3.4.
2.3.2 Results: Total Manufacturing Sector
The top panel of Figure 2.6 plots the βp coefficients from equation (2.5) for the months
surrounding the To¯hoku event. Relative to the control group, there is a large drop in total
intermediate input imports by Japanese firms in the months following the earthquake. The
drop in intermediate inputs bottoms out at 4 million USD in t = 3 (June 2011) and the
16See Appendix B.3.1 for more discussion, as well as results obtained using other specifications. Impor-
tantly, in a reduced sample abstracting from zeros, a weighted regression using percentage changes directly
yields estimates that are very close to those presented here.
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point estimates do not return back to the pre-shock trend until month t = 7 (October 2011).
More interesting are the results from panel B of Figure 2.6, which looks for evidence
of the production/sales impact of this shock on Japanese firms via their North American
exports. The differential time-path of N.A. exports also exhibits a substantial drop following
the To¯hoku event, hitting a trough of 2 million USD below baseline in t = 2 (May 2011). The
standard errors, which are clustered at the firm level, are themselves interesting. As made
clear via the 95-percent confidence bands on the point estimates of Figure 2.6, the standard
errors increase dramatically in the months following the shock, a feature we interpret to
reflect heterogeneous incidence and timing of the shocks (as well as the recoveries) for the
Japanese multinationals.
To gain a sense of the average percentage drops of these two data series for Japanese
multinationals as a group, we take the two plots of the differential dollar amounts from
Figure 2.6 and divide by the average pre-shock level for these firms (see Table 2.2). The
results, plotted jointly in Figure 2.7, show the fraction below pre-shock trend levels for these
firms, on average. There is a remarkable correlation between these two series – whereby
there is essentially a one-for-one drop in output for a given drop in intermediate imports.
Using the mapping from Result 1, these reduced form results suggest a production function
that is essentially Leontief in the imported input.
One potential concern with the interpretation of these results is separating out the inter-
mediate input channel with other channels, such as a direct “productivity shock” affecting
the U.S. operations of Japanese affiliates. Separating an ownership channel from an imported
input channel is difficult due to lack of substantial overlap we identified above: few Japanese
firms have low input exposure and few non-Japanese firms have high input exposure. In
appendix B.3.2 we present results using a binary response model to disentangle the defining
features of the import and output disruptions during this time.
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2.4 Structural Estimation of Cross Country Input Linkages
The relative movements of imported inputs and output of Japanese multinational firms
point to little substitutability of Japanese intermediate inputs. In this section we expand
our analysis by structurally estimating the production function of firms affected by the
To¯hoku shock. Unlike in the previous section, which used a set of instruments related to
the differential import share of intermediates coming from Japan, this estimation relies on
leveraging the high degree of exogenous variation in Japanese inputs coming from the To¯hoku
event, while also fully specifying the production function under study. This estimation
serves multiple purposes. First, it is reassuring to find elasticities that are consistent with
the heuristic evidence implied by our reduced-form results, when imposing a conventional
production function framework. Second, by imposing additional structure, we are able to
distinguish two elasticities: one between Japanese material inputs and other material inputs,
and another between an aggregate bundle of material inputs and domestic capital and labor.
Finally, by using an estimation procedure not relying on a control group we can obtain
separate estimates for Japanese and non-Japanese firms. The results corroborate the claim
that the supply chains of Japanese and non-Japanese exhibit different degrees of rigidity.
The estimation procedure will utilize information from two distinct periods: the six
months preceding and the six months following the March 11 event. The pre-period, which
we denote by τ − 1, yields information on the production function of the firm under profit-
maximizing conditions. In the post-period, denoted τ , we do not impose that the firm is
optimizing over its input use, due to the fact that shipments from Japan are to some extent
beyond the control of the firm.
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2.4.1 Framework









































In this production function xi,t, Ki,t, and Li,t denote the output, capital, and labor of firm
i. The variable Mi,t denotes an aggregate of intermediate inputs consisting of materials
sourced from Japan (mJi,t) and materials sourced from all places other than Japan (m
−J
i,t ),
including domestic materials. We are interested in estimating ω and ζ, which parameterize
the substitutability between Japanese and non-Japanese materials and that between the
capital-labor aggregate and the aggregate of intermediate inputs. The parameters µi and νi
are firm-specific weights and φi parameterizes the firm’s productivity, all of which we assume
are constant over the short time horizon we consider. Further, we assume that the firm is








As usual, Yi,t is the bundle used or consumed downstream and serves as a demand shifter
beyond the control of the firm.
2.4.1.1 Pre-Tsunami period
Period τ corresponds to the period April-September 2011, and τ−1 the period September
2010 - February 2011. We exclude the month of March 2011. In period τ−1 the firm operates
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in a standard environment, choosing capital, labor, and materials so as to maximize
pxi,τ−1xi,τ−1 − wτ−1Li,τ−1 −Rτ−1Ki,τ−1 − p−Ji,τ−1m−Ji,τ−1 − pJi,τ−1mJi,τ−1
subject to (2.6), (2.7), and (2.8). The firm takes all factor prices as given. Material prices
pJi,τ−1 and p
−J
i,τ−1 are firm-specific to indicate that different firms use different materials.

























































We will use these relationships in the structural estimation that follows below.
2.4.1.2 Post-Tsunami period
At the beginning of period τ many firms’ production processes in Japan are disrupted.
Obtaining the desired amount of shipments of materials from Japan may either be pro-
hibitively expensive or simply impossible. Modeling firm behavior in this environment
therefore requires modifications to the previous setup. One possibility is to assume that
the quantity of materials that firms obtain from Japan is exogenous and that firms freely
choose non-Japanese materials, capital and labor. This option is unattractive for two rea-
sons. First, due to existing contracts it is unlikely that a firm is able to adjust the quantities
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of non-Japanese materials, capital, and labor without costs in such a short time frame. One
remedy would be to add adjustment costs to the model. Although straightforward, this ap-
proach would require us to estimate additional parameters. Second, and more importantly,
the materials sourced from Japan (mJi,t) may not be exogenous for every firm. Some suppliers
in Japan may have been unaffected by the earthquake and tsunami such that materials could
be shipped as desired. Hence, using this approach would require us to distinguish between
firms whose supply chains are disrupted and those whose are not. That is, we would have
to classify firms based on an endogenous outcome.
For these reasons we prefer an alternative approach, namely to estimate the production
function without specifying the full optimization problem. We only assume that in period
τ , firms operate the same technologies given by (2.6) and (2.7), and that no firm adjusts its
capital stock such that Ki,τ = Ki,τ−1. Conditional on knowing the time-invariant features of
the production function (φi, µi, νi), we next describe an estimation procedure that allows us
to find the elasticity parameters most consistent with the observed input choices and output
evident in the data.
2.4.2 Estimation
Recall that we use North American exports as a proxy for a firm’s output pxi,txi,t, with
the underlying assumption that the former is proportional to the latter. We continue here
in the same spirit, though we now make this assumption explicit. Let V NAi,t be the value of





In words, κi is the fraction of firm i’s shipments exported to Canada and Mexico in the six
months preceding the tsunami. We next make two assumptions that allow us to construct
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an estimation equation. First, we assume that a relationship analogous to (2.12) continues
to hold in period τ , except for a log-additive error ui,τ . That is,
lnV NAi,τ = lnκip
x
i,τxi,τ + ui,τ . (2.13)
The second assumption is that E [ui,τ |Xi] = 0 where Xi is a vector of all right-hand-side
variables. Setting the conditional mean of ui,τ to zero is a standard exogeneity assumption
requiring that, loosely speaking, the error is uncorrelated with all right-hand-side variables.
It rules out, for example, that in response to a fall in Japanese intermediate imports firms
export a fraction of their shipments to Canada and Mexico that systematically differs from κi.
We provide evidence in section 2.5.3.1 that demonstrates that this is a reasonable assumption.



























Values for νi and µi are obtained from equations (2.10) and (2.11).
17 Using (2.12), the






















Notice that κi and φi are not separately identified. Under standard assumptions, we can
consistently estimate equation (2.14) using, e.g., nonlinear least squares. The only parame-
ters to calibrate are the rental rate of capital Rτ and the capital share in the capital/labor
aggregate α. We estimate the two elasticities, ζ and ω. Notice that ω appears in the interme-





17After constructing µi according to equation (2.11) we average by industry to reduce the level of noise.
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Why do we restrict the sample to the year surrounding the To¯hoku event? To understand
this, recall that the principal difficulty of estimating production functions lies in unobserved
inputs and productivity. Since both are unobserved by the econometrician, they are absorbed
into the error term. However, because they are known to the firm, other input choices depend
on them. Hence, right-hand-side variables and the error term will generally be correlated,
rendering estimates inconsistent.18
By restricting the sample period to a single year, the assumption of constant firm pro-
ductivity seems appropriate. If productivity is constant, it cannot be correlated with the
error term, thereby ruling out one of the concerns.19 The fact that the To¯hoku event was an
unexpected shock negates much of the concern about endogeneity arising from unobserved
inputs. To see why, consider the case when the firm anticipates a supply chain disruption
in a future period. Firm adjustment of unobserved inputs in expectation of this shock will
impact input choices – leading to an endogeneity problem where inputs are correlated with
the shock. Put simply, the unexpected nature of the To¯hoku event works towards equalizing
the information sets between the econometrician and the firm because factor choices are not
affected prior to the shock being realized.20
Before turning to the data we briefly discuss the intuition of parameter identification.
Unlike other approaches to estimating elasticities of substitution (e.g. Feenstra et al. (2014)),
our method does not rely on the response of relative values to a change in relative prices.21
In fact, in an econometric sense, our approach treats all inputs as independent variables.
A simple example illustrates how the parameters are identified. Consider the production
18This problem is discussed in greater detail in, for example, Ackerberg et al. (2006).
19Of course, the size and exogeneity of the shock also helps with this concern: any idiosyncratic produc-
tivity movements during this time are surely subsumed by the earthquake/tsunami.
20An unobserved input that could remain operative in our case is that of factor utilization. Since the
scope for substantial adjustment along this dimension seems quite limited, we remain confident that our
estimates would be robust to the inclusion of this missing ingredient.
21Given that we observe little systematic variation in prices (see section 2.5.3.4), we believe that our
approach is more appropriate in this setting.
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function (2.6) and suppose that, for a particular firm, the initial period yields a value of
(1− µ) = 0.4. The elasticity ζ determines how deviations from this measure of the optimal
input mix between the intermediate aggregate Mi,τ and the capital labor aggregate translate
into measured output. Thus, if we observe comparatively fewer intermediates Mi,τ , reflecting
a different mix of inputs than that given by 0.4, we obtain an elasticity estimate for ζ that
best matches the response in output. Because the estimates for µ, ν, and κiφi are themselves
functions of the elasticities, this procedure must iterate across the parameter space to find
the estimate most consistent with the data. Similar reasoning applies for the identification of
the ω elasticity based on relative movements in Japanese materials, non-Japanese materials,
and output. The estimates we obtain are the best fit across the firms in each sample.
2.4.3 Connecting Model and Data
Estimation of the model requires data on employment, Japanese and non-Japanese ma-
terial inputs, as well as on exports to North America and output prices for periods τ − 1
and τ . Since data on firm-specific capital stocks are hard to obtain and likely noisy, we use
equation (2.9) to construct it from firm payroll and a semi-annual rental rate of 7 percent
for period τ − 1.22 Recall that the capital stock is not adjusted over this time horizon so
that Ki,τ = Ki,τ−1. The parameter α is calibrated to 1/3.23
Quarterly employment information comes from the Business Register, which we adjust
to reflect the average value over the 6 month periods we study, as they do not align with
the quarters defined within a calendar year.24 As discussed in earlier sections, the LFTTD
contains firm-level data of Japanese imports and North American exports. For non-Japanese
22This comes from assuming a real interest rate of 4 percent, combined with an annual depreciation rate
of 10 percent, and then adjusting for a semi-annual frequency. The estimates are insensitive to alternative
values of the rental rate.
23In principle it is possible to construct a firm-specific value for α, using value-added information available
in a census year. We are currently exploring the feasibility of this option.










material inputs, we would ideally combine the non-Japanese imported materials with infor-
mation on domestic material usage for these firms. As information on domestic material
inputs is not available in Census data at this frequency, we utilize information on the to-
tal material expenditures from the Census of Manufacturers (CM) to construct a firm-level
scaling factor to gross up non-Japanese intermediate imports. Put differently, we impute
non-Japanese material inputs from non-Japanese input imports. For each firm, we construct
the scaling factor as





from the latest CM year. Because the closest available CM year is 2007 in our data, there
is some concern about missing or outdated information for this factor. We mitigate this
by using industry-specific means for missing values, and winsorizing large outliers at the
90th/10th percentiles.
Regarding information on prices, the LFTTD records the value and quantity of each
trade transaction (at the HS10 level), and thus it is possible to construct the associated
price, or “unit-value” of each shipment directly.25 Aggregating up these shipments into a
firm-month observation is complicated, of course, by the differing quantity units. Lacking
any better alternative, we simply average the transaction prices using the dollar value of
each transaction as weights.
Finally, we restrict the sample of firms to those that have regular imports from Japan and
non-Japan over the periods we study, as well as regular North American exports.26 While
this substantially limits the number of firms in each sample, the shares of trade represented
by these firms in each category remains very high (see Table 2.3).
We obtain standard errors using bootstrap methods, which also allow us to account for the
25Those transactions with missing or imputed quantity information are dropped. Future efforts will
evaluate whether it is possible to recover the quantity values from prior transaction details.
26Specifically, we drop any firm that has more than 3 months of zeros for any of these values, over the
period τ − 1 or the period τ .
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uncertainty implied by the imputation of non-Japanese material inputs. We draw randomly
with replacement from our set of firms to construct 5000 different bootstrap samples. For
each of these samples, the non-Japanese materials share is imputed as described above before
the estimation proceeds.
2.4.4 Summary of Results
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 2.3. The elasticity between material
inputs for Japanese affiliates is 0.2, while the elasticity between the aggregate material input
and capital/labor is 0.03. Together, these estimates are indeed consistent with the reduced-
form evidence for the (ψ) elasticity from section 2.3.2. The relative magnitudes are also
intuitive: while Japanese imported inputs are strong complements with other material inputs
— consistent with the high share of intra-firm transactions comprising this trade — there is
even less scope for substitution between material inputs and domestic capital/labor.
The estimation procedure also allows us to estimate these elasticities for two samples of
non-Japanese firms: non-Japanese multinationals and non-multinational firms. While the
estimates for the ζ elasticity are indeed very close for these other samples, the elasticity
estimates corresponding to material inputs are higher, at 0.6 and 0.4 respectively. The lower
share of intra-firm imports from Japan for the non-Japanese multinationals aligns with the
argument that this type of trade is the key source of non-substitutability in the short-run.
On the other hand, the low estimates for non-multinational firms, which have essentially
zero intra-firm imports, may point to other mechanisms at work beyond the role of intra-
firm trade. More generally, however, the estimates for these parameters are all significantly
lower than what is commonly assumed (typically unity or higher) in the literature.
Although the number of firms included in this estimation is small (550 firms in total
across the three subgroups) , they account for a large share of economic activity in the
United States. Looking at their combined share of total trade, these firms account for over
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80% of Japanese intermediate imports, 68% of non-Japanese intermediate imports, and well
over 50% of North American exports. Such high concentration of trade among relatively few
firms is consistent with other studies using this data (see Bernard et al. (2007)).
2.5 Discussion
The structural estimates of the model are broadly in agreement with the evidence in
section 2.3.2: imported inputs are strong complements with other inputs in the production
function. The rigidity of the production function for multinational firms in particular is likely
due to i) the high degree of intra-firm trade in what is presumably highly specialized inputs,
and ii) .27 Our results have a number of important implications for how economists should
think about multinational firms in general, as well as aggregate topics such as volatility and
business cycle co-movement.
2.5.1 Aggregation
Before relating our estimates to macroeconomic topics, it is important to discuss aggre-
gation. Indeed, in any study utilizing micro-level estimates to inform macro-level objects
of interest, the details of aggregation and heterogeneity are of critical importance. Work
by Imbs and Me´jean (2011) argues that imposing homogeneity across sectors when estimat-
ing consumption elasticities can be overly restrictive, creating a heterogeneity bias which
can be quantitatively large. In our case one could discuss aggregation along various dimen-
sions: across products, industries, firms, and so on. We examine the effects of product-level
aggregation in section 2.5.3.3 below.
A primary concern is how to translate the results from the firm-level subsamples into
estimates that would pertain to macro-oriented models. As a first step, the final column
27The vertical integration of production across countries, within the firm, has shown to be a key driver
of the decline in joint ventures (see Desai et al. (2004)).
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in Table 2.3 shows the elasticity estimates when aggregating across all firms in the sample.
The results are consistent with the estimates by subgroup, suggesting substantial comple-
mentarities across inputs. All estimates in Table 2.3, however, correspond to the average
across firms in each group, and do not take into account heterogeneity in firm size within
the groups. It is relatively straightforward to modify our estimation procedure to weight
firms according to their relative size.28 We report the results from this modified estimation
in Panel B of Table 2.4. When comparing the results to those in Table 2.3, it is evident
that the weighted estimates are not substantially different than the unweighted estimates.
Although the samples of firms comprising these estimates do not amount to the total manu-
facturing sector of the United States, they do account for the considerable majority of U.S.
trade.
2.5.2 Implications
The rigid production networks of foreign-owned multinationals will have direct conse-
quences on the destination (host) economy. Previous literature has hypothesized that input
linkages could generate business-cycle comovement, but supportive empirical evidence has
been difficult to find. This paper can be seen as a first step in establishing empirical evidence
for a causal relationship between trade, multinational firms, and business cycle comovement.
In a companion paper (Boehm et al. (2014b)), we evaluate the quantitative importance of
such complementarities of imported inputs by multinational affiliates. When separately ac-
counting for intermediate input trade by multinationals and traditional trade in final goods,
the model distinguishes between the production elasticity of imported inputs and the tradi-
tional “Armington” elasticity used to bundle together international goods for consumption.
The complementarities in import linkages by multinationals increases value-added comove-
28Since the appropriate measure of size in our context is output, we follow our convention and use the
relative amounts of North American exports in the period before the shock as the weights.
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ment in the model by 11 percentage points relative to a benchmark without such firms.
This model shares similarities with several other existing models, particularly Burstein
et al. (2008). A key advantage of Boehm et al. (2014b), however, is a tight link to Census
data for matching other features of multinationals and trade. Johnson (2014) also looks at
the role of vertical linkages on comovement, but applies greater input-output structure on
the model. Such features will generate increases in value-added comovement in his model,
the magnitude of which becomes significant only when the elasticity of substitution among
inputs is sufficiently low. Other work also identifies multinationals as a key source of the
transmission of shocks: Cravino and Levchenko (2014) demonstrates that foreign multina-
tional affiliates can account for about 10 percent of aggregate productivity shocks.29
The low value for ω indicates the presence of spillovers beyond the immediate effect from
Japan. That is, imports from non-Japanese locations are lower as a result of the shock in
Japan30, and we would presume this applies to suppliers within the United States as well.
Specifically, upstream suppliers (in countries other than Japan as well as within the U.S.)
were affected indirectly due to the exposure of Japanese affiliates to the shock combined with
the rigidity of their production with respect to those inputs. Downstream suppliers that rely
on the inputs from the disrupted firms would likewise be adversely affected. The presence
of such spillovers combined with the large network of input linkages can indeed magnify the
total effect of the transmission of the shock to the U.S. market. Such effects are also evident
in a related paper, Carvalho et al. (2014), which finds large spillovers in both upstream and
downstream firms in Japan following the 2011 earthquake.
Another branch of literature on the diversification of risk has studied whether firms using
complex production structures with several intermediates could be less volatile (Koren and
29Of course, shocks can be passed through to affiliates through other means as well. See Peek and
Rosengren (1997) and Peek and Rosengren (2000) for the case of U.S. affiliates from Japan.
30To confirm this, see Figure ??, which replicates the results in Figures 2.6 (Panel A) and 2.7, but only
for non-Japanese imports.
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Tenreyro (2013)). Kurz and Senses (2013) establish that firms with substantial imports
and exports have lower employment volatility than domestic firms in the medium to long
term, which they attribute partly to the diversification of risk.31 The key result in this
paper points to a possibly overlooked fact: the extent of the benefits from diversification
depends heavily on the substitutability of inputs. Conditional on a given number of inputs
used in production, a firm will likely experience greater volatility if each input is key to
the production process and inputs are subject to heterogeneous shocks.32 Conceptually, an
increase in the use of imported inputs should not be viewed necessarily as diversification. A
fragmentation of production can lead to an increased supply chain risk that is an important
counterweight to whatever efficiencies such complex input sourcing might afford, particularly
when the production elasticities are low.
The rigid production networks of multinational firms also influences our understanding
of why firms segment production across country borders. In a related paper, ? shows that
despite the presence of substantial and complex import linkages with the source country
(consistent with a vertical framework of FDI), the motive for multinational production ap-
pears to be to serve the domestic market (consistent with the horizontal framework of FDI).
The result could be called “horizontal FDI with production sharing.”33 The evidence for
strong complementarities in this production sharing, however, presents a puzzle. Why does
the firm replicate only select portions of the supply chain, considering the penalties for dis-
ruptions and mismatched inputs are so great? It is perhaps the case that the segments of
the production chain that remain in the source country have a location-specific component
31An interesting result from Kurz and Senses (2013) is that firms that only import are actually more
volatile than the domestic-only benchmark.
32Pravin and Levchenko (2014) outline theoretical results showing that for a given elasticity value (in
their case, Leontief), volatility in output per worker should be actually decreasing in the number of inputs
used.
33Ramondo et al. (2014) is another recent example arguing for a more nuanced interpretation of multina-
tional production.
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that is not easily transferable when the firm moves production abroad.34 Understanding the
dynamics behind these sourcing decisions is an area in need of further research.35
2.5.3 Robustness and Extensions
2.5.3.1 Mis-measurement of Firm Production
A natural concern with our analysis is the use of N.A. exports as a proxy for firm-level
production. Perhaps it is the case that shipments abroad fall disproportionately more than
domestic shipments following a shock to production. If this were the case, the N.A. exports
would indeed be a poor proxy for production, and its usefulness in evaluating a production
elasticity substantially compromised.
To evaluate this concern, we narrow our study to the automotive sector, which has data
on production, sales, and inventory at a monthly frequency. Using the Ward’s electronic
databank, which reproduces the published series in the annual Automotive Yearbook, we
obtain plant-level information on production, and model-line information on inventory, sales,
and incentives.36 The baseline specification is the same as in equation (2.5), where the
dependent variable is now Qjit: production of plant j of firm i in month t. The Japanese
multinational firms are, in this case, those automakers with plants located within North
America but whose parent company is headquartered in Japan.37
Figure 2.8 shows the results, where we once again divide by pre-shock levels to gain a
sense of the percentage effects of these changes. Relative to their U.S. counterparts, Japanese
automakers in the United States experienced large drops in production following the To¯hoku
34The model of knowledge sharing in Keller and Yeaple (2013) is one attempt to analyze the dynamics
between such transfers being accomplished in embodied (intra-firm trade) or disembodied (direct commu-
nication) form. Alternatively, domestic content requirements may provide incentives to produce specified
inputs in one location over another.
35For a recent example of how such investment and sourcing decisions can alter a country’s comparative
advantage over time, see Alviarez (2014).
36Appendix B.3.7 details further features of this data and explains how the sample was constructed.
37These firms are Honda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Toyota, and Subaru.
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event. Production bottomed out in May of 2011 — two months after the event — at almost
60 percent below trend. 38 The point estimates return to a level near zero in September
of 2011, implying that the shock affected production for nearly 6 months.39 We interpret
these results to be largely supportive of the results obtained using the exports-based proxy
for production. The percentage drops in the two series are remarkably similar: a trough of
59% at t = 2 in the automotive data vs 53% at t = 2 using the proxy. We conclude that,
at least for this exercise, the proxy appears to be providing valuable information on a firm’s
U.S. production behavior.40
2.5.3.2 Intermediate Input Inventories
Inventories are another obvious feature that should influence the relationship between
input shipments, production, and the elasticity of substitution. In particular, inventories of
intermediate inputs allow the firm to absorb unforeseen shocks to input deliveries without
an impact on the production process.41 As it relates to the production elasticity, however,
the presence of these inventories should serve to diminish or delay the production impact,
thereby increasing the elasticity relative to what it would be without such inventories.
In fact, it is striking the extent to which we do not see any evidence for the role of
38The average monthly plant-level production at these firms during December 2010 through February
2011 was about 12,200 units a month. The magnitude of the drop in May was -7200 units.
39We describe additional results on the behavior of inventories, sales, incentives, and production in Japan
in an appendix.
40In addition, one might be concerned that the N.A. exports series may be contaminated with Japanese
imports whose country of ultimate destination is Canada/Mexico (a.k.a “in-transit shipments” – imports to
Canada/Mexico via U.S.). These shipments should not be picked up in the reporting systems underlying
the LFTTD. According to section 30.2(d)(1) of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, “In-transit shipments
of goods from one foreign country to another where such goods do not enter the consumption channels
of the United States are excluded from filing the Electronic Export Information (EEI).” Additionally, the
Army Corps of Engineers has suspended the requirement to file the Form 7513, Shippers Export Declaration
(SED) for In-transit Goods leaving the United States via vessel. Finally, the corroborating results from
section 2.5.3.1 should also serve to allay such concerns.
41The existence of final good inventories, on the other hand, makes a distinction between the production
and sales of a particular product. Here, the presence of final good inventories implies that the firm can
continue to sell from existing inventory stocks even while production is temporarily affected.
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intermediate input inventories in the production impacts of Figure 2.6 (Panel B) or Figure
2.8. The effect on production appears to be almost immediate, indicating that the stock of
inventories of imported intermediates is low (less than one month’s supply) for these firms.
We obtain a rough sense of the degree of inventory holdings from the Census of Man-
ufacturers micro-data. Combining information on the beginning period stock of materials
inventories with the annual usage of materials, we calculate the average monthly supply of
inventories for each firm.42 Panel A of Table 2.1 calculates the production-weighted averages
over a select set of firm groups.43 We see that on average, Japanese multinationals hold a
little over 3-weeks supply of intermediate inputs as inventory. This is slightly less than non-
multinational firms, a fact that aligns with the oft-cited “lean” production processes made
famous by Japanese firms in previous decades. Though these data are for the year 2007,
there is little reason to believe these relative magnitudes have changed substantially over a
period of a few years. For completeness, Panel A of Table 2.1 also reports the corresponding
estimates for output inventories.44
Low inventory holdings combined with an inelastic production function suggests that
firms are willing to tolerate some degree of expected volatility in their production. Either
the costs of holding inventories or diversifying sources of supply are sufficiently high, or firms
believe the probability of disruption is low. In either case, these lean production strategies
carry a greater potential for the propagation of shocks across countries, perhaps affecting
firms with limited knowledge of their indirect exposure through complicated production
chains.
42Unfortunately, the CM data does not report imported materials inventory separately.
43These numbers are broadly similar, though somewhat lower than other estimates in the literature. See
Ramey (1989) for one example.
44At first glance, the average monthly supply of these output inventories looks surprisingly low. On the
other hand, it is probably the case that inventories are held jointly by the manufacturer and wholesale/retail
establishments Thus, considering the inventories of manufacturers alone could potentially under-represent
the “true” level of output inventories available for smoothing out production disturbances.
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2.5.3.3 Multi-Products and Sub-Optimal Mix
In the frameworks used in sections 2.3.1 and 2.4, we consider the aggregate bundles of
imported intermediates, abstracting away from product-level detail. In reality, the firms
in our dataset often import many distinct intermediate inputs from Japan. The structure
of a CES production function implies that if each of these within-country inputs was non-
substitutable with one another (a further, nested Leontief structure), the production impact
of a disruption in the supply of just one input could be amplified relative to the value of that
input.45 We evaluate this possibility below.
This is particularly true given the heterogeneous impact of the To¯hoku event across
Japan (see Figure 2.4). This could translate into considerable dispersion in the impact on
the products imported by a particular U.S. firm or Japanese affiliate. With product-level
shocks, considering the effect on the aggregate import bundle amounts to assuming either
1) perfect substitutability among products, or 2) that the firm maintains an optimal within-
country product mix at all times.
To be concrete, it may be more accurate to view the Mt in equation (2.1) as a further
C.E.S. function of multiple products. Thus, we can define the proper measurement of this
variable as

















where now V Mi,t is the value based on a combination of N distinct products, with weights ηn
and elasticity χ.
Product-level heterogeneity in the production impact of the shock combined with im-
perfect coordination among input suppliers implies that the aggregate (measured) import





n,tmn,t) ≥ V Mi,t . And the lower the elasticity of substitution among products,
45This point has been made in somewhat differing contexts, by Kremer (1993) and Jones (2011).
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the more severe the disconnect between the measured imports and the “effective” imports
— that which is actually useful in downstream production.
A suboptimal product mix indicates that measured imports (V̂ Mi,t) are greater than the
effective imports (V Mi,t ). As a result the measured output response to the import shock will
be larger than otherwise, resulting in a downward “bias” in the elasticity estimates from
section 2.3.1 and 2.4.46 Such an effect is decreasing in the product-level elasticity parameter
χ, as complementarity itself is the driving force between differences in V̂ Mi,t and V
M
i,t . In
addition, the effect is also increasing in the degree of deviation from the optimal product
mix.
Does this exert a quantitatively large effect on our point estimates? Given the emphasis
on low inventories and lean production processes in downstream operations, one might expect
that across-product adjustment would take place before sending the inputs abroad. To
analyze this empirically, we analyze whether there are significant deviations in the product
composition of Japanese imports during the months following the To¯hoku event. To do this,
we construct a measure of the distance of a firm’s import bundle from a benchmark, which
we will interpret to be the optimal bundle. Let t = s∗ be such a benchmark date. Then,
using the product-level information in the LFTTD data we construct for each firm i, the
share of total imports from Japan for a given product code n. Defining this share to be sn,i,t,






(|sn,i,t − sn,i,s∗|) (2.17)
where N i is the total number of products imported by firm i. We define the period s∗
to be the months of April-June of 2010, and then evaluate DOi at a monthly frequency,
with particular interest in the months following the To¯hoku event. While there may be
46Because the source of this downward pressure on the estimate for ψ (or ω) is itself a very low product-
level elasticity, it is unclear whether this should be considered a bias in the traditional sense.
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natural movements in the bundle of products imported from Japan, evidence for substantial
coordination failure in product composition or heterogeneity in product-level shocks would
come from any abnormal jumps in this index in the months of the disruption. One can
calculate this at various levels of product aggregation (i.e. HS4, HS6, HS8, HS10), though
we report results using the HS6 level.47
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 2.9. We plot the average DOi across
Japanese firms for each month (the figure shows a 3-month moving average) during the
period 2009-2011. Mechanically, this measure should be relatively close to zero in the months
consisting of the benchmark (April-June 2010). While there is a secular rise in this measure
on either side of this benchmark period, there do not appear to be any large jumps in the
months directly following the To¯hoku event. More interesting, perhaps, are the considerably
larger values for this measure during early 2009, which might reflect the effects of the trade
collapse associated with the Great Recession. We interpret Figure 2.9 as evidence that the
potential for suboptimal mix across products from Japan does not pose a serious problem
to our measurement in previous sections.
2.5.3.4 Other Considerations
Strategic Behavior: Another possibility that could affect the interpretation of the re-
sults from Figure 2.7 might be strategic behavior, particularly on the part of the competitors
of Japanese firms in the United States. These firms could raise production or prices following
the negative supply shock affecting their competitors, which would serve to bias downward
the βp coefficients from the equation with X
NA
i,t as the dependent variable.
48 To evaluate this
47The level of aggregation we use attempts to balance concerns along two dimensions. With less product
aggregation (i.e. HS10 level), one might be concerned with the inherent lumpiness of product-level firm
imports. More product aggregation, on the other hand, could mask important product differences within a
particular product grouping.
48Specifically, in equation (2.5) the γp’s would be higher than would be expected without the shock, and
hence the βp’s artificially low.
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possibility, we turn once again to the automotive data. Here, we can look directly at the
production of non-Japanese automakers in the months directly following the To¯hoku event.
Appendix Figure A1 plots the relative production of these firms, using time-series variation
only. There appears to be no quantitatively meaningful responses in the months following
March 2011. This should not come as a surprise given capacity constraints and utilization
adjustment costs, particularly given the short time horizon. We provide evidence on the role
of prices next.
Prices: Traditionally, estimating the elasticity of substitution is accomplished via price
and quantity data for products over extended periods of time. For the short horizon we
consider in this paper, there are several reasons why prices may not have the scope to ad-
just. Many supplier relationships negotiate prices for longer periods of time than one or
two months. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Table 2.2 demonstrates that the large
majority of imported intermediate inputs are intra-firm. The observed prices of these trans-
actions are transfer-prices (within firm) and not likely to change reflecting any short-term
disturbance. However, because the LFTTD contains both quantity and price information,
we can confirm whether or not prices remained relatively stable during this period. The
results in Appendix Table B.6 confirm that there are few significant price movements on im-
port or export transactions for either Japanese or non-Japanese multinationals surrounding
the To¯hoku event.49
Domestic Inputs: It is also possible to evaluate the response of domestic inputs di-
rectly, using the limited information we have on quarterly firm-level employment and payroll
information, taken from the Census Bureau’s Business Register (BR).50 We consider the
evidence in Appendix B.3.5 and find no significant effects on either employment or payroll
49Further details on the construction of the data underlying the analysis of unit values is available in
Appendix B.3.6.
50The BR itself receives quarterly payroll and employment information for business and organizational
employers from the IRS: Form 941, the Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return. For more information on
the BR (formerly the SSEL), see Walker (1997).
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for Japanese firms in the quarter(s) following the shock (see Table B.5). Of course, there are
a number of reasons — principally labor adjustment costs — why one would expect little, if
any, impacts on employment following this short-lived shock. Press releases dispatched by
the Japanese automakers during this time indicated that no layoffs would occur. Rather, the
firms indicated that they would use the production stoppages for employee skill and safety
training.
2.5.4 External Validity
Finally, we discuss the external validity of this result. The exogenous variation we use to
identify this elasticity is tied to a particular event in time, making generalization subject to
some caveats. On the other hand, there are few, if any, estimates of this parameter in the
existing literature. The critical question is whether the mechanisms underlying the elasticity
estimates are operative beyond the circumstances surrounding this event study.
The pattern of strong intermediate input linkages with the source country is not restricted
to Japanese affiliates only. As shown in Flaaen (2013a), over 45 percent of the imports for
all foreign multinational affiliates are sourced from the country of the parent firm. The cost
share of imported intermediates from the source country is 0.12 for all foreign affiliates, which
is lower than the 0.22 for Japanese affiliates but still much larger than the representative
importing firm in the United States. The cost share of all imported inputs is actually quite
close: 35 percent for Japanese affiliates vs 32 percent for all foreign affiliates.
A related concern is whether the estimates for Japanese affiliates are driven solely by
the automotive sector. The ideal check would be to run industry-by-industry subgroup es-
timates for the elasticities, thereby generating heterogeneity that could be assessed relative
to expectations. Unfortunately, the small number of firms applicable for this analysis, com-
bined with disclosure requirements associated with the Census Bureau data usage, prevents
this degree of detail. Instead, we address this concern by splitting the sample into a motor
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vehicle and non-motor vehicle subsample. We do this for the Japanese multinationals as well
as the total sample of all firms. The results for these four subsamples are reported in Panel
C of Table 2.4. Using the published data from the B.E.A., the automotive sector is a large
but not overwhelming percentage of total Japanese manufacturing affiliates in the U.S. The
entire motor vehicle sector as a whole comprises significantly less than half of value-added
(roughly 40 percent) for the Japanese manufacturing affiliates.
When viewed in light of the substantial fraction of intra-firm imports comprising multi-
national affiliate trade, the low elasticity of substitution should not come as a surprise. One
would not expect close substitutes for the sort of specialized products reflecting firm-specific
knowledge that likely comprises this trade. Moreover, such a low estimate for an elasticity of
this nature is not without precedent. Using different methodologies, recent work by Atalay
(2014) highlights strong complementarities between intermediate inputs, using industry-level
data for the United States.51
Any elasticity estimate is tied to the time-horizon to which it corresponds. Ruhl (2004)
emphasizes the difference between elasticities implied by responses to temporary vs perma-
nent shocks. Larger values are calculated for an elasticity following a permanent shock,
owing in part to firm responses along the extensive margin. In our context, we estimate the
elasticity subject to a short-lived shock where the structure of the supply chain is plausi-
bly fixed and extensive margin movements of supplier relationships would not apply. For
this reason the elasticity parameters (ω, ζ) should likely generalize to other contexts of this
horizon and for shocks of this general duration. Even for a long-lived shock, the estimated
elasticities would remain relevant while the firm makes changes to its network of suppliers.
Evaluating whether there is evidence for long-term supply-chain reorganization following the
To¯hoku event is an area of ongoing work.




Using a novel firm-level dataset to analyze firm behavior surrounding a large exogenous
shock, this paper reveals the mechanisms underlying cross-country spillovers. We find com-
plementarities in the international production networks of Japanese affiliates, such that the
U.S. output of these firms declined dramatically following the To¯hoku earthquake, roughly
in line with an equally large decline in imported inputs. The elasticity of substitution be-
tween imported and domestic inputs that would best match this behavior is very low –
nearly that implied by a Leontief production function. The reliance on intra-firm imports by
multinational affiliates from their source country is the most plausible explanation for such
strong complementarities in production. Structural estimates of disaggregated elasticities
are similarly low, and imply spillovers to upstream and downstream firms in the U.S. and
abroad (non-Japan). The large impacts to Japanese affiliates together with the propagation
to other U.S. firms explains the large transmission of the shock to the U.S. economy in the
aggregate.
These elasticities play a critical role in the way international trade impacts both source
and destination economies. Such complementarities between domestic and foreign goods
have been shown to improve the ability of leading theoretical models to fit key moments
of the data. We emphasize here the distinction between substitutability between domestic
and foreign final goods (a “consumption” elasticity of substitution, or the so-called Arm-
ington elasticity) and substitutability between domestic and foreign intermediate goods (a
“production” elasticity of substitution). In a companion paper (Boehm et al. (2014b)), we
document the behavior of a model with such complementarities in imported intermediates,
and discuss how these elasticity parameters interact. Calibrating this model to the share of
multinational affiliate trade in intermediates yields an increase in value-added comovement
of 11 p.p.
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Such rigid production networks will also play a substantial role in aggregate volatility,
productivity growth and dispersion, and the international ownership structure of production.
The novel datasets described in this paper may help to shed light on these and other areas
of research in the future.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Imported Inputs and Inventories by Firm Type
Japanese Non
Multinationals Multinationals
Panel A: Avg. Monthly Supply of Inventories
Inputs 0.83 1.08
Output 0.31 0.45
Panel B: Cost Share Of Imported Inputs
from Japan 21.8 1.0
from all countries 35.0 17.5
Source: CM, LFTTD, DCA, and UBP as explained in the text. The data
are for year 2007. This table reports the average monthly supply of in-
ventories [(usage/12)/beginning period inventory stock] for materials and
output, as well as the cost share of imported products.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Cost Share Of Imported Inputs
Japanese Non
Firms Multinationals
from Japan 21.8 1.0
from all countries 35.0 17.5
Panel B: Treatment Effects Sample Details
Japanese Other Balancing Tests % Reduct
Firms Multinationals t p > |t| |bias|
N.A. Exports 3,504,894 3,413,058 0.38 0.706 79.1




8,075,893 7,596,761 0.87 0.384 88
share from Japan 70.0 3.5
share intra-firm 86.0 21.7
Industry (Avg) – – 0.009 0.965 97.8
Source: LFTTD, DCA, and UBP as explained in the text.
Panel A data are for year 2007. Panel B reports the baseline average values of N.A. exports and
intermediate input imports, as well as the characteristics of that trade, for the two groups of firms:
Japanese affiliates and other multinational firms. The statistics are calculated in the three months
prior to the To¯hoku earthquake: Dec. 2010, Jan. 2011, and Feb 2011. The control group of other
multinational firms has been re-weighted using the normalized propensity score, from a specification
including the level of N.A. exports, int imports, and industry dummies. The final three columns
report balancing tests of the equality of the means between the treated and control group.
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Panel B: Estimation Results
Japanese Non-Japanese Non- All
Multinationals Multinationals Multinationals Firms
ω 0.201 0.624 0.423 0.552
[0.02 0.43] [0.16 0.69] [0.26 0.58] [0.21 0.62 ]
ζ 0.032 0.038 0.032 0.037




0.223 0.514 0.278 0.409
Weight on JPN
Materials (1− ν¯) 0.173 0.044 0.147 0.096
Number of Firms 105 304 141 550
Share of Total Trade
JPN int imports 0.60 0.23 0.03 0.86
Non-JPN int imports 0.02 0.66 0.01 0.69
N.A. exports 0.08 0.47 0.01 0.56
Source: CM, LFTTD, DCA, and UBP as explained in the text.
This table reports the results from the firm-level estimation detailed in section 2.4. Panel A outlines the
parameters that are calibrated prior to estimation. The top two rows of Panel B reports the point estimates
of the elasticities, and the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals using a bootstrapping procedure.
(See Appendix B.3.3 for more details on the measurement of dispersion for these estimates.) Rows 3 and
4 report other estimates related to the calculated production functions. The final rows of Panel B describe
features of the estimation samples.
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Panel B: Estimation Results (Weighted)
Japanese Non-Japanese Non- All
Multinationals Multinationals Multinationals Firms
ω 0.157 0.611 0.543 0.606
[0.02 0.40] [0.30 1.23] [0.305 0.57] [0.28 0.70]
ζ 0.241 0.038 0.032 0.037
[0.03 0.884] [0.034 0.51] [0.029 0.55] [0.034 0.038 ]
Number of Firms 105 304 141 550
Panel C: Estimation Results: MV Sector
Japanese Mult. All Firms
Motor Non-Motor Motor Non-Motor
Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles
ω 0.311 0.094 0.414 0.574
[0.019 0.398] [0.016 0.59] [0.27 0.60] [0.16 0.66]
ζ 0.032 0.071 0.037 0.037
[0.030 0.48] [0.028 1.27] [0.031 0.64] [0.033 0.037]
Number of Firms 35 70 100 450
Source: CM, LFTTD, DCA, and UBP as explained in the text.
This table reports additional estimation results. Panel B recalculates the results from Table 2.3 using a
vector of weights to assign larger firms a greater share in the estimation. Panel C divides the samples
based on the motor vehicle industry.
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Figure 2.1: Index of Japanese Industrial Production: Manufacturing Jul.2010 - Jan.2012
Source: Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
(METI). The series are logged, HP-Filtered, after seasonally ad-
justing.
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Figure 2.2: U.S. Imports from Japan and Rest of World, Jul.2010 - Jan.2012
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (FT900: U.S. International Trade in
Goods and Services). The series are logged, HP-Filtered, after
seasonally adjusting.
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Figure 2.3: U.S. Industrial Production: Manufacturing and Durable Goods
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Industrial Production and Capac-
ity Utilization - G.17 Series . Series is Seasonally Adjusted.
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Figure 2.4: Geographic Distribution of Earthquake Intensity and Affiliate Locations
Source: USGS and DCA/Uniworld Directories
This figure plots the geographic distribution of the To¯hoku earthquake, based on recorded measure-
ments taken directly after the event. The “Modified Mercalli Intensity” (MMI) scale is constructed
based on a relation of survey response and measured peak acceleration and velocity amplitudes
from prior major seismic events. Each dot corresponds to a geocoded Japanese affiliate location
corresponding to a firm with U.S. operations. For more details, see Appendix B.2.3.2.
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Figure 2.5: Density of Firm-Level Exposure to Japanese Imported Inputs: By Firm Type
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text. The estimates correspond to year 2010. This figure
displays density estimates of the log exposure measure to Japanese imported inputs, separately for
Japanese affiliates and non-Japanese multinational firms. The measure is defined as the ratio of Japanese
imported inputs to total imported inputs plus U.S. salaries and wages. Estimates at either tail are
suppressed for confidentiality purposes.
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Figure 2.6: Dynamic Treatment Effects: Japanese Firms
A. Relative Intermediate Input Imports of Japanese Firms
B. Relative North American Exports of Japanese Firms
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
These figures report the intermediate imports and North American exports of the U.S. affiliates of
Japanese firms relative to a control group of other multinational firms. The values are coefficient
estimates taken from an interaction of a Japanese-firm dummy with a monthly dummy – additional
baseline monthly dummies remove seasonal effects. See equation 2.5 in the text. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure 2.7: Relative Imported Inputs and Output (Proxy) of Japanese Firms: Fraction of
Pre-Shock Level
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This figure reports the intermediate imports and output proxy (North American exports) of the
U.S. affiliates of Japanese firms relative to a control group of other multinational firms. The values
are percent changes from the pre-shock level of each series, defined as the average of the months
December 2010, January 2011, and February 2011.
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Figure 2.8: Assessing the Output Proxy Using Monthly Automotive Production
Source: Ward’s Automotive Database
This figure reports the production levels of Japanese auto plants relative to a control group of
non-Japanese auto plants. The values are percent changes from a pre-shock level, defined as the
average of the months December 2010, January 2011, and February 2011. See equation B.14 in the
text. For purposes of comparison, we also include the equivalent measure corresponding to total
manufacturing of Japanese affiliates using the output proxy from Census data (from Figure 2.7).
The Japanese automakers are Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Toyota, and Subaru. For the sake
of clarity, we suppress the standard errors for the automotive series, though there are 4 months
with below zero production based on a 95 percent confidence interval. See Appendix B.3.7 for more
details.
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Figure 2.9: Japanese Products: Average Distance from Benchmark Cost Shares: JPN Multi-
nationals
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explain in the text
Underlying this figure is the calculation of the average total (absolute) deviations
from a benchmark measure of a firm’s cost shares across input products from Japan.
See equation 2.17 in the text. The figure reports the mean across the Japanese
multinationals used in the section 2.4.
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CHAPTER III
TFP, News, and “Sentiments:” The International
Transmission of Business Cycles
with Andrei A. Levchenko
3.1 Introduction
Business cycles in advanced economies exhibit strong positive comovement. A complete
empirical and theoretical account of positive cross-border comovement remains elusive. The
International Real Business Cycle (IRBC) literature, going back to Backus et al. (1992)
develops quantitative models in which fluctuations are driven by surprise TFP shocks, and
assesses their performance in generating comovement. However, a series of empirical contri-
butions in the closed-economy literature have argued that the bulk of (short-run) business
cycle fluctuations is actually accounted for by non-technology shocks, customarily referred
to as “demand” shocks. (For a number of different approaches that reach this conclusion,
see Blanchard and Quah, 1989; Gal´ı, 1999; Canova and de Nicolo´, 2003; Basu et al., 2006).
It is thus a natural conjecture that international business cycle comovement can be driven
by transmission of non-technology as well as technology shocks across borders. Indeed, in-
ternational business cycle models are more successful at matching basic moments in the data
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when augmented with demand shocks (Stockman and Tesar , 1995; Wen, 2007).1
This paper investigates empirically the relative importance of the cross-border transmis-
sion of both technology and non-technology shocks. It uses US and Canada as a laboratory
to study these issues. These two economies are closely integrated, and very asymmetric in
size. The latter feature implies that identified US shocks are unlikely to be “contaminated”
by endogenous US responses to Canadian shocks.2
We begin by identifying three types of US shocks in a structural vector auto-regression
(VAR) setting. The first is a shock to contemporaneous TFP. This shock is identified as the
reduced-form TFP shock, assuming that the TFP series is ordered first. New to the study
of the international business cycle, the TFP series we use is adjusted for unobserved input
utilization. Basu et al. (2006) show that the utilization adjustment has a large impact on both
the properties of the TFP series itself, and on the impulse responses of US macroeconomic
aggregates to the TFP shock. The second shock is a news shock about future TFP (Beaudry
and Portier , 2006), identified following Barsky and Sims (2011) as the shock that has no
contemporaneous TFP impact and explains the maximum of the forecast error variance of
the utilization-adjusted TFP series.
Most importantly, we propose a new identification strategy for a non-technology business
cycle shock. The VAR includes an expectation variable, alternatively a GDP forecast from
the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters or the Michigan/Reuters Consumer
Confidence variable. The non-technology shock is identified as the shock orthogonal to both
the surprise-TFP and the news-TFP shocks that explains the maximum of the residual
1An obvious alternative is that international comovement is generated by transmission of policy or credit
shocks. Available evidence suggests that the importance of these shocks in fluctuations is limited. Kim
(2001) and Mac´kowiak (2007) show that shocks to the US monetary policy explain only very limited share
of forecast error variance of other countries’ output, while Ilzetzki and Jin (2013) show that even the sign of
the impact is not stable over time. In a similar vein, Helbling et al. (2011), Kollmann (2013), and Eickmeier
and Ng (2015) show that the share of variance of other countries’ GDP accounted for by the US credit shocks
and bank shocks is small as well.
2This approach has been adopted by Cushman and Zha (1997), Schmitt-Grohe´ (1998), Justiniano and
Preston (2010), and Miyamoto and Nguyen (2014), among others.
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forecast error variance of this expectational variable. Because the shock is identified explicitly
from data on expectations after controlling for shocks to current and future TFP, we label this
shock “sentiment” as an homage to the recent literature on non-technology driven business
cycles (e.g., Angeletos and La’O , 2013; Benhabib et al., 2015b; Huo and Takayama, 2015).
It is important to underscore that this is only a shorthand, as we do not identify the precise
mechanisms that produce fluctuations in these theoretical contributions. Our shock can be
driven by anything that makes agents expect better/worse times, conditional on available
information about current and future productivity.
We identify the three shocks in the US data. We then estimate the impact of these
shocks on Canadian macro aggregates, included as non-core variables in the baseline VAR.
The results can be summarized as follows. The sentiment shock generates a US business cycle
and accounts for an important share of forecast error variance in the US macro aggregates.
GDP, consumption, and hours (as well as expectations) all increase on impact, peak within a
year, and revert back to pre-shock values in the medium run. These dynamics are consistent
with the sentiment shock being a transitory “demand” shock. The sentiment shock drives the
bulk of short-run fluctuations in the US. It accounts for 65-75% of the forecast error variance
in GDP at short frequencies (one year or less). At short frequencies, it also accounts for
about one-fifth of the forecast error variance of consumption and about 70% of the forecast
error variance in total hours. The finding that a non-technology shock is responsible for
a large share of short-run fluctuations is of course consistent with results from other ways
of identifying “demand” shocks (see, e.g., Gal´ı, 1999; Canova and de Nicolo´, 2003, among
others).
Our main results concern the cross-border transmission of shocks to Canada. The first
important finding that sets the stage for the rest of the results is that Canadian utilization-
adjusted TFP does not react to any of the three identified US shocks. This makes us confident
that the business cycle impact of US shocks on Canada is not contaminated by an underlying
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correlation between US shocks and Canadian TFP. On the rest of the Canadian variables,
the three identified shocks have very different impacts.
The common theme is that in the short run, Canadian aggregates react much more
strongly to the sentiment shocks than to the surprise and news TFP shocks. Following
a sentiment shock, Canadian GDP rises instantaneously and peaks within one year. By
contrast, the response of Canadian GDP to the US surprise TFP or news shocks is positive
but takes place with a lag of 2-3 quarters. Canadian consumption and hours follow the same
pattern. Canadian exports to the US and US exports to Canada both rise instantaneously
following a sentiment shock, peak at 1 or 2 quarters, and then fall back to steady state. By
contrast, there is not much of a trade response to surprise TFP shocks. US news do not
generate a positive trade response for over 1 year following the shock. There is suggestive
evidence that Canadian imports from and exports to the US actually fall on impact in
response to a US news shock.
Among the three identified US shocks, the sentiment shock is by far the most important
in accounting for the forecast error variance of the Canadian variables. At short frequencies,
it accounts for 20-40% of the forecast error variance of Canadian GDP, 8-12% of Canadian
consumption, 20-35% of Canadian hours, and 25-44% of Canada-US trade flows. By contrast,
the surprise TFP shock accounts for less than 6% of the forecast error variance of Canadian
GDP and hours across all frequencies between 1 quarter and 5 years, and for less than 10%
of Canadian consumption. The (lack of) importance of the US news shock is similar at short
frequencies, though the news shock does become more important for Canadian output and
consumption at frequencies longer than 2 years.
Finally, we examine the role of the three US shocks in business cycle comovement between
US and Canada by means of computing conditional correlations between the variables due to
each shock following the approach in Gal´ı (1999). The correlation of the US and Canadian
GDP conditional on surprise TFP shocks is 0.47. The surprise TFP shock actually generates
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a negative correlation in consumption (−0.13) and hours (−0.47) between US and Canada.
Conditional GDP correlations due to news (0.99) and sentiment (0.99) shocks are much
higher. These shocks generate positive instead of negative correlations of consumption and
hours as well. The sentiment shock generates a conditional correlation in consumption of
0.80 and in hours of 0.98, which is substantially higher than that generated by the news
shock.
The bottom line is that at short frequencies, the non-technology shocks generate a much
stronger cross-border impact of US shocks and account for a higher share of Canadian fluc-
tuations. The sentiment shocks also generate much higher conditional correlations between
US and Canadian aggregates than surprise TFP shocks. At the same time, news shocks are
also important for international comovement at medium frequencies. An empirical account
of observed international comovement therefore requires knowledge of the impact of both
types of shocks, coupled with the understanding that the surprise TFP innovation central
to most IRBC models is actually a shock that does not generate substantial comovement.
The results are robust to wide range of additional controls and alternative empirical
models. Augmenting the VAR with the federal funds rate, we identify the sentiment shock
alongside a monetary policy shock. Accounting for monetary policy shocks does not change
either the properties of the sentiment shock nor its explanatory power. We also show that
the sentiment shock is not an oil shock or an uncertainty shock. We add to the VAR a
number of variables to increase the information set used to identify shocks: stock prices,
consumer prices, the real exchange rate, as well as an estimated factor variable. Adding
these variables does not alter the features of the sentiment shock or diminish noticeably its
importance.
Our analysis is most closely related to empirical assessments of cross-border transmission
of shocks, in particular non-technology shocks. Canova (2005) examines the impact of US
supply and demand shocks on Latin America, while Corsetti et al. (2014) assess the reaction
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of externally-oriented variables – such as real exchange rates and foreign assets – to US supply
and demand shocks. Both of these papers identify supply and demand shocks using sign
restrictions. Our paper contributes a novel identification strategy for supply and demand
shocks, based on expectational variables (for demand) and utilization-adjusted TFP (for
supply). Importantly, we separate news about future TFP – which can look like a demand
shock in the short run – from sentiment shocks unrelated to TFP.
Our paper draws heavily on the recent closed-economy empirical and theoretical litera-
ture on “demand”-driven fluctuations (see, among others, Gal´ı, 1999; Beaudry and Portier ,
2006; Lorenzoni , 2009; Barsky and Sims , 2011; Angeletos and La’O , 2013; Blanchard et al.,
2013; Benhabib et al., 2015b,a; Huo and Takayama, 2015). Two recent papers in particular
identify shocks that are interpreted as sentiments. Angeletos et al. (2014) extract a shock
that explains the most of the forecast error variance of key macroeconomic aggregates, and
show that it has the properties consistent with being a confidence shock. Angeletos et al.
(2014) and Milani (2014) structurally estimate fully-specified DSGE models that incorpo-
rate sentiment shocks, and show that the sentiment shocks identified within the structure of
those models can explain a large fraction of the US business cycle fluctuations. Our empirical
strategy complements both of these approaches. In contrast to both of these alternatives,
we explicitly separate a strictly non-technology sentiment shock from the TFP news shock.
Relative to the data-driven exercise in Angeletos et al. (2014), our identification strategy is
based on explaining the variation only in an explicit expectational variable. Our strategy
thus “ties our hands behind our back” to a much greater extent, as we are not extracting
a shock that by construction explains the bulk of fluctuations in the key macro aggregates.
We complement the fully structural DSGE estimation approach by performing a more data-
driven exercise. It is reassuring that our findings regarding the importance of “sentiments”
in the US business cycle are consistent with these alternative approaches. Substantively, of
course, our focus is on the international dimension of shock transmission.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the empirical strategy
and estimation methods. Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 presents the main
results, while Section 3.5 discusses interpretation and relates our analysis to the literature.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Identification of Shocks
Our identification strategy builds on Uhlig (2003, 2004) and Barsky and Sims (2011).
As an illustration of why it is important to separate non-technology shocks from news TFP
shocks, suppose that the TFP process in the US is affected by only two innovations: an
unanticipated ‘surprise’ TFP shock and a ‘news’ shock. An example of a process that would






where sur and news are the surprise and anticipated innovations in TFP and the agents
learn about the news shock s > 0 periods in advance.3
Further, assume that expectations of future economic activity are influenced not only
by the surprise innovation in TFP and the anticipated future improvement in TFP, but
also by ‘sentiments,’ as the agents rationally expect a positive sentiment shock to lead to a
temporary boom in the economy and increase output. Forward-looking agents also respond
to other changes in the economy that could stimulate GDP, but we assume that the bulk of
the variation in expectations of future activity is due to these three shocks. A simple process













t + ζt, (3.2)
3This TFP process can clearly be modified to include a persistent component.
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with sent the sentiment shock.
Expectations of better future economic conditions, controlling for current fundamentals,
can be due to either news of high future TFP, or to positive ‘sentiment.’ Clearly, in order
to extract a non-technology shock from data on expectations, we must control for news of
future productivity. It would not be possible to identify the three shocks of interest from
movements in TFP and expectations alone. We therefore consider the processes for these
variables together with other forward-looking macroeconomic aggregates in a VAR. Let Yt
denote the k×1 vector of observables in levels. For much of our analysis, this will be US TFP,
real GDP, consumption, hours, and forecasts of GDP. The moving average representation of
this k-variable VAR is:
Yt = B (L) ut,
where ut is the vector of reduced-form disturbances, L denotes the lag operator and B (L)
is the matrix of lag order polynomials.
To identify the structural shocks, we assume that there exists a linear relationship ut =
At where t is the vector of structural shocks and A is the impact matrix. This implies that
the structural representation of the VAR is
Yt = A (L) t,
where A (L) = B (L)A. Clearly, assuming that the structural shocks each have unit vari-
ance, AA′ = Σ, where Σ is the covariance matrix of u. It is well known that the Choleski
decomposition A˜ of Σ provides one candidate for A, but this is just one among many. For
any orthonormal k × k matrix D such that DD′ = I, A˜D will provide an identification of
the structural shocks.
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The forecast error h steps ahead is defined as




where Bτ is the reduced-form matrix of lag-τ moving average coefficients. Since the elements
of t are independent, this equation illustrates that the forecast error variance of a particular
variable i at horizon h is the sum of the contributions of the k structural shocks. Let Ωi,j (h)
denote the contribution of shock j to the forecast error variance of variable i at horizon h.
The assumption that only two shocks (surprise and news) affect true TFP then implies:
Ω1,sur (h) + Ω1,news (h) = 1 ∀h. (3.3)
The unexpected TFP innovation surt in (3.1) is identified as the reduced-form innovation
in a VAR with TFP ordered first. By identifying the reduced-form innovation in TFP as
the first structural shock, we effectively fix Ω1,1 (h) at all horizons. The news shock 
news
t−s is
true news about future changes in TFP s periods ahead. Without loss of generality, assume
the second structural shock is the news shock, and thus the second column of A˜D is its
impact vector. The news shock is identified as the linear combination of the remaining VAR
innovations that maximizes the residual forecast error variance of TFP, 1− Ω1,1 (h), over a
finite horizon Hnews.4 Of course, in practice (3.3) is unlikely to hold as an identity for all
h ≤ Hnews. Thus, given the Choleski decomposition A˜, Barsky and Sims (2011) choose the
vector γnews (the second column of D), such that this second shock maximizes the residual
forecast error variance of the TFP process over horizon Hnews.
4In the empirical implementation we select Hnews = 40, or a ten-year horizon.
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D (1, i) = 0 ∀i 6= 1 (3.4)
D is orthonormal, (3.5)
where the lower-triangular matrix A˜ is the Choleski decomposition (so A˜ (1,m) = 0 ∀m > 1).
We next proceed to the identification of the sentiment shock. As this shock cannot be
inferred from movements to TFP, our identification will rely on its impact on expectational
variables. These will be alternately forecasts of GDP by professional forecasters or consumer
confidence. Further, we impose that this shock does not affect true TFP. The procedure
outlined above naturally builds in this assumption: by allowing only the first two shocks to
affect TFP, we minimize the TFP impact of the remaining k − 2 structural shocks, which
includes the sentiment shock.
Let the expectational variable Ft be ordered 5th in the VAR, and without loss of generality
assume that the sentiment shock is the 3rd shock. Note that by equating the first reduced-
form shock to the surprise innovation to TFP and then identifying the news shock as in
Barsky and Sims (2011), we have in effect fixed Ω5,1 (h) and Ω5,2 (h) at all horizons. We
therefore select the sentiment shock as the linear combination of the remaining k−2 reduced-
form innovations that maximizes the forecast error variance of Ft, where k is the total number
of core and non-core variables in the VAR.5 Because the sentiment shock is short-run, we
5Note, we do not allow the reduced form shock to the Canadian variable, ordered k, to affect the
identification of the sentiment shock. Hence, the sentiment shock is identified from k − 2 reduced form
shocks (as the surprise TFP innovation also does not affect it).
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D (1, i) = 0 ∀i 6= 1 (3.6)
D is orthonormal (3.7)
D (:, 2) = γnews. (3.8)
Both the news and sentiment identification steps are conditional on an arbitrary orthog-
onalization, the Choleski decomposition A˜. The first restriction – (3.4) and (3.6) – common
to both problems specifies that none of the k − 1 structural shocks has a contemporaneous
impact on TFP. The second restriction, (3.5) and (3.7), states that the matrix D remains
orthonormal throughout, and thus the identified shocks are orthogonal to each other. Re-
striction (3.8) ensures that identification of the sentiment shock holds identification of the
news shock constant. We expect the surprise TFP and the news shocks, as informative about
true fundamentals, to explain the movements in the forecast of GDP. The sentiment shock
identified in this manner simply captures patterns in the residual variance of the forecast of
GDP, once supply-side determinants are accounted for. The identification strategy for both
shocks is robust to the reordering of the remaining k − 1 variables in the VAR other than
TFP.6
Our strategy relies on ‘medium-run’ identification. It might appear that the natural
6In a recent paper, Angeletos et al. (2014) adopt a closely related identification strategy to extract a
factor that explains most of the business cycle variation in hours and investment at frequencies of 6-32
quarters. In contrast to our approach, that paper obtains an expression for the share of the variance of
a variable due to a shock at this frequency through a spectral decomposition, and then chooses a linear
combination of shocks that maximizes the variance of the selected variables. TFP is not included in their
VAR. In short, they sum across variables, while we maximize the residual forecast error variance of a single,
expectational, variable – either GDP forecast or confidence – over several horizons.
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identification of the sentiment shock would make use of a ‘long-run’ restriction, namely that
it has no long-run impact on output or forecasts. We prefer the method here as several papers
have emphasized that long-run restrictions are problematic in VARs of finite order, where
the coefficient estimates are biased (Faust and Leeper , 1997). Medium-run identification has
shown better behavior in finite samples (Francis et al., 2014).7
3.2.2 Estimating International Transmission
We estimate the impact of the US shocks on various Canadian aggregates in turn, treating
them as ‘non-core’ variables in the VAR. The Canadian variables are included one at a time
and are ordered last in a six-variable VAR with 5 US series. The matrices of coefficients
are restricted to allow no current or lagged impact of the Canadian variable on the five US
variables. We believe this assumption is reasonable given the small size of the Canadian
economy relative to the US (Canadian GDP is about one-tenth that of the US). Section
3.4.1 shows that the results are robust to allowing lagged Canadian variables to affect US
variables.
The impulse responses of Canadian variables to the identified US shocks are interpreted
as evidence of cross-border transmission of those shocks to Canada, rather than a correlation
of underlying Canadian shocks with the US shocks. A useful check presented below is to
construct the impulse responses of Canadian TFP to these identified shocks, and ascertain
that Canadian TFP does not comove with the identified US shocks. Section 3.5 also checks for
the possibility of correlated sentiment shocks, which would not be visible in TFP movements,
and finds little evidence that the impulse responses of Canadian aggregates to US shocks are
due to a correlated Canadian shock.
7An alternative approach to long-run identification in VARs uses the spectral factorization of the variance
matrix at frequency zero. This does not circumvent the issues related to long-run restrictions in general,
however. We do not pursue the spectral approach in this paper as we are not aware of methods by which
we would be able to identify the three shocks, while maintaining the medium-run identification structure.
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We estimate the reduced-form VAR with estimated generalized least squares (EGLS)
using a method adapted from Lu¨tkepohl (2005). The VAR in p lags is:
Yt = C0 + C1LYt + ...+ CpL
pYt + ut
where Cj are k × k. If the Canadian variable is ordered last, the restriction that Canadian
variables are have no impact on US variables amounts to Cj (1 : k − 1, k) = 0 ∀Cj. Rewrite
the VAR in compact form as Y = CZ + U , where Y = [Y1, ..., YT ], Zt = [1, Yt, .., Yt−p+1],
Z = [Z0, ...ZT−1], C = [C0, ...Cp], and U = [u1, ...uT ].
Let the constraints on the coefficients of the six-variable VAR be written as β = vec (C) =
Rb+r, where R is a known matrix of rank M , r is a vector of constants, and b is the (M × 1)
vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. Appropriately pick R (size k (kp+ 1)×M)
and r such that the desired constraints on Cj hold. Clearly, linear restrictions of the type
we are interested in can easily be expressed in this form.















z = vec (Y )− (Z ⊗ IK) r




T − kp− 1 UˆolsUˆ
′
ols
where Uˆols are the residuals from an unconstrained ordinary least squares estimation of the
six-variable VAR(p). We use an iterative procedure, in which we compute a new covariance
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matrix from the first stage EGLS residuals to replace Σu in the computation of the next
value of b and iterate to convergence. This procedure is asymptotically more efficient than
standard multivariate least squares, and under the assumption of Gaussian errors the esti-
mator for b in (3.9) is the same as the maximum likelihood estimator. Using estimates of
b it is then straightforward to compute the impulse response functions of each Canadian
macro aggregate to the three shocks of interest. Note that the identification of the shocks is
unaffected by this procedure.
Following the recommendation of Hamilton (1994), the model is specified in levels, since
parameter estimates in levels are still consistent even in the presence of cointegration, while
the vector error correction model might be misspecified when the cointegration is of unknown
form. The baseline implementation uses p = 4 lags, the optimal lag length according to the
Akaike Information Criterion. All standard errors are constructed from 2000 bias-corrected
bootstraps as in Kilian (1998).
3.3 Data
The time period covered by our data is 1968:Q4 to 2010:Q3. All variables are logged.
For a measure of US productivity, we use the quarterly, utilization-adjusted TFP series
from Fernald (2014). The series is the quarterly version of the annual series developed by
Basu et al. (2006). That paper constructs a modified Solow residual from industry-level
data, allowing for both non-constant returns to scale and varying unobserved capital and
labor utilization. The identification of the three structural shocks in our VAR relies on
an accurate measure of US technology. Clearly, accounting for measurement issues arising
from changes is utilization is crucial. Basu et al. (2006) find that the detrended utilization-
adjusted TFP is both less correlated with output, and less volatile than the standard Solow
residual. Unfortunately the industry-level data required for controlling for non-constant
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returns to scale are not available quarterly, so the Fernald (2014) series corrects only for
variable capital and labor utilization.
US population and hours data are from the BLS. For population, we use the civilian
non-institutionalized population age 16 and over. Aggregate hours are the total hours of
wage and salary workers on non-farm payrolls. For consumption and output, we use the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables from the BEA. Output is measured
as quarterly real GDP, chain-weighted, from NIPA table 1.1.6. As a chain-weighted series
for non-durables and services consumption is not available, we construct a series using the
Tornqvist approximation (see Whelan, 2000, for details on chain-weighting in the BEA data).
For this procedure, we use the nominal shares of spending on non-durables and services from
NIPA table 1.1.5. Chain-weighting reduces the dependence of a series on the choice of
base year, and is the current standard for macroeconomic series constructed by all major
statistical agencies. All variables are converted into per capita terms.
The data on the forecasts of US GDP come from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF), provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. For NIPA variables, the
survey contains quarterly forecasts at several horizons as well as longer-term forecasts. We
use the one quarter ahead growth rate forecast. The perturbation to US sentiment that we
are interested in identifying is not related to true technological progress, and we would expect
the effects of this shock to be very short-lived. The survey provides mean and median levels
forecasts as well as growth rates. The base year for the levels forecasts changes periodically
throughout the survey. To avoid issues related to rebasing the forecasts ex-post, we construct
an index of implied GDP levels forecasts from the mean forecast of the one quarter ahead
growth rate. We check the sensitivity of our results to using a two- or three-quarter ahead
growth rate forecast, as well as different horizons Hsent = 4, 8, 16 over which we expect the
sentiment shock to contribute to the forecast error variance of the GDP forecast variable,
and find no significant differences in the shape of the responses.
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In addition, we re-do the analysis using an index of consumer confidence from the Uni-
versity of Michigan Survey of Consumers instead of the SPF GDP forecast. We use the
consumer confidence series E12Y, constructed from the responses to the question ‘And how
about a year from now, do you expect that in the country as a whole, business conditions will
be better, or worse than they are at present, or just about the same?’
A consistent measure of quarterly hours for the length of our sample is not easily available
for most countries. For Canada, we use a new dataset assembled by Ohanian and Raffo
(2012), constructed from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators database and other sources.
Our Canadian hours measure is the total hours worked in Canada divided by the Canadian
population. The population data are taken from CANSIM (the Statistics Canada database),
and is the quarterly estimate of total population in all provinces and territories of Canada.
Canadian real GDP and consumption are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook and are
also converted into per capita terms. For the bilateral exports and imports series, we use
data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database. The series are deflated
with a US GDP deflator and deseasonalized using the X-12 ARIMA program developed by
the US Census Bureau.
3.3.1 Utilization-Adjusted TFP for Canada
The last critical variable for the analysis is a measure of Canadian TFP. Ideally, we
would use a utilization-adjusted series with further adjustments for non-constant returns
to scale, similar to the Basu et al. (2006) series for the US. Unfortunately, such a series
to our knowledge is not available for any other country. The data required to construct
such a series are also not available at the quarterly frequency for Canada. Therefore we
build our own utilization-adjusted TFP series for Canada, following the approach in Imbs
(1999). This method uses a similar insight, namely that with a constant returns to scale
production function the first-order conditions for capital and labor are informative about
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the choices of capital utilization and the workweek of labor. As data on the capital stock
are also not available at the quarterly frequency, we use the perpetual inventory method
to construct an initial capital stock series, given data on investment from the OECD and
a constant depreciation rate. This produces a starting utilization series. We then use an
iterative procedure to construct a time-varying depreciation rate, capital stock, and implied
utilization series consistent with the observed investment in the data. We construct labor
utilization from information on hours worked, wages, and consumption in Canada. The wage
data is from the OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI). The utilization-adjusted Solow
residual is then log TFP = log Y Cant − (1− α) (logKt + log ut) − α (logNt + log et), where
et is labor utilization,ut is capital utilization, Y
Can
t is output, Kt is capital and Nt is hours
worked. Details of the procedure are in Appendix C.1.
We present the impulse response functions for both the utilization-adjusted TFP series
and the implied capital utilization series.8
3.4 Results
Our baseline specification identifies the news shock at a horizon of ten years, the sentiment
shock at a horizon of two quarters, and uses the forecast of GDP one quarter ahead as the
fifth variable in the VAR. We begin by discussing the responses to the surprise TFP, news,
and sentiment shocks on the US economy (Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3), followed by an analysis
of the transmission to Canada. Section 3.5 places the results in the context of standard
business cycle models and some variants proposed in the literature.
The surprise TFP innovation signals a deviation in TFP from trend of about 0.8%. The
effects of the shock die out slowly, with TFP decreasing but staying significantly above trend
8We check the responses of the unmodified Solow residual as well, and find it does not move in response
to the shocks. However we think it is still important to correct for utilization, as it is a channel through
which the Canadian economy could respond.
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for 12 quarters. The responses of other domestic variables to this shock are consistent with
other empirical investigations (Basu et al., 2006; Barsky and Sims , 2011). Output increases
temporarily before falling below trend after two years. Consumption stays constant on
impact, and declines with output.
Our identified news shock signals a slowly building increase in utilization-adjusted TFP,
beginning in quarter 2. Consumption increases slightly on impact and continues for two
years, after which it exhibits a very slight decline. There is an impact decrease in hours,
qualitatively consistent with the results in Barsky and Sims (2011). The response of hours
turns positive one year after the shock, peaking at about Q9. There is no significant impact
effect on output. Rather, the response of output builds slowly, similar to technology (but
stronger). The peak increase is later than for surprise TFP, two years after the shock.
Reassuringly, the forecasts of GDP track the responses of actual GDP quite well, with the
response of the forecast variable peaking about one quarter before GDP.
Overall, these responses are in line with Barsky and Sims (2011). As in that paper,
the impact decrease in hours is consistent with a strong wealth effect, and indicates that
the news shock does not solve the impact comovement problem of hours, consumption,
and output.9 It therefore cannot explain the unconditional positive comovement of these
variables in the data. As Barsky and Sims (2011) point out, however, the responses to the
news shock shown here are consistent with the predictions of a simple neoclassical growth
model augmented with news shocks. As the response of hours is eventually positive, our
news shock does generate comovement a few periods after impact, indicating that it is an
important component of business cycle fluctuations in the medium term. On the other hand,
9This problem has been commonly observed in response to estimated TFP shocks (Gal´ı, 1999), and news
shocks were originally discussed as a possible solution. For instance Beaudry and Portier (2006) identify
news shocks as the innovation in stock prices orthogonal to current TFP and find that the identified shock
does generate positive comovement on impact. The news shocks identified in that paper capture a much
longer-term improvement in technology, and therefore dissimilar to those in Barsky and Sims (2011) and
our paper. Furthermore, the Beaudry and Portier (2006) identification scheme has been shown to deliver
non-unique dynamic paths when extended to several variables (Kurmann and Mertens, 2014).
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Barsky et al. (2014) argue that it is unclear whether the comovement in the dynamic paths
of all variables is due to the news shock itself or the realized productivity growth.
The impulse responses to the sentiment shock look noticeably different. There is an
impact increase in output, consumption, hours, and the forecast variable. There is a very
small and insignificant decrease in measured TFP, which might be due to the quarterly
series not perfectly correcting for utilization as discussed in Section 3.3. The business cycle
generated by the shock lasts approximately three years. A substantial empirical literature
beginning with Gal´ı (1999) has previously argued that demand shocks are promising for
explaining business cycles. Ours is (to our knowledge) the first paper to directly measure
these shocks based on forecast or confidence data while ensuring they are uncorrelated with
both current and future technological change. We discuss the relationship of our identified
shock to the literature on demand shocks in Section 3.5.
The top panels of Tables 3.1-3.3 report the share of the forecast error variances of the
US macro aggregates accounted for by the TFP, news, and sentiment shocks respectively.
At short frequencies, the sentiment shock appears most important. It accounts for 65-75%
of the variation in GDP, 18-22% in consumption, and 62-71% in hours at horizons 1 year or
less. By contrast, at these frequencies surprise TFP shocks explain less than 8-12% of the
variation in GDP, 2% in consumption, and 2-8% in hours. The news shock does a little bit
better for consumption (36-48%), but is about equally unimportant for GDP and hours. Not
surprisingly, at longer frequencies the news shock increases in importance. Barsky and Sims
(2011) reach a qualitatively similar conclusion about the news and surprise innovations, and
point out that unexplained shocks were responsible for most of the variation at business
cycle frequencies in domestic aggregates. Our analysis has now identified one such shock.
International Transmission. Figure 3.4 sets the stage for the remainder of the re-
sults. It shows the impulse responses of Canadian utilization-adjusted TFP to the three
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identified US shocks. None of the three identified shocks have a perceptible impact on Cana-
dian technology (note also the different scale of the y-axis compared to the other figures).
The news shock actually leads to a barely visible, though persistent and significant increase
in Canadian TFP beginning about five quarters ahead. This might indicate the presence
of technology spillovers, but the magnitude is quantitatively tiny. Thus, whatever impact
of US shocks on Canada that we find below is not accompanied by a change in Canadian
productivity.
Figure 3.5 shows that the three shocks lead to very different reactions of Canadian GDP.
Neither shock to true TFP leads to an impact increase in GDP. The surprise TFP inno-
vation in the US generates the smallest visible spillovers, with a slight increase in output
three quarters after impact. The increase is short-lived, peaking at four quarters, after which
Canadian output quickly returns to trend. In contrast, the news shock leads to more per-
sistent Canadian output growth. GDP starts to increase two quarters after impact, lagging
one quarter behind its US counterpart. The effects of the shock are more long-lived, with
GDP peaking a little over two years after impact. At five years, output is still significantly
above steady state.
The most striking is the response to the sentiment shock. Canadian GDP jumps on
impact, in sync with US output. It increases further for two quarters, before gradually
returning to steady state. The effects of the shock are significant for two and a half years,
demonstrating that the sentiment shock has the potential to generate output comovement
at high frequencies.
As it is clear that Canadian TFP is not affected, we propose one channel, consistent
with our results, through which US sentiment shocks could generate spillovers. As Figures
3.6 and 3.7 show, Canadian exports to the US and imports from the US show the strongest
responses to the sentiment shock. Both series jump on impact, a two percent deviation from
trend. They demonstrate a strong hump-shaped pattern: the increase in Canadian exports
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peaks at one quarter. However they stay significantly above trend for two years. Since the
US is Canada’s largest trade partner and the sentiment shock generates increased demand
in the US, this response is unsurprising.
The increased exports do not come through lowered Canadian consumption. Rather, as
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show, the factors of production are used more intensively following a
US sentiment shock: Canadian hours increase, as does capital utilization. The increased
production for export increases GDP, and generates an income effect which leads to higher
consumption on impact (Figure 3.10). Demand for imports increases as well as a result of
the higher consumption, and US exports to Canada rise.10 The empirical evidence clearly
suggests that the sentiment shock has the potential to not just generate a domestic busi-
ness cycle, but explain both international synchronization as well as the positive correlation
between exports and imports (Engel and Wang , 2011).
The news shock also generates comovement between Canadian exports and imports, but
the impact effect is actually negative. The impact of higher future demand in the US contains
both a substitution effect and an income effect. Holding TFP and production constant, the
news shock would increase the price of future Canadian output and lead to a substitution
effect towards consumption today. That said, cheaper future imports lower the price of
future output and induce a negative substitution effect. However, the income effect from the
future prolonged period of high export demand should unambiguously increase consumption
and decrease hours. Each of these effects cannot be isolated in our framework, but the
net effect is a slight decrease in Canadian hours after a US news shock, an insignificant
decrease in GDP and a decrease in exports on impact. Consumption does not jump, so the
wealth effect is not dominant, but it also begins to increase at about Q3.11 After one year,
10Of course this is only one plausible channel. Schmitt-Grohe´ (1998) finds that exports are not a strong
enough channel for the transmission of a generic shock to US output to Canada. That paper does not
distinguish between the types of shocks that affect the US, however.
11Other explanations such as habit formation could also play a role here.
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there is positive comovement among the key US and Canadian aggregates following a news
shock. This implies that news shocks could also be an important component of comovement
at medium- to long-term frequencies. It is unclear why US exports fall on impact. One
possible explanation is weak demand in Canada coupled with the decreased production in
the US.
The discussion above points to the different and complementary roles of the news and sen-
timent shocks in generating business cycle spillovers. Forecast error variance decompositions
provide additional support for the importance of sentiment shocks at shorter frequencies,
and of the news shocks at longer frequencies, internationally as well as domestically. The
bottom panels of Tables 3.1-3.3 report the shares of forecast error variances of the Canadian
macro aggregates accounted for by the three identified US shocks. At short frequencies, the
sentiment shock is by a large margin the most important of the three. The sentiment shock
contributes substantially to the forecast error variance of US-Canada trade, explaining up to
44% of the variance of Canadian exports and 41% of imports at the one year horizon. It also
explains a large fraction of the forecast error variance of Canadian output (41% at one year),
hours and utilization (over one third), and consumption (8-12%). The impact of this short
run US ‘demand’ shock on a smaller trading partner is persistent, as it still accounts for 36%
of the variance of output at 10 years. The small share of Canadian TFP variation attributed
to the sentiment shock at 10 years is likely due “leakage” in the utilization adjustment, as
our procedure for Canada is even coarser than the Fernald (2014) method on the US data.
In contrast the news shock is only responsible for very long run variation in TFP, output,
and consumption, and does not contribute much to explaining the forecast error variance
of other Canadian variables. The surprise TFP shock contributes very little to the forecast
error variance of the Canadian aggregates at any frequency.
As further evidence on the importance of both sentiment and news shocks for interna-
tional comovement, we construct correlations of key variables conditional on only one type
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of shock. As in Gal´ı (1999), these correlations can be inferred directly from the structural
impulse response coefficients. Formally, the correlation of variables j and k conditional on
















where Ahji is the lag-h, (j, i)-th element of the matrix A (L) of lag order polynomials of the
structural moving average representation of the VAR, that captures the impulse response of
variable j to shock i at lag h. In practice, we compute these correlations for a finite but
large maximum horizon of 10000 periods.
The results of this exercise are in Table 3.4. The sentiment and news shocks both generate
high correlations (both 0.99) of US and Canadian output, while the surprise TFP innovation
delivers a much lower correlation than observable in the data. The surprise TFP shock
actually generates a slightly negative US-Canada correlation of consumption (-0.13) and a
strongly negative (-0.47) US-Canada correlation of hours. While both news and sentiment
shocks deliver strongly positive consumption correlations, the correlation of hours due to the
news shock is too low at only 0.46, but due to the sentiment shock it is too high at 0.98.
The sentiment shock comes the closest to explaining the unconditional cross-correlations of
exports from Canada with US output.12
In summary, the impulse response functions, variance decompositions, and conditional
correlations show that surprise TFP innovations, which are usually assumed to be the key
driver of IRBC models, play a negligible role in the international transmission of shocks.
Sentiment shocks are important for transmission at higher frequencies, while news shocks
12Interestingly, the surprise TFP innovation does a reasonable job of reproducing the cross-correlations
of US output, consumption, and hours, despite the impact impulse responses being inconsistent with closed
economy RBC models. As King and Rebelo (1999) point out, data generated by feeding utilization-adjusted
TFP into a model with sufficient internal propagation mechanisms does a reasonable job of matching histor-
ical US time series. The news and sentiment shocks also match the correlation of output and consumption
well, but both undershoot the hours and output correlation.
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play a stronger role at medium/long frequencies.
We conclude this section by discussing the role of all three shocks in recent business
cycles. Figures 3.11– 3.14 display the historical decompositions of the key US and Canadian
macro aggregates into the components due to the three identified US shocks. While the TFP,
sentiment, and news components all contributed to the great recession in the US, the fall
in output in Canada appears driven entirely by the sentiment shock. Similar patterns are
visible for Canadian consumption and hours, as well as exports and imports, indicating the
sentiment shock played a key role in the transmission of the recent recession. The sentiment
shock does not appear to contribute equally to all recessions however, with the dips in output
and consumption in the 1981-82 recession driven primarily by news.
3.4.1 Robustness
We check the responses of all variables to variations in the horizons of identification of
the sentiment shock, and find no significant qualitative difference for Hsent = 4, 8, or 16. We
also vary the forecast variable used in identification, using forecasts of GDP two quarters
ahead and three quarters ahead. The qualitative shape of the dynamic responses remains
the same. To conserve space the results are not reported here, but are available on request.
Consumer confidence. To check robustness of the results to the choice of expecta-
tional variable, we replace the GDP forecasts the VAR with the E12Y variable from the
Michigan Survey of Consumers, constructed from the responses to the question ‘And how
about a year from now, do you expect that in the country as a whole, business conditions will
be better, or worse than they are at present, or just about the same?’ The results from this
exercise are in Appendix Figures C.1-C.10. Reassuringly, the patterns described above are
robust to the expectational variable used to identify the sentiment shock.
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Monetary policy shocks. Our empirical strategy permits the separate identification
of a monetary policy shock. We extend the core VAR to include the federal funds rate,
ordered fifth. The identification of the monetary policy shock is then standard (Christiano
et al., 1999): we assume that the shock has no contemporaneous impact on the variables
ordered above the federal funds rate (TFP, Consumption, GDP, and Hours), but does have
an impact on the variables below (the expectational variable). This simply requires certain
zero restrictions on the impact matrix A˜D.13 The identification of the news and sentiment
shocks then follows as in the baseline with the added monetary policy shock restriction.
Figure 3.15 plots the impulse responses of the main US macro aggregates and Canadian
GDP to the monetary policy shock and the sentiment shock side by side. Controlling ex-
plicitly for monetary policy shocks does not change the properties of the sentiment shock.
As in the baseline, consumption, output, and hours all increase on impact in response to
the sentiment shock. Interestingly, the federal funds rate increases following a sentiment
shock, pointing to policy tightening in response to increased demand generated by positive
“sentiments.” The federal funds rate rises slightly on impact, and then increases sharply
further in the second quarter. It then stays flat for about two years, and the subsequent
decline is slower than following a monetary policy shock.
Figure 3.15 also makes clear that the identified sentiment shock is not a traditional
monetary policy shock. In the figure, the monetary policy shock is an unexpected decrease
in the federal funds rate, and is thus expansionary. The responses of the macroeconomic
aggregates are as expected following a monetary policy loosening (Christiano et al., 1999).
Output and consumption are flat initially and then rise. Hours decrease for about 5 quarters,
and then increase. Turning to comovement, the path of Canadian GDP tracks US GDP in
both cases, so both shocks generate spillovers. However, the dynamic responses are different:
13If the monetary policy variable is ordered in position j, the restrictions simply imply that the jth column
of A˜D must have zeros in rows 1 through j − 1.
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a negative shock to the Federal Funds rate generates a gradual expansion, while the sentiment
shock generates a short-lived expansion on impact.
Table 3.5 reports the variance decompositions for the two shocks. Augmenting the anal-
ysis with the monetary policy shocks does not affect the share of the forecast error variance
attributed to the sentiments. The sentiment shock is still the dominant shock for the vari-
ability of output and hours at time horizons of less than two years. The monetary policy
shock explains most of the variance of the federal funds rate (88% at one quarter) but does
not contribute much to variance of the other variables: it explains 5% of the variance of US
output and 9% of the variance of Canadian output at a horizon of five years.
Additional controls: Stock Prices, Oil Prices, FAVAR. Beaudry and Portier
(2006, 2014) identify news shocks with a long-run restriction in a VAR with TFP and an
index of stock prices. Our identification of news shocks is medium-run and based on the
information content in forward-looking real variables. Stock prices are also forward-looking,
so we test the robustness of our identified shock to adding stock prices as an additional
control. We use the index of stock prices from Beaudry and Portier (2014), ordered second,
but we maintain the medium-run identification strategy.14 Figures 3.16 and 3.17 display the
impulse responses of US and Canadian GDP and hours, respectively, to a sentiment shock
while augmenting the VAR with the stock price variable. The results are very similar to the
baseline specification. In particular, the impact effects are almost identical. The addition of
stock prices as a control leads a slightly different dynamic path, but the difference is slight.
Another potential concern is whether our sentiment shock might be picking up oil-price
shocks. That is, perhaps not including a measure of oil prices would lead to omitted variable
bias in our specification. We test this by augmenting the core VAR with the oil price index
14We can increase Hnews to an arbitrarily large number to approximate the long-run restriction in Beaudry
and Portier (2006), and we do find that the responses of key variables to the news shock approach their
findings (results available on request). However, as long-run restrictions can be problematic (Faust and
Leeper , 1997), we favor our medium-run approach.
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available from FRED.15 The IRFs of US and Canadian GDP and hours are reported in
Figures 3.16 and 3.17. The responses of the core variables to the sentiment shock are almost
unchanged relative to the baseline. We also test the responses to adding the US-Canada real
exchange rate or US CPI as additional controls. We construct the bilateral real exchange
variable using the nominal Canadian-US dollar exchange rate and the US and Canadian
consumer price indices from the International Financial Statistics. The units are Canadian
basket/US basket, so an increase in the variable is a US appreciation. Figures 3.16 and 3.17
report the responses of US and Canadian GDP and hours when including the real exchange
rate, and show that the main results are unaffected.
We augment the core VAR with the first factor identified in Forni et al. (2014) to increase
the information available about the macroeconomy in identifying news and sentiment shocks.
Including this factor further mitigates the possible omitted variables issues in the VAR.
Figures 3.16 and 3.17 present the impulse responses of GDP and hours to the sentiment
shock in the FAVAR. Reassuringly, we find very similar responses of all core variables with
the FAVAR, though the point estimates of the dynamic responses are smaller for longer
frequencies.
Table 3.6 reports the share of the forecast error variance of selected core variables at-
tributed to the sentiment shock, while including each of the additional controls. The impor-
tance of the sentiment shock for accounting for the forecast error variance of US GDP and
hours and Canadian GDP does not differ appreciably from the baseline in each case.
Response of prices. Figure 3.18 displays the impulse responses to the three identified
shocks of the key price series: US CPI, US stock prices, oil prices, and the US-Canada
real exchange rate.16 The response of the price variables to the three shocks is consistent
15We use a seasonally adjusted consumer price index for all urban consumers, fuel oil and other fuels,
series ID CUSR0000SEHE.
16The response of US and Canadian GDP and hours in the VAR including US CPI are not substantially
different from the other robustness exercises reported in Figures 3.16 and 3.17 so they are omitted to conserve
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with theories of news and demand shocks (particularly, demand shocks not driven by shocks
to the price variable itself). The US consumer price index increases slightly following the
sentiment shock, and the increase is persistent. This response supports the notion that the
demand shock embodied in the identified sentiment shock is inflationary. By contrast, there
is no response of US CPI to the surprise TFP shock, and prices fall following a news TFP
shock. This difference is further illustration that the sentiment shock affects the economy
differently from disturbances to technology.
There is no impact response of oil prices to the sentiment shock, ruling out the possi-
bility that the sentiment shock is an oil price shock. Two quarters following the sentiment
shock, oil prices if anything rise modestly, indicating that times of positive sentiment do not
systematically coincide with low oil prices. In response to the news shock, oil prices fall and
stay low, consistent with the decline in inflation documented in Barsky and Sims (2012).
The information content of stock prices is evident in the response to the news shock.
On impact, there is a large jump in the stock price index, with a further increase for about
five quarters followed by slow reversion. However, at the maximum horizon plotted (20
quarters) the index is still substantially above trend. Stock prices also display an impact
increase in response to the sentiment shock, but the increase is more muted. This suggests
that the sentiment shock is indeed a shock to higher-order beliefs about the economy, which
are rational though not based on expected changes to TFP.
The bilateral real exchange rate displays an impact increase only in response to the news
shock (this is followed by a gradual decline that approximately coincides with the actual
increase in TFP). With the sentiment shock, there is no response for two quarters, and
then a slight but persistent US appreciation. The surprise TFP shock leads to a gradual
depreciation of the real exchange rate. This is similar to the results in Nam and Wang
(2015), who estimate the response of real exchange rates to news and surprise TFP shocks.
space.
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Spillovers or correlated shocks. Our three US shocks are identified using only US
data. Therefore, the possibility that the observed impulse responses of Canadian variables to
US shocks are due to exogenously correlated shocks affecting both countries simultaneously
cannot be ruled out. For the two technology shocks, this is unlikely to be a problem: Figure
3.4 shows that Canadian TFP does not respond to US surprise and news TFP shocks.
However, it may still be that there are exogenous common shocks to US and Canadian
sentiments. We evaluate this hypothesis by identifying a surprise TFP innovation, a news
shock, and a sentiment shock in Canadian data alone. We then check the correlation of these
identified shocks with their US counterparts. Note that if there are indeed spillover effects
from US to Canada, this is not a clean exercise: Canadian expectations of future Canadian
economic activity will rise following a US sentiment shock, not because optimism increased
exogenously in Canada, but because Canadian agents know that a positive sentiment shock in
the US will increase Canadian GDP via cross-border transmission. In this sense, identifying
a Canadian sentiment shock as if it were a closed economy stacks the deck against us, as
those shocks might embody Canadian agents’ endogenous revisions of expectations following
an increase in US sentiment.
The Canadian expectational variable is an index constructed from the responses to the
question ”Do you expect overall economic conditions in Canada six months from now to be:
Better/Same/Worse”, and comes from the Conference Board of Canada. As in Barsky and
Sims (2012), we construct the composite index by subtracting the percentage of responses
answering ‘worse’ from those answering ‘better’ and adding 100. This series corresponds
most closely to the US confidence series from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. Therefore
we compare the Canadian shocks identified with these data with those identified from the
five variable core US VAR using the consumer confidence series. Table 3.7 presents the
correlations between the US and Canadian shocks identified this way. The correlation of
the surprise TFP innovations is 0.16. The US and Canadian sentiment shocks are actually
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slightly positively correlated, while the news shocks are negatively correlated. However, these
correlations are low (0.18 for the sentiment shock and -0.17 for the news shock), indicating
that the spillovers observed in the estimated impulse responses are unlikely to be driven
primarily by exogenous common shocks.
Our baseline identification strategy does not allow feedback effects from the Canadian
variables to the US variables in the VAR coefficients. These restrictions are testable. For
each Canadian variable, we perform likelihood ratio tests comparing restricted (baseline)
and unrestricted VARs. When the Canadian variables are TFP, output, hours, exports, or
imports, we fail to reject the null that the restricted VAR is the true model. For Canadian
consumption, however, the null is rejected. Therefore Figure 3.19 presents the responses
to the identified shocks when Canadian consumption is the sixth variable and there are
no restrictions on the lagged coefficients. Substantively, this does not change the baseline
results for any shock, indicating the addition of Canadian consumption as a core variable is
not extremely informative for the news or sentiment shocks.
We also attempted to test an alternative model where the Canadian variables were the
core entries in the VAR and the US variables were treated as non-core. However, this model
does not converge for any US variable. As we cannot estimate the restricted version of this
model, we could not evaluate this alternative setup. This is supportive of our assumption
that while shocks to the US matter for Canada, the converse is not true.
Additional exercises. The robustness checks above show that the sentiment shock is
not a monetary policy shock or an oil price shock. The sentiment shock has characteristics
suggesting it is similar to a rational “optimism” shock, where the optimism is not related
to a change in productivity. While a proof that this is a pure shock to agents’ higher-order
expectations is not feasible in this empirical context, we also examine whether this shock is
related to uncertainty (second moment) shocks using the correlation of the identified shock
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series with the VIX index, which measures market expectations of near-term volatility. We
obtain a quarterly VIX index using the average aggregation method from FRED, beginning in
1990:Q1. The sentiment shocks are moderately negatively correlated with the growth rates of
the VIX index, with a correlation of −0.24. This indicates positive sentiment shocks are more
likely to occur when uncertainty growth is low, but the link is not very strong. The sentiment
shock could therefore partially capture an uncertainty shock, but it is highly unlikely that
fluctuations in uncertainty are entirely responsible for the impact of our sentiment shocks.
Finally, we also examine the properties of the forecast variables used in estimation. If the
forecast is a very accurate predictor of future GDP, then the sentiment shock by construction
would maximize a substantial fraction of the forecast error variance of GDP as well. Table 3.8
presents the correlations of the forecast and consumer confidence variables, in growth rates,
with GDP growth. The forecast of GDP growth is highly correlated with contemporaneous
GDP growth (correlation of 0.93), but substantially less correlated with realized future GDP
growth one quarter ahead (correlation of only 0.38). The growth of consumer confidence does
display the highest correlation with one quarter ahead GDP growth, but this correlation is
still very low at 0.25. This is evidence that selecting the sentiment shock as the shock that
maximizes its contribution to the forecast error variance of the forecast/consumer confidence
variables is not equivalent to simply selecting a shock that by construction explains the bulk
of the variation in GDP at business cycle frequencies.
3.5 Discussion
News and noise shocks. Signals about future TFP are likely to be riddled with noise.
Blanchard et al. (2013) point out that news shocks cannot be separated from noise shocks
(unfounded signals about future TFP) in a structural VAR setting, since if the econometri-
cian can extract different paths of variables in response to a noise shock, so can the consumer.
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It is clear that these noise shocks are not related to our sentiment shock, which is identified
as a fully rational change in forecasts or sentiments orthogonal to surprise and news TFP.
That is, in our economy neither the forecaster/consumer nor the econometrician will believe
the sentiment shock to be either news or a noisy signal of future TFP. Further, Barsky and
Sims (2012) assess the importance of noise or ‘animal spirits’ shocks and find that they do
not account for a substantial portion of the relationship between confidence and output. This
supports the notion that the responses to the news TFP shocks in Figure 3.2 are informative
of the impact of true news.
Demand shocks. Our identified shock could be a combination of several shocks tradi-
tionally considered ‘demand’ shocks. The strategy simply relies on the forecasters rationally
expecting an increase in GDP that is not due to current TFP innovations or news/noise
about future TFP. To the extent that an increase in ‘demand’ leads agents to forecast an
increase in economic activity, it would be identified as a sentiment shock in our framework.
However, our shock is not consistent with all of the results associated with demand shocks
previously identified in the literature. For instance, the demand shock identified by Gal´ı
(1999) as the shock orthogonal to changes in long run labor productivity leads to a tempo-
rary increase in labor productivity. Monetary shocks are also commonly proposed as demand
shocks. As we demonstrated in Figure 3.15, controlling for monetary policy shocks does not
significantly change the shape of the impulse responses to the sentiment shock. Further,
monetary policy and sentiment shocks generate very different impulse responses both in the
US and Canada.17 The response of US consumption to the sentiment shock would be con-
sistent with models with taste shocks. For instance, Stockman and Tesar (1995) show that
the addition of a preference shock increases the volatility of consumption.
17Angeletos et al. (2014) find that monetary policy shocks deliver closed-economy business cycle mo-
ments very similar to their sentiment shock, but require the assumption that they affect the economy in an
implausibly large way.
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Investment-specific technology shocks also exhibit properties that would appear similar
to demand shocks, despite being shocks to technology. The dynamics of output and hours
following our sentiment shock do bear a resemblance to those in response to the investment-
specific technology shocks as identified in Fisher (2006) post 1982:Q3. The magnitudes are
very different however. More importantly, the investment-specific shock generates increases
in labor productivity. From the responses of output and hours in Figure 3.3, this does
not appear to be true for our sentiment shock, increasing our confidence that it is not the
investment-specific technology shock.
Relationship to standard neoclassical and New Keynesian models. A large
body of work on closed-economy business cycles has established that (i) RBC models driven
by a technology shock do well at matching the key moments of US data; and (ii) estimated
technology shocks do not deliver impulse responses similar to those in RBC models, calling
into question the mechanisms driving the model’s success (see also Gal´ı and Rabanal , 2005).
While surprise TFP shocks have proven of questionable value in explaining US business
cycles, they have been even worse at explaining international transmission. The seminal
work of Backus et al. (1992) showed that even with correlated shocks, the gap between
theory and data was large (see also Justiniano and Preston, 2010, for a recent statement of
this result). Many variants of the original model have been proposed to improve on these
results, with limited success. Part of the reason for this failure is that with uncorrelated
technology shocks investment increases in the country receiving a positive TFP surprise. As
a result, consumption is more highly correlated across countries than output, contrary to
the data.
News shocks identified from structural VARs have proven a better fit to the predictions
of the neoclassical model. However, due to the wealth effect on labor supply they do not
generate the desired impact comovement in the closed economy. A similar outcome appears
145
in an open economy setting: Kosaka (2013) finds that news shocks do help generate an
international business cycle, but only when the model is parameterized with a low elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and no wealth effect on labor supply.
Beaudry et al. (2011) also rely on a low elasticity between the goods produced by different
countries in order to generate positive comovement in response to a news shock.
Nominal rigidities have also been proposed as an explanation for the drop in hours in
response to a technology shock. The intuition is simple: with sticky prices, only a fraction of
firms adjust their prices downward in response to a productivity shock. Therefore, aggregate
demand (price level) will rise (fall) less than proportionately to the shock, and hours will
fall as a consequence (Gal´ı, 1999; Gal´ı and Rabanal , 2005). Gal´ı and Rabanal (2005) also
find in their estimated New Keynesian model that a pure preference shock accounts for the
bulk of the variation in the output growth, hours, and the nominal interest rate. However,
Angeletos et al. (2014) estimate a medium-scale DSGE model allowing for nominal rigidities
and find a shock that generates impulse responses for the US economy alone similar to our
sentiment shock. Allowing for nominal rigidities helps, but does not seem crucial in their
results. At this stage, it is unclear whether sticky prices will be indispensable in a model of
the international transmission driven by news and sentiment shocks.
VAR invertibility. For a structural VAR to uncover the “true” shocks in an economic
model, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2007) demonstrate that the matrices associated with
the state space representation of the model must satisfy a certain invertibility condition.
In particular, this is necessary for the VAR to have a moving average representation. This
condition can be violated if the structural shocks are not fundamental, i.e. they cannot be
recovered from the current and lagged values of the variables. This is a particular concern
for news shocks, which are shocks that contain information about future TFP innovations.18
18This issue would be of less concern if the true VAR only contained surprise TFP innovations and
sentiment shocks, as neither are signals of future shocks. However, it would not be possible to identify
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This problem is mitigated if the VAR has sufficient information (Forni and Gambetti , 2014).
Beaudry and Portier (2014) discuss this issue in detail, and argue that while VARs with
news shocks can be non-fundamental, they don’t have to be. Furthermore, Sims (2012)
shows that even if the VAR is non-fundamental, the resulting impulse response functions
can be good approximations of the true impulse responses. In our context, the baseline VAR
includes several forward-looking variables, and the results are robust to including additional
variables such as stock prices or a factor, that would further mitigate this concern.
3.6 Conclusion
We introduce a novel identification scheme to uncover the effects of surprise TFP inno-
vations, news shocks, and ”sentiment” shocks. These shocks have very different implications
for international comovement in US and Canadian data. The bulk of high-frequency busi-
ness cycle comovement can be attributed to the sentiment shocks, while the news shocks are
important for medium- to long-term synchronization. Surprise TFP innovations, which are
the most common driver of IRBC models, are found to be nearly irrelevant for international
business cycle synchronization. Future work will include estimating a dynamic two-country
model to quantify the effects of the different shocks.
sentiment shocks without first controlling for news shocks.
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Figure 3.1: The Impulse Responses to the US Surprise TFP Shock

































































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of US TFP, GDP, consumption, hours, and the forecast of US GDP in response to the
surprise TFP shock. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.2: The Impulse Responses to the US News TFP Shock













































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of US TFP, GDP, consumption, hours, and the forecast of US GDP in response to the
news shock. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.3: The Impulse Responses to the US Sentiment Shock























































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of US TFP, GDP, consumption, hours, and the forecast of US GDP in response to the
sentiment shock. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.4: The Impulse Responses of Canadian TFP to the Three US Shocks


































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of Canadian utilization-adjusted TFP to each of the three shocks
in the US: surprise TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock. Standard errors are
bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.5: The Impulse Responses of Canadian GDP to the Three US Shocks































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of Canadian GDP to each of the three shocks in the US: surprise TFP
shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped
90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.6: The Impulse Responses of Canadian Exports to the US to the Three US Shocks





































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of Canadian exports to the US to each of the three shocks in the US:
surprise TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock. Standard errors are bias-corrected
bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.7: The Impulse Responses of Canadian Imports from the US to the Three US
Shocks





































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of US exports to Canada to each of the three shocks in the US:
surprise TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock. Standard errors are bias-corrected
bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.8: The Impulse Responses of Canadian Hours to the Three US Shocks































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of Canadian total hours to each of the three shocks in the US:
surprise TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock. Standard errors are bias-corrected
bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.9: The Impulse Responses of Canadian Utilization to the Three US Shocks
Quarter after shock






























Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of Canadian utilization to each of the three shocks in the US:
surprise TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock. Standard errors are bias-corrected
bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 3.10: The Impulse Responses of Canadian Consumption to the Three US Shocks































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of Canadian consumption to each of the three shocks in the US:
surprise TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock. Standard errors are bias-corrected
bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.11: Historical Decompositions, Part 1
(a) US Output
(b) Canadian Output
Notes: These figures show the decomposition of historical data into components due to the three identified shocks.
The shaded areas are US NBER recession dates.
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Figure 3.12: Historical Decompositions, Part 2
(a) Canadian Imports from the US
(b) Canadian Exports to the US
Notes: These figures show the decomposition of historical data into components due to the three identified shocks.
The shaded areas are US NBER recession dates
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Figure 3.13: Historical Decompositions, Part 3
(a) US Hours
(b) Canadian Hours
Notes: These figures show the decomposition of historical data into components due to the three identified shocks.
The shaded areas are US NBER recession dates
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Figure 3.14: Historical Decompositions, Part 4
(a) US Consumption
(b) Canadian Consumption
Notes: These figures show the decomposition of historical data into components due to the three identified shocks.
The shaded areas are US NBER recession dates.
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Figure 3.15: The Impulse Responses of the Core US Variables and Canadian GDP to a
Sentiment and Monetary Policy Shock
















































































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of US Consumption, GDP, Hours, the Federal Funds rate, the Forecast
variable and Canadian GDP to a sentiment shock and a monetary policy shock, identified as discussed in Section
3.4.1. Dashed lines plot the responses to the monetary policy shock and lines marked by -x- plot the responses to
the sentiment shock.
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Figure 3.16: The Impulse Responses US and Canadian GDP to the Sentiment Shock in a
VAR with Additional Controls












RER SP Oil Factor Baseline













RER SP Oil Factor Baseline
Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of US and Canadian GDP to the sentiment shock, in a VAR with
additional controls identified as discussed in 3.4.1. The additional controls are a measure of stock prices (labeled
SP), an oil price index (Oil), the real exchange rate (RER) and a US factor (Factor).
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Figure 3.17: The Impulse Responses of US and Canadian Hours to the Sentiment Shock in
a VAR with Additional Controls













RER SP Oil Factor Baseline















RER SP Oil Factor Baseline
Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of US and Canadian GDP to the sentiment shock, in a VAR with
additional controls identified as discussed in 3.4.1. The additional controls are a measure of stock prices (labeled
SP), an oil price index (Oil), the real exchange rate (RER) and a US factor (Factor).
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Figure 3.18: The Responses of Price Variables to the Three Shocks
























































Notes: This figure plots the responses of the US CPI, the oil price index, the stock price index, and the US-Canada
real exchange rate to the three shocks.
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Figure 3.19: Responses with Canadian Consumption as a Core Variable











































































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of all key variables to the three shocks in a six variable VAR where
Canadian Consumption is treated as a core variable (see section 3.4.1 for details).
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Table 3.1: Surprise TFP Shock: Variance Decomposition
Panel A: US
Horizon TFP GDP Consumption Hours Forecast
1Q 1.00 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.13
(0.00) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
2Q 0.98 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.08
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
1Y 0.93 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.09
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
2Y 0.91 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.06
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
5Y 0.79 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.05
(0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08)
10Y 0.59 0.13 0.12 0.28 0.07
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.10)
Panel B: Canada
Horizon Output Consumption Hours Exports Imports TFP Utilization
1Q 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
2Q 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00
(0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
1Y 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
2Y 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00
(0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
5Y 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.11
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12)
10Y 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.29
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.16)
Notes: This table shows the contribution of the surprise TFP innovation to the forecast error variance
of all variables at different horizons. Standard errors are from 2000 bootstrap repetitions.
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Table 3.2: News Shock: Variance Decomposition
Panel A: US
Horizon TFP GDP Consumption Hours Forecast
1Q 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.14 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02)
2Q 0.01 0.03 0.45 0.06 0.05
(0.01) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
1Y 0.04 0.11 0.48 0.02 0.15
(0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.07)
2Y 0.06 0.32 0.52 0.08 0.35
(0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11)
5Y 0.18 0.45 0.56 0.13 0.46
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.12)
10Y 0.36 0.45 0.54 0.12 0.47
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.08) (0.15)
Panel B: Canada
Horizon Output Consumption Hours Exports Imports TFP Utilization
1Q 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
2Q 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
1Y 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
2Y 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.18 0.16
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09)
5Y 0.26 0.32 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.39 0.24
(0.11) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.12) (0.11)
10Y 0.33 0.51 0.06 0.17 0.10 0.47 0.20
(0.13) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.11)
Notes: This table shows the contribution of the news shock to the forecast error variance of all
variables at different horizons. Standard errors are from 2000 bootstrap repetitions.
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Table 3.3: Sentiment Shock: Variance Decomposition
Panel A: US
Horizon TFP Output Consumption Hours Forecast
1Q 0.00 0.65 0.18 0.62 0.85
(0.00) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
2Q 0.02 0.75 0.21 0.71 0.81
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
1Y 0.03 0.61 0.22 0.69 0.62
(0.03) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
2Y 0.02 0.36 0.21 0.52 0.35
(0.04) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10)
5Y 0.02 0.25 0.18 0.35 0.26
(0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10)
10Y 0.03 0.21 0.15 0.29 0.22
(0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Panel B: Canada
Horizon Output Consumption Hours Exports Imports TFP Utilization
1Q 0.19 0.08 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.01 0.18
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
2Q 0.32 0.12 0.29 0.38 0.36 0.01 0.28
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07)
1Y 0.41 0.09 0.35 0.44 0.41 0.04 0.33
(0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09)
2Y 0.34 0.05 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.03 0.25
(0.10) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10)
5Y 0.29 0.03 0.37 0.32 0.29 0.06 0.17
(0.10) (0.05) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10)
10Y 0.26 0.02 0.37 0.30 0.26 0.08 0.12
(0.10) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
Notes: This table shows the contribution of the sentiment shock to the forecast error variance of all
variables at different horizons. Standard errors are from 2000 bootstrap repetitions.
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Table 3.4: Conditional Correlations
Correlation Conditional on:
Data TFP News Sentiment
US, Canada Output 0.73 0.47 0.99 0.99
(0.28) (0.07) (0.05)
US, Canada Consumption 0.51 -0.13 0.94 0.80
(0.47) (0.13) (0.23)
US, Canada Hours 0.68 -0.47 0.46 0.98
(0.56) (0.45) (0.30)
Exports from Canada, US Output 0.66 0.95 0.97 0.89
(0.19) (0.16) (0.09)
Canadian Imports, US Output 0.58 0.79 0.91 0.91
(0.31) (0.28) (0.12)
US Output, US Consumption 0.84 0.97 0.99 0.96
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
US Output, US Hours 0.87 0.81 0.20 0.73
(0.39) (0.44) (0.31)
Notes: This table shows conditional correlations of various macroeconomic aggregates in response
to the three shocks. Standard errors are from 2000 bootstrap replications. The data column refers
to the unconditional correlations from HP-filtered data with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
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Table 3.5: Sentiment vs. Monetary Policy Shocks: Variance Decomposition
Panel A: Sentiment Shock
Horizon TFP C GDP H FF Forecast Can GDP
1Q 0.00 0.36 0.83 0.64 0.08 0.70 0.18
2Q 0.02 0.32 0.83 0.64 0.20 0.62 0.33
1Y 0.02 0.25 0.64 0.61 0.23 0.47 0.42
2Y 0.02 0.18 0.34 0.42 0.22 0.23 0.33
5Y 0.02 0.10 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.12 0.21
10Y 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.08 0.17
Panel B: Monetary Policy Shock
Horizon TFP C GDP H FF Forecast Can GDP
1Q 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.01 0.01
2Q 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.75 0.01 0.01
1Y 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.65 0.01 0.01
2Y 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.55 0.01 0.01
5Y 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.47 0.04 0.09
10Y 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.45 0.03 0.07
Notes: This table reports the forecast error variance contributions of the sentiment shock and the
monetary policy shock in a VAR that includes the federal funds rate.
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Table 3.6: Other Controls: Sentiment Shock Variance Decomposition
Panel A: US GDP
Horizon Factor RER Stock Prices Oil
1Q 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.64
2Q 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.76
1Y 0.54 0.66 0.49 0.63
2Y 0.23 0.45 0.26 0.34
5Y 0.11 0.27 0.15 0.18
10Y 0.09 0.22 0.12 0.15
Panel B: US Hours
Horizon Factor RER Stock Prices Oil
1Q 0.59 0.47 0.66 0.53
2Q 0.70 0.58 0.70 0.65
1Y 0.66 0.58 0.57 0.66
2Y 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.47
5Y 0.14 0.30 0.23 0.24
10Y 0.11 0.24 0.19 0.18
Panel C: Canadian GDP
Horizon Factor RER Stock Prices Oil
1Q 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.18
2Q 0.28 0.31 0.25 0.29
1Y 0.33 0.43 0.28 0.39
2Y 0.21 0.39 0.21 0.30
5Y 0.12 0.23 0.16 0.20
10Y 0.10 0.20 0.14 0.18
Notes: This table shows the contribution of the sentiment shock to the forecast error variance of
the key variables when the core VAR is extended with various controls, discussed in Section 3.4.1.
Factor refers to the FAVAR, RER refers to the real exchange rate, and Stock Prices and Oil refer to
VARs that include an index of stock prices and an oil price index respectively
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Table 3.7: Correlations of Shocks: US and Canada
Contemporaneous Correlations US TFP US News US Sentiment
Canada TFP 0.16 0.01 0.17
Canada News -0.04 -0.02 -0.17
Canada Sentiment -0.02 0.11 0.18
Notes: This table shows the contemporaneous correlation of the three identified shocks between the
US and Canada. They are identified in separate VARs with only the core variables corresponding
to each country.
Table 3.8: Cross-Correlations of Forecast and Confidence with GDP
Lags
Variable -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
GDP Forecast -0.07 0.04 0.01 0.18 0.20 0.93 0.38 0.24 0.14 0.11 -0.03
Consumer -0.17 -0.12 -0.21 -0.13 -0.15 0.21 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.25 0.03
Confidence
Notes: This table shows the cross-correlation of the GDP forecast and the Consumer Confidence






A.1 Chapter1: Data Appendix
A.1.1 Creating Constant Manufacturing Sample
An important challenge for our analysis of U.S. manufacturing employment over such
an extended period of time is defining exactly what plant-level operations constitute manu-
facturing. This task is complicated by the fact that our sample coincides with two distinct
industry classification systems (SIC and NAICS) as well as periodic revisions to these sys-
tems.
To construct a constant manufacturing sample, we begin with the Longitudinal Business
Database (LBD), an assembly of the Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL) that
has been augmented with longitudinal identifiers and standardized across years. We drop
establishments listed as government, and establishments listed as “dead”. Next, we utilize a
new concordance of manufacturing classification systems outlined in Fort and Klimek (2015)
for smoothing out discrepancies between industries defined as manufacturing between SIC
and NAICS. There remain several acknowledged data issues of the Fort and Klimek (2015)
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manufacturing definition, principally related to manufacturing establishments that are re-
coded into NAICS 55 - “Management of Companies and Enterprises” in 2002. We set up
the following two rules to broadly account for establishments that transition into and out
of a FK-manufacturing industry during our sample. First, we drop establishments (in all
years) that are re-classified out of manufacturing during our sample; and second, we retain
establishments (in all years) that are ever reclassified into manufacturing during our sample.
This system prevents the possibility of spurious establishment “births” or “deaths” being
recorded as a consequence of a classification change.
Figure A.1 illustrates how our constant manufacturing sample compares to manufacturing
employment from two other sources: published totals from the Current Employment Survey
and Pierce and Schott (2013).
A.1.2 Identifying Plants Owned by Multinationals
The discussion that follows is an abbreviated form of the full technical note (see Flaaen
(2013b)) documenting the bridge between the DCA and the Business Register.
A.1.2.1 External Sources of Information
Identification of foreign ownership and affiliate information comes from two external
sources, the LexisNexis Directory of Corporate Affiliations (DCA) and Uniworld Business
Publications.
The LexisNexis DCA is the primary source of information on the ownership and locations
of U.S. and foreign affiliates. This directory describes the organization and hierarchy of public
and private firms, and consists of three separate databases: U.S. Public Companies, U.S.
Private Companies, and International – those parent companies with headquarters located
outside the United States. The U.S. Public database contains all firms traded on the major
U.S. exchanges, as well as major firms traded on smaller U.S. exchanges. To be included in
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the U.S. Private database, a firm must demonstrate revenues in excess of $1 million, 300 or
more employees, or substantial assets. Those firms included in the International database,
which include both public and private companies, generally have revenues greater than $10
million. Each database contains information on all parent company subsidiaries, regardless
of the location of the subsidiary in relation to the parent.
Uniworld Business Publications (UBP) provides a secondary source used to identify multi-
national structure, and serves to increase the coverage and reliability of these measures.
UBP has produced periodic volumes documenting the locations and international scope of
i) American firms operating in foreign countries; and ii) foreign firms with operations in the
United States. Although only published biennially, these directories benefit from a focus on
multinational firms, and from no sales threshold for inclusion.
Because there exist no common identifiers between these directories and Census Bureau
data infrastructure, we rely on probabilistic name and address matching — so-called “fuzzy
merging” — to link the directories to the Census data infrastructure.
A.1.2.2 The Matching Procedure: An Overview
The matching procedure uses a set of record linking utilities described in Wasi and
Flaaen (2014). This program uses a bigram string comparator algorithm on multiple vari-
ables with differing user-specified weights.1 The primary variables for matching include the
establishment name along with geographic indicators of street, city ,zip code, and state.
Recognizing the potential for false-positive matches, w use a relatively conservative crite-
ria for identifying matches between the directories and the Census Bureau data. In practice,
the procedure generally requires a match score exceeding 95 percent, except in those cases
1The term bigram refers to two consecutive characters within a string (the word bigram contains 5
possible bigrams: “bi”, “ig”, “gr”, “ra”, and “am”). The program is a modified version of Blasnik (2010),
and assigns a score for each variable between the two datasets based on the percentage of matching bigrams.
See Flaaen (2013b) or Wasi and Flaaen (2014) for more information.
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where ancillary evidence provides increased confidence in the match.2 This matching pro-
ceeds in an iterative fashion, in which a series of matching procedures are applied with
decreasingly restrictive sets of matching requirements. In other words, the initial matching
attempt uses the most stringent standards possible, after which the non-matching records
proceed to a further matching iteration, often with less stringent standards. In each itera-
tion, the matching records are assigned a flag that indicates the standard associated with
the match.
See Table B.1 for a summary of the establishment-level match rate statistics by year and
type of firm. Table B.2 lists the corresponding information for the Uniworld data.
A.1.3 Creating Panel of Multinational Plants
The external directories allow for relatively easy categorization of the multinational sta-
tus of U.S. plants. If the parent firm contains addresses outside of the United States, but is
headquartered within the U.S., we designate this establishment as part of a U.S. multina-
tional firm. If the parent firm is headquartered outside of the United States, we designate
this establishment as part of a Foreign multinational firm.
This paper seeks to understand how changes in multinational status affect labor market
outcomes in the United States. To achieve this end, we must take the yearly multinational
identifiers and construct a panel across many years. The challenge with this exercise comes
from the fact that the directories are matched year-by-year, utilizing little longitudinal in-
formation.3 This implies the possibility that a multinational plant may not be successfully
matched every year, and our data could have spurious entries and exits from multinational
status throughout the panel.
2The primary sources of such ancillary evidence are clerical review of the matches, and additional parent
identifier matching evidence.
3The only longitudinal information used is by applying prior clerical edits forward in time for a particular
establishment, provided that the name and address information remains unchanged.
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To mitigate this concern, we develop a series of checks and rule-based procedures to
correct and smooth out any unlikely firm switching. These steps can be classified as those
accounting for changes within a year across plants of a given firm, and those correcting for
multinational status across years for a particular plant.
A.1.3.1 Within-Year Rules
First, we apply our multinational indicators to all establishments within a firm provided
there are no disagreements in the DCA/UBP information among the establishments. This
is an attractive feature of our methodology as the researcher must only successfully match
one plant of a given firm to apply that information throughout the firm. To resolve any
conflicting information within a year, we first attempt to use corroborating evidence from
the secondary source (typically Uniworld), and then turn to the maximum employment share
of a particular type of match. Finally, we conduct manual checks on the data, particularly
on those firms that demonstrate very large amounts of related-party trade but have not been
captured by our matching procedure.
A.1.3.2 Checks and Rules for Across Years
Another important step in creating a panel of establishment information on the scope
of international operations is to check and correct for any potentially spurious transitions
of establishment type over time. First, if there is only one missing year of a multinational
indicator in the establishment’s history, we fill it in manually. Second, if there is a gap of
two years in this indicator that corresponds to gap years in the Uniworld coverage, we also
fill it manually. Similarly, if an establishment is identified as a multinational in only one
year in it’s history, we remove the flag. Finally, we fill in 2 year gaps provided that in the
intervening period the share of related party trade remains high.
178
A.1.4 Classification of Intermediate/Final Goods Trade
Firm-level data on imports available in the LFTTD do not contain information on the
intended use of the goods.4 Disentangling whether an imported product is used as an inter-
mediate input for further processing — rather than for final sale in the U.S. — has important
implications for the effect of offshoring on U.S. employment. Fortunately, the Census Bureau
data contains other information that can be used to distinguish intermediate input imports
from final goods imports. In brief, identifying the principal products produced by U.S. es-
tablishments in a given detailed industry should indicate the types of products that, when
imported, should be classified as a “final” good – that is, intended for final sale without
further processing. The products imported outside of this set, then, would be classified as
intermediate goods.5 Such product-level production data exists as part of the “Products”
trailer file of the Census of Manufacturers. As detailed in Pierce and Schott (2012) (see page
11), combining import, export, and production information at a product-level is useful for
just such a purpose.
It is important to acknowledge that the Census data on trade exists at the firm level,
while the other information used in this paper is , principally, at the plant level. Utilizing
the establishment industry information, however, will allow us to parse a firm’s trade based
on the intermediate/final distinction for a given establishment, thereby generating some
heterogeneity in firm trade across establishments.6
4This is one advantage of the survey data on multinational firms available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. There are, however, a number of critical disadvantages of this data source, as outlined in Flaaen
(2013a).
5To be more precise, this set will include a combination of intermediate and capital goods.
6To be more precise, the total trade at each establishment of a firm must be identical. The shares of
intermediate/final goods will vary.
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A.1.4.1 Creating a NAICS-Based set of Final/Intermediate Products
As part of the quinquennial Census of Manufacturers (CM), the Census Bureau surveys
establishments on their total shipments broken down into a set of NAICS-based (6 digit)
product categories. Each establishment is given a form particular to its industry with a
list of pre-specified products, with additional space to record other product shipments not
included in the form. The resulting product trailer file to the CM allows the researcher to
understand the principal products produced at each manufacturing establishment during a
census year.
There are several data issues that must be addressed before using the CM-Products
file to infer information about the relative value of product-level shipments by a particular
firm. First, the trailer file contains product-codes that are used to “balance” the aggregated
product-level value of shipments with the total value of shipments reported on the base CM
survey form. We drop these product codes from the dataset. Second, there are often codes
that do not correspond to any official 7-digit product code identified by Census. (These
are typically products that are self-identified by the firm but do not match any of the pre-
specified products identified for that industry by Census.) Rather than ignoring the value
of shipments corresponding to these codes, we attempt to match at a more aggregated level.
Specifically, we iteratively try to find a product code match at the 6, 5, and 4 digit product
code level, and use the existing set of 7-digit matches as weights to allocate the product
value among the 7-digit product codes encompassing the more aggregated level.
We now discuss how this file can be used to assemble a set of NAICS product codes that
are the predominant output (final goods) for a given NAICS industry. Let xpij denote the
shipments of product p by establishment i in industry j during a census year. Then the total
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One might argue that the set of final goods products for a given industry should be defined
as the set of products where Spj > 0. That is, a product is designated as a “final good” for
that industry if any establishment recorded positive shipments of the product. The obvious
disadvantage of employing such a zero threshold is that small degrees of within-industry
heterogeneity will have oversized effects on the classification.
Acknowledging this concern, we set an exogenous threshold level W such that any p
in a given j with Spj > W is classified as a final good product for that industry. The
upper portion of Table B.3 documents the number of final goods products and the share of
intermediate input imports based on several candidate threshold levels. The issues of a zero
threshold are quite clear in the table; a small but positive threshold value (0.1) will have a
large effect on the number of products designated as final goods. This shows indirectly that
there are a large number of products produced by establishments in a given industry, but a
much smaller number that comprise the bulk of total value.
There are several advantages to using the CM-Products file rather than using an input-
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output table.7 First, within a given CM year, the classification can be done at the firm or
establishment level rather than aggregating to a particular industry. This reflects the fact
that the same imported product may be used as an input by one firm and sold to consumers as
a final product by another. Second, the CM-Products file is one of the principal data inputs
into making the input-output tables, and thus represents more finely detailed information.
Related to this point, the input-output tables are produced with a significant delay – the
most recent available for the U.S. is for year 2002. Third, the input-output tables for the
U.S. are based on BEA industry classifications, which imply an additional concordance (see
below) to map into the NAICS-based industries present in the Census data.
We now turn to the procedure to map firm-level trade into intermediate and final goods
using the industry-level product classifications calculated above.
A.1.4.2 Mapping HS Trade Transactions to the Product Classification
The LFTTD classifies products according to the U.S. Harmonized Codes (HS), which
must be concorded to the NAICS-based product system in order to utilize the classification
scheme from the CM-Products file. Thankfully, a recent concordance created by Pierce and
Schott (2012) can be used to map the firm-HS codes present in the LFTTD data with the
firm-NAICS product codes present in the CM-Products data.
A challenge of this strategy is that the LFTTD exists at a firm-level, while the most
natural construction of the industry-level classification scheme is by establishment. More
concretely, for multi-unit, multi-industry firms, the LFTTD is unable to decompose an im-
port shipment into the precise establishment-industry of its U.S. destination. By using the
industry of each establishment to classify the firm’s imports, we generate heterogeneity in
the intermediate/final goods trade across the establishments of the firm.
7Another option is to use the CM-Materials file, the flip side of the CM-Products file. Unfortunately,
the CM-Materials file contains significantly more problematic product codes than the Products file, and so
concording to the trade data is considerably more difficult.
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Once the firm-level trade data is in the same product classification as the industry-level
filter created from the CM-Products file, all that is left is to match the trade data with the
filter by NAICS industry. Thus, letting Mij denote total imports from a firm i (firm i is










where Pj = {p | Spj ≥ W} . (A.1)
The bottom section of Table B.3 shows some summary statistics of the intermediate share
of trade according to this classification system, by several values of the product-threshold
W . There are at least two important takeaways from these numbers. First, the share
of intermediates in total imports is roughly what is reported in the literature using IO
Tables. Second, the share of total trade occupied by intermediate products is not particularly
sensitive to the exogenous threshold level. While there is a small increase in the share when
raising the threshold from 0 to 0.1 (about 3 percentage points), the number is essentially
unchanged when raising it further to 0.2.
A.1.5 Creating the Firm-Level Sample
Much of our analysis is at the firm level, so we build a sample of U.S. multinational firms
from the panel of multinational plants (constructed as detailed in Section A.1.3). As the
Corporate Directories are matched at the establishment level, when aggregating up to the
firm, there are occasional conflicts in the definition of a firm between the Census and the
Directories. We rely on the Census definition of a firm. Conflicts are resolved as follows:
• We define a firm in the panel as a U.S. multinational in a particular year if our matches
are completely consistent in that year, and there are no conflicts.
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• In the special case of a conflict where the Census classifies a firm as a set of establish-
ments, but our matches to the Directories indicate a subset of those establishments
belongs to a foreign multinational and a subset to a U.S. multinational, we classify the
firm as a U.S. multinational if the employment share of the firm in the matched U.S.
multinational sample is larger than that matched as a Foreign multinational.
Note, firm identifiers in the Census are sometimes problematic longitudinally. An example
is that the firm identifier changes when the firm goes from being a single unit to a multi-unit
establishment. Further, mergers and acquisitions can lead in some cases to the birth of a
new firm identifier, and in others to the continuation of one of the merged identifiers. As
such, results pertaining to the extensive margin that use the firm identifier as the basis of
analysis will be overstated. This is a problem faced by all longitudinal firm-level analysis
using Census Bureau data. We do not use longitudinal information in classifying U.S. and
foreign multinationals, or non multinational firms. However, some of our analysis in 3.3
uses the growth rates of employment in the firm. In these cases, we use establishment level
outcomes as the baseline (as these identifiers are longitudinally consistent), and present the
firm-level results for robustness. The structural estimation relies on repeated cross-sections
of the firm-level data and does not suffer from this issue.
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Table A.1: DCA Establishments and Match Rates, by Firm Type
Panel A: Total DCA Panel B: U.S. Multinationals Panel C: Foreign Multinationals
DCA Matched Match DCA Matched Match DCA Matched Match
(Total) to BR Rate (Total) to BR Rate (Total) to BR Rate
1993 61,646 43,190 0.70 21,482 14,387 0.67 8,270 5,810 0.70
1994 64,090 44,904 0.70 22,396 15,110 0.67 9,326 6,437 0.69
1995 65,223 45,743 0.70 22,952 15,448 0.67 9,365 6,414 0.68
1996 64,152 41,713 0.65 22,353 13,806 0.62 10,057 6,331 0.63
1997 60,884 41,290 0.68 20,962 13,583 0.65 9,556 6,328 0.66
1998 59,043 40,854 0.69 20,012 13,218 0.66 9,416 6,282 0.67
1999 58,509 40,697 0.70 20,157 13,408 0.67 9,218 6,054 0.66
2000 68,672 48,875 0.71 18,728 12,631 0.67 9,900 6,755 0.68
2001 70,522 50,105 0.71 18,516 12,477 0.67 10,089 6,864 0.68
2002 97,551 66,665 0.68 31,260 21,004 0.67 13,168 8,483 0.64
2003 123,553 86,838 0.70 25,905 17,465 0.67 11,101 7,398 0.67
2004 117,639 84,450 0.72 24,028 16,923 0.70 10,152 7,156 0.70
2005 110,106 80,245 0.73 20,870 15,191 0.73 9,409 6,865 0.73
2006 110,826 79,275 0.72 21,335 15,539 0.73 9,981 7,243 0.73
2007 112,346 81,656 0.73 22,500 16,396 0.73 10,331 7,555 0.73
2008 111,935 81,535 0.73 23,090 16,910 0.73 9,351 6,880 0.74
2009 111,953 81,112 0.72 22,076 16,085 0.73 11,142 8,193 0.74
2010 111,998 79,661 0.71 21,667 15,785 0.73 11,308 8,181 0.72
2011 113,334 79,516 0.70 21,721 15,557 0.72 11,619 8,357 0.72
1Notes: U.S. multinationals are defined as establishments whose parents are U.S. firms that have
a foreign affiliate in the DCA. Foreign multinationals are defined as establishments owned by firms
whose headquarters are in a foreign location.
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Figure A.1: Comparison of Constant Manufacturing Employment Samples: 1993-2011
Source: BLS, Pierce and Schott (2013) and the LBD.
A.2 Chapter 1: Additional Results
A.2.1 Within-Group Decompositions
In a first level of disaggregation, we show that job creation and destruction rates vary
substantially by establishment type: U.S. multinational, exporter or purely domestic. U.S.
multinationals have had persistently high job destruction rates and low job creation rates.
In contrast, exporting and domestic establishments have higher job creation rates than de-
struction rates during business cycle expansions.
Employment growth is affected jointly by the rate of job creation and that of job destruc-
tion, and further by the extent to which this pertains to establishment births and deaths
rather than employment changes at continuing establishments. Following the common prac-
tice exemplified by Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) we decompose the changes in within-group
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Table A.2: Uniworld Match Statistics: 2006-2011
# of Uniworld Matched Percent
Establishments to B.R. Matched
Foreign Multinationals
1992 1,597 1,223 0.77
1995 1,625 1,213 0.75
1998 2,020 1,555 0.77
2000 2,371 1,862 0.79
2002 2,780 2,154 0.77
2004 3,220 2,347 0.73
2006 3,495 2,590 0.74
2008 3,683 2,818 0.76
2011 6,188 4,017 0.65
U.S. Multinationals1
1993 2,553 1,746 0.68
1996 2,502 1,819 0.73
1999 2,438 1,942 0.80
2001 2,586 2,046 0.79
2004 3,001 2,403 0.80
2005 2,951 2,489 0.84
2007 4,043 3,236 0.80
2009 4,293 3,422 0.80
1U.S. multinationals include only the establishments identified as
the U.S. headquarters.
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Table A.3: Appendix Table Comparing the Results from Threshold Values W
Threshold Values
W = 0 W = 0.1 W = 0.2
Number of Final Good Products per Industry
Median 19 1 1
Mean 25 1.52 1.14
Min 1 1 0
Max 154 6 3
Implied Share of Intermediate Inputs
Imports 60.9 63.90 63.97
Exports 52.0 54.96 55.04
This table is applicable to the year 2007.
employment into job creation/destruction rates, separated by intensive and extension mar-
gins. Formally, let employment at establishments in group S ∈ {D,X,MH,MF} in time t




t−1 as the set of establishments in S that increase
(decrease) employment between t-1 and t, we can then define the job creation (JCS,t) and
destruction (JDS,t) rates as:
Job Creation Rate: JCS,t=
∑
i∈S+t−1 ∆ei,S,t
(ES,t + ES,t−1) /2
(A.2)
Job Destruction Rate: JDS,t=
∑
i∈S−t−1 |∆ei,S,t|
(ES,t + ES,t−1) /2
(A.3)
Separating these groups further into those surviving establishments (existing in both t−1
and t) will yield intensive margin growth rates, while focusing on establishment births/deaths
in a given year will yield rates corresponding to the extensive margin.
Figures A.2 report the intensive job creation/destruction rates of the three relevant groups
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we study. In Panel A, the job creation rates show both cyclicality and a secular decline
for both domestic and exporting establishments.8 The job creation rate for multinational
firms is lower and slightly less cyclical than the other groups. The high cyclicality of job
destruction rates is very much evident in Panel B of Figure A.2. Taking into account that
both JC and JD rates are known to decrease with both firm size and firm age (see Davis
and Haltiwanger (1992) and Haltiwanger et al. (2013)), and that multinationals are 3 times
(20 times) larger than exporting (domestic) establishments, it is striking how similar the
job destruction rates for multinationals are to the other two groups. With this in mind, it
appears that job destruction plays a more important role for multinationals relative to non-
multinational establishments, and has been an important driver of the observed aggregate
decline in employment in this group.
Figure A.3 translates the job creation and destruction rates into a net measure of em-
ployment gains by type of establishment. Panel A shows that multinational establishments
have had lower net growth rates than the domestic/exporting groups in nearly every year
of our sample. While domestic/exporting firms were on net adding jobs following the 2001
recession in the U.S., the multinational establishments continued to shed jobs through the
2008/2009 financial crisis. In this way multinationals are shown to be a contributor to the
“jobless recovery” of the 2003-2007 expansion.
A.2.2 Other Results on Transitions
A.2.2.1 Assumptions of Firm-Level trade Following an Establishment Death
There are at least two distinct approaches to account for the role of establishment death
on the import activity at the firm-level. The estimates in Figure 1.3 fill in the post-death
values for a given establishment with the actual imports of the firm associated with that
8This decline in job creation rates is consistent with other evidence on the decline in the overall dynamism
of U.S. businesses, as documented in Decker et al. (2014).
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establishment. 9 This approach better captures the import substitution that may occur
if a plant is closed in response to offshore activities. If this was the case, we would see
a larger import differential relative to the benchmark calculation. On the other hand, if
establishment deaths are associated with broad firm decline, then this differential import
measure would be smaller relative to the benchmark.
An alternative approach would be to fill in a value of zero trade for all years following
an establishment death. If transitioning establishments are dying at a higher rate than non-
transitioning establishments, this would reduce the differential importing patterns following
the transition. A final approach would be to ignore the extensive-margin effects and simply
allow the observations to be dropped upon an establishment death.
Below we demonstrate the effects of these assumptions on our estimates of import be-
havior surrounding the event study . In our baseline sample underlying Figure 1.3, we create
a balanced panel and fill the pre-birth or post-death observations with the value at the firm
immediately following preceding its birth/death. To assess the alternative approach we fill
the pre-birth and post-death trade values with zero (which we call the “zeros-fill” results).
Finally, the “no-ext margin” results demonstrate our estimates when completely ignoring
these extensive margin effects.
Figure A.4 reports the coefficient estimates from the baseline, zero-fill, and no-ext margin
samples corresponding to related-party imports before and after the transition to multina-
tional status. The evidence points to transitioning plants with a higher death rate than
the control group, an effect which pulls the differential import behavior down relative to
the baseline. On the other hand, filling in the firm imports after death actually increases
the importing differential. This evidence further supports the hypothesis of employment
substitution of these firms.
9If the entire firm disappears, we then record zeros in that period and all future periods.
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A.2.2.2 Other Trade Effects Following Multinational Transitions
We estimate equation (1.2) using various types of firm-level trade corresponding to es-
tablishments that transition into part of a multinational firm. The results pertaining to
related-party and arms-length intermediate imports are shown in Figure 1.3. New U.S. multi-
nationals may also begin importing final goods from an arms-length or intra-firm supplier
abroad. The results that show the differential imports of final goods of new multinationals
are shown in Figure A.5. Perhaps more surprisingly, we also find strong growth in export
volumes in the years following a multinational transition. The increase in exports (shown in
Figure A.6), together with the broad increase in importing activity, demonstrates the overall
modifications of the production structure of these firms that accompany expansions abroad.
What do our results imply in the aggregate? To convert the estimates from Figure 1.2
into a measure of total job gain/loss from new multinational activities.
Further details are available in Appendix A.2.3.1.
A.2.3 Quantifying Job Loss: Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations
A.2.3.1 Job Loss from Multinational Transitions
This section describes how we convert the estimates on relative employment growth rates
of new multinational plants into a measure of the aggregate net gains of employment. The
coefficients from Figure 1.2 represent relative employment effects, expressed in percentage
points, of a transitioning plant. These effects represent averages that span the entire period
(1993-2011) for which plants may be transitioning into a multinational firm. To translate
these percentage points into jobs, one challenge is to identify the appropriate base on which to
apply the relative percentage differentials. Unfortunately, the average size of transitioning
plants is not currently available. However, using the productivity/size ordering of firms
implied by models such as Helpman et al. (2004), and confirmed using similar data sources
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in Flaaen (2013a), we assign these transitioning plants an average size that is between that
of exporters and multinational plants.
Another challenge comes from what to assume when the time-path of a given transitioning
plant extends beyond our estimates (which currently end at t = 10 years post transition).
While we could extrapolate our estimates in the later years of the estimation in , we instead
follow the more conservative assumption and terminate the counterfactual time path once
the estimates from equation (1.2) run out. (Essentially, we assume that the growth rate
differentials in all years t > 10 are zero.) Of course, extrapolating the estimates beyond year
10 would magnify the job losses – adding an additional percentage point or two in accounting
for the total job loss – resulting from multinational transitions.









(1 + δj) (A.4)
where Tt is the number of transitioning plants in event year t, Et is the average size of
transitioning plants in event year t, and δ are the coefficient estimates from equation (1.2).
Table A.4 provides further details. The result is an estimate of approximately 400,000 jobs
lost due to these transitioning plants, roughly 7 percent of the total 5.65 million decline in
manufacturing employment in our sample.
A.2.3.2 Job Loss from all Multinational Activity: Total
A similar exercise can be done using the coefficient estimates from Table 1.5. This calcu-
lation is somewhat easier in that we simply apply the employment growth rate differential
to the average establishment size of multinationals, and then multiply by the total number
of multinational establishments in each year. Table A.5 shows the results. The first set
of calculations uses the weighted regression coefficient pertaining to the intensive/extensive
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establishment growth rate, whereas the second set of calculations uses the unweighted re-
gression coefficient. The numbers are large: between 2.02 and 2.45 million manufacturing
jobs over our full sample.
A.2.4 Regression Evidence: Robustness
Table A.6 presents results from running the specification in equation 1.1 for various
subsamples of our data. The results are also robust to including lagged establishment or
firm employment growth rates as controls (available upon request).
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Figure A.2: Job Creation and Destruction Rates by Group: Intensive Margin
A. Job Creation Rates
B. Job Destruction Rates
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
These figures report the decomposition of within-group growth rates of employment at the intensive
margin. See equation A.2 in the text.
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Figure A.3: Net Growth Rates by Group:
A. Intensive Margin
B. Extensive Margin
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
These figures report the decomposition of within-group growth rates of employment at the intensive
margin. See equation A.2 in the text.
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Figure A.4: Importing Differentials of Multinational Transitions, Balanced Panel
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This figure reports the related-party intermediate input imports of the parent firm of the transi-
tioning establishment relative to a control group, as outlined in equation 1.2. Zero Fill refers to
a balanced panel with zeros for trade after an establishment death. No Ext. Margin refers to the
sample with no extensive margin effects following the establishment death.
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Figure A.5: Final Goods Importing Differentials of Multinational Transitions
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This figure reports the related-party and arms-length final goods imports of the parent firm of an
establishment that transitions into part of a multinational firm in year (t = 0), relative to a control
group based on interacted effects of firm age, establishment size, and industry (in year t = −1).
See equation 1.2, modified to reflect firm-level imports as dependent variables. The shaded area
corresponds to a 95 percent confidence interval.
A.3 Chapter 1: Structural estimation appendix
A.3.1 Estimation
This appendix lays out the procedure we use to find bounds of the constant (σ − 1) /θ.












Figure A.6: Exporting Differentials of Multinational Transitions
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This figure reports the related-party and arms-length exports of the parent firm of an establishment
that transitions into part of a multinational firm in year (t = 0), relative to a control group based
on interacted effects of firm age, establishment size, and industry (in year t = −1). See equation
1.2, modified to reflect firm-level imports as dependent variables. The shaded area corresponds to a
95 percent confidence interval.
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Table A.4: Appendix Table Detailing Aggregate Job Loss from New Multinational Plants
Year Average # of Cumul. Jobs Total Job
Size Transitions per Estab. Gains
1994 203 344 -45 -15,424
1995 204 498 -45 -22,436
1996 205 915 -45 -41,344
1997 202 762 -45 -33,977
1998 205 851 -45 -38,590
1999 208 994 -46 -45,593
2000 197 962 -43 -41,774
2001 195 699 -43 -30,048
2002 193 1,060 -43 -45,062
2003 181 623 -36 -22,185
2004 178 723 -32 -23,204
2005 175 539 -29 -15,401
2006 174 535 -24 -12,799
2007 174 837 -16 -13,428
2008 169 679 -9 -6,255
2009 164 352 3 964
2010 152 465 12 5,759
Total -400,796
Share of 5.65 million lost 0.07
Source: Estimates based on Table 1.1, Table 1.2, and Figure 1.2.
Solving for Φ (ϕ), substituting into the expression for revenues, and taking logs gives















+ ln s (ϕ) (A.5)
where ΨI is a fixed effect. Strictly speaking ΨI does actually not depend on the set I.
However, since the nonparametric term does depend on I, we always allow the constant to
depend on I.
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Table A.5: Appendix Table Detailing Aggregate Job Loss from All Multinational Plants
Extensive, Weighted Extensive, Unweighted
Avg. Differential Avg. Differential
Average # of Mult Employment per Total Employment per Total
Size Establishments Establishment1 per year Establishment2 per year
1994 310 17,119 -8.0 137,112 -9.7 166,341
1995 311 16,269 -8.0 130,612 -9.7 158,456
1996 309 16,316 -8.0 129,956 -9.7 157,660
1997 306 16,365 -7.9 129,359 -9.6 156,935
1998 313 15,950 -8.1 128,823 -9.8 156,285
1999 312 16,084 -8.0 129,307 -9.8 156,872
2000 299 16,466 -7.7 127,067 -9.4 154,155
2001 297 15,886 -7.7 121,800 -9.3 147,766
2002 296 15,386 -7.6 117,568 -9.3 142,631
2003 279 14,930 -7.2 107,524 -8.7 130,446
2004 275 14,823 -7.1 105,186 -8.6 127,609
2005 270 14,692 -7.0 102,480 -8.5 124,326
2006 270 14,534 -7.0 101,095 -8.4 122,646
2007 269 14,482 -6.9 100,475 -8.4 121,894
2008 261 14,641 -6.7 98,763 -8.2 119,817
2009 254 14,456 -6.5 94,562 -7.9 114,721
2010 235 13,865 -6.1 83,888 -7.3 101,771
2011 222 13,562 -5.7 77,721 -7.0 94,290
Total 2,023,296 2,454,619
Share of 5.65 million lost 0.36 0.43
Source: Estimates based on Table 1.1, Table 1.2, and Table 1.5.
1This column applies the coefficient estimates from the intensive/extensive and weighted estimates from
Table 1.5. 2This column applies the coefficient estimates from the intensive/extensive and unweighted
estimates from Table 1.5.
Next, we fix a particular sourcing strategy J and partition it into the strict subsets
I1, ..., IS. We then estimate equation (A.5) for all I1, ..., IS and obtain S estimates of −σ−1θ .
Now the same logic as described in the text applies. As the sample size tends to infinity, the
true value of −σ−1
θ
must lie between the smallest and the largest estimates we obtain. Of
course, in practice these bounds are estimated with error.
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Table A.6: Regression Results: Subsamples
Establishment Level
Intensive Extensive and Intensive
Unweighted Employment Weighted Unweighted Employment Weighted
β 0.02*** 0.01*** -0.04*** -0.03***
1993 - 2000 S.E. (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Clusters 8179 8179 8606 7081
β 0.02*** 0.004*** -0.03*** -0.03***
2001 - 2011 S.E. (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Clusters 8437 8437 8922 8922
Firm Level
Intensive Extensive and Intensive
Unweighted Employment Weighted Unweighted Employment Weighted
β -0.01*** -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.04***
1993 - 2000 S.E. (0.004) (0.006) (0.01) (0.01)
Clusters 3481 3481 3931 3931
β -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
2001 - 2011 S.E. (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Clusters 4547 4547 5187 5187
Source: LBD, DCA, and UBP. The table reports pooled regression results, where the
sample is split into subsamples from 1993-2000 and 2001-2011.
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A.3.2 Invertibility of ηm,k
To show that ηm,k is invertible for some m and k, we estimate specification 1.19 separately
for all j ∈ J . Note, the technology transfer function is not conditional on a sourcing strategy,
but only on a location/mode j. Unlike the bounding procedure, therefore we do not condition
on a particular sourcing strategy J ⊂ J , but pool all observations that source from a given
location/mode. The results of the estimation are shown in Table A.7.
The table shows that the estimate of −σ−1
θ
is severely upward biased when j = HO. In
contrast, the estimate is most downward biased when j = HI. For all other j ∈ J , the
estimates are quite close together and lie between these two extremes. The structure of our
model now suggests that χHO is strictly increasing in ϕ while χHI is strictly decreasing in
ϕ. This implies that ηHO,HI is strictly increasing and therefore invertible.
We next estimate 1.21 for j = HO and plot the semi-parametric component (σ − 1) .. as
a function of χHO
χHI
. The result is shown in Figure ??. As expected, the technology transfer
function is increasing in the share ratio.
Table A.7: Bias in single share estimates of σ−1
θ
χHI χHO χNI χNO χSI χSO
−σ−1
θ
-1.798*** 1.263*** -0.095*** -0.156*** -0.137*** -0.254***
(0.0259) (0.0571) (0.0184) (0.0158) (0.0308) (0.0188)
Observations 32,000 32,000 2,100 6,000 1000 2900
R2 0.168 0.054 0.024 0.014 0.051 0.070
Source: LBD, LFTTD and CMF
This table reports the results from estimating 1.19 for all firms in 1997. The single shares are
instrumented with lagged shares. F statistics for the first stage are significant at conventional levels.
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log share ratio
Source: LBD, LFTTD and CMF
This figure displays the results of plotting hj (ϕ) on
χHO
χHI
as discussed in the text.
The size distribution of χHOχHI is truncated at the 15th and 85th percentiles.
203
A.3.3 Estimation results: robustness
Table A.8: Estimation Results: Semiparametric Regressions (Robustness)
Year 1993 1997 2002 2007
σ−1
θ
0.16*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.06***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Higher order F.E. YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Size percentiles NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Instrumented NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 72,700 72,700 79,500 79,500 67,200 67,200 71,800 71,800
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
σ−1
θ
0.14 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.20* 0.15***
(0.200) (0.011) (0.024) (0.011) (0.118) (0.010)
Higher order F.E. YES NO YES NO YES NO
Size percentiles NO YES NO YES NO YES
Instrumented YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 76,000 76,000 63,800 63,800 67,400 67,400
Source: LBD,LFTTD, CMF and ASM
This table reports point estimates for σ−1θ from the polynomial approximation and size bin ap-
proaches discussed in 1.3.4, where the dependent variable is firm revenues. The lower panel displays
results where the cost shares are instrumented with lagged values.
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Table A.9: Robustness to κj
Baseline All κj = 1, j 6= HO κj = 1,∈ {NI, SI}
Manufacturing -0.13 -0.14 -0.13
Employment
Multinational -0.28 -0.27 -0.27
Employment
Non-MN Employment -0.07 -0.08 -0.07
Employment
This table summarizes the decline in aggregate manufacturing employment within the model
under alternative assumptions on which κj .
A.4 Chapter 1: Quantitative Exercises Appendix
A.4.1 Robustness to choices of κj
This section presents results of fitting the model in Section 1.4 to the calibration targets
in Table 1.13 with alternative choices for κj, j ∈ {HO,NO,NI, SO, SI}. We present the
declines in employment between 1997 and 2007 implied by the model when (a) all technology
transfer parameters with the exception of κHO are set to 1, and (b) all within firm technology
transfer parameters are set to 1 (κj = 1,∈ {NI, SI}).
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Table A.10: Robustness: Quantitative Exercises
Data (1997- 2007) Baseline Only Tj changes Only fixed costs change
Manufacturing -0.25 -0.13 -0.06 -0.03
Employment
Multinational -0.27 -0.28 0.06 0.13
Employment
Non-MN Employment -0.24 -0.07 -0.12 -0.10
Employment
This table summarizes the decline in aggregate manufacturing employment within the model
under alternative assumptions on which parameters change between 1997 - 2007.
A.4.2 Counterfactual exercises
We next discuss the changes in employment implied in our baseline model if we (a) only
allow the technology parameters Tj, j ∈ HO,HI,NO,NI, SO, SI to change between 1997
and 2007 or (b) only allow the fixed costs of each sourcing strategy fj, J ∈ J to change.
Table A.10 presents the results of these alternative calibrations. Notice that in both
counterfactual exercises, we do not change any of the calibration targets, so we have more
targets than parameters to fit the model. Manufacturing employment falls in aggregate in
both cases, but by a smaller amount than in the baseline. Further, multinational employment
actually increases, with the largest effect in the calibration where only fixed costs fall to match
observed importing patterns. The large declines in fixed costs in this case result in entry
into multinational activity, which dominates the within-firm effect of declining domestic
employment due to import substitution. Similar reasoning applies to the case with only
technological improvements, but the effect is smaller.10
10We note that as we do not have many parameters to fit our calibration targets in these exercises, the




B.1 Chapter 2: Basic Theory Appendix
B.1.1 Proof of Result 1
Suppose that the firm solves





























































The same equation can be obtained under perfect competition.
Now take the production function and multiply it by px
pxx = px
[




















































Before differentiating, recall the assumption that the firm takes prices pM as given and














































































B.1.2 On Flexibility in Domestic Inputs
Under the assumption of perfect competition, the first order conditions are:
x (1− µ) = (pD)ψ FD
xµ = (pM)
ψ IM










The above equations demonstrate that a constant returns to scale production function com-
bined with these assumptions on market structure imply that the output elasticity will equal
one for all values of the elasticity of substitution. For this reason, we require some assump-
tions limiting the flexibility of domestic inputs following the import disruption.
Below we show an alternative way of understanding the interaction of competitive factor
markets, changes in domestic inputs, and the mapping of the output elasticity into parameter
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= 0, then the output elasticity will be equal to one regardless of the value of
ψ. On the other hand, any assumptions that yield a non-zero change in the relative input
prices will then yield the result that d lnx
d ln IM
= 1 provided ψ → 0.
B.2 Chapter 2: Data Appendix
B.2.1 Matching Corporate Directories to the Business Register
The discussion below is an abbreviated form of the full technical note (see Flaaen (2013b))
documenting the bridge between the DCA and the Business Register.
B.2.1.1 Directories of International Corporate Structure
The LexisNexis Directory of Corporate Affiliations (DCA) is the primary source of in-
formation on the ownership and locations of U.S. and foreign affiliates. The DCA describes
the organization and hierarchy of public and private firms, and consists of three separate
databases: U.S. Public Companies, U.S. Private Companies, and International – those parent
companies with headquarters located outside the United States. The U.S. Public database
contains all firms traded on the major U.S. exchanges, as well as major firms traded on
smaller U.S. exchanges. To be included in the U.S. Private database, a firm must demon-
strate revenues in excess of $1 million, 300 or more employees, or substantial assets. Those
firms included in the International database, which include both public and private compa-
nies, generally have revenues greater than $10 million. Each database contains information
on all parent company subsidiaries, regardless of the location of the subsidiary in relation to
the parent.
The second source used to identify multinational firms comes from Uniworld Business
Publications (UBP). This company has produced periodic volumes documenting the loca-
tions and international scope of i) American firms operating in foreign countries; and ii)
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foreign firms with operations in the United States. Although only published biennially,
these directories benefit from a focus on multinational firms, and from no sales threshold for
inclusion.
Because there exist no common identifiers between these directories and Census Bureau
data infrastructure, we rely on probabilistic name and address matching — so-called “fuzzy
merging” — to link the directories to the Census data infrastructure.
B.2.1.2 Background on Name and Address Matching
Matching two data records based on name and address information is necessarily an im-
perfect exercise. Issues such as abbreviations, misspellings, alternate spellings, and alternate
name conventions rule out an exact merging procedure, leaving the researcher with prob-
abilistic string matching algorithms that evaluate the “closeness” of match — given by a
score or rank — between the two character strings in question. Due to the large computing
requirements of these algorithms, it is common to use so-called “blocker” variables to restrict
the search samples within each dataset. A “blocker” variable must match exactly, and as a
result this implies the need for a high degree of conformity between these variables in the
two datasets. In the context of name and address matching, the most common “blocker”
variables are the state and city of the establishment.
The matching procedure uses a set of record linking utilities described in Wasi and Flaaen
(2014). This program uses a bigram string comparator algorithm on multiple variables with
differing user-specified weights.1 This way the researcher can apply, for example, a larger
weight on a near name match than on a perfect zip code match. Hence, the “match score”
for this program can be interpreted as a weighted average of each variable’s percentage of
1The term bigram refers to two consecutive characters within a string (the word bigram contains 5
possible bigrams: “bi”, “ig”, “gr”, “ra”, and “am”). The program is a modified version of Blasnik (2010),
and assigns a score for each variable between the two datasets based on the percentage of matching bigrams.
See Flaaen (2013b) or Wasi and Flaaen (2014) for more information.
212
bigram character matches.
B.2.1.3 The Unit of Matching
The primary unit of observation in the DCA, UBP, and BR datasets is the business
establishment. Hence, the primary unit of matching is the establishment, and not the firm.
However, there are a number of important challenges with an establishment-to-establishment
link. First, the DCA (UBP) and BR may occasionally have differing definitions of the
establishment. One dataset may separate out several operating groups within the same firm
address (i.e. JP Morgan – Derivatives, and JP Morgan - Emerging Markets), while another
may group these activities together by their common address. Second, the name associated
with a particular establishment can at times reflect the subsidiary name, location, or activity
(i.e. Alabama plant, processing division, etc), and at times reflect the parent company name.
Recognizing these challenges, the primary goal of the matching will be to assign each DCA
(UBP) establishment to the most appropriate business location of the parent firm identified
in the BR. As such, the primary matching variables will be the establishment name, along
with geographic indicators of street, city, zip code, and state.
B.2.1.4 The Matching Process: An Overview
The danger associated with probabilistic name and address procedures is the potential
for false-positive matches. Thus, there is an inherent tension for the researcher between a
broad search criteria that seeks to maximize the number of true matches and a narrow and
exacting criteria that eliminates false-positive matches. The matching approach used here is
conservative in the sense that the methodology will favor criteria that limit the potential for
false positives at the potential expense of slightly higher match rates. As such, the procedure
generally requires a match score exceeding 95 percent, except in those cases where ancillary
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evidence provides increased confidence in the match.2
This matching proceeds in an iterative fashion, in which a series of matching procedures
are applied with decreasingly restrictive sets of matching requirements. In other words,
the initial matching attempt uses the most stringent standards possible, after which the
non-matching records proceed to a further matching iteration, often with less stringent stan-
dards. In each iteration, the matching records are assigned a flag that indicates the standard
associated with the match.
See Table B.1 for a summary of the establishment-level match rate statistics by year and
type of firm. Table B.2 lists the corresponding information for the Uniworld data.
B.2.1.5 Construction of Multinational Indicators
The DCA data allows for the construction of variables indicating the multinational status
of the U.S.-based establishment. If the parent firm contains addresses outside of the United
States, but is headquartered within the U.S., we designate this establishment as part of a
U.S. multinational firm. If the parent firm is headquartered outside of the United States,
we designate this establishment as part of a Foreign multinational firm. We also retain the
nationality of parent firm.3
There can be a number of issues when translating the DCA-based indicators through
the DCA-BR bridge for use within the Census Bureau data architecture. First, there may
be disagreements between the DCA and Census on what constitutes a firm, such that an
establishment matches may report differing multinational indicators for the same Census-
identified firm. Second, such an issue might also arise due to joint-ventures. Finally, incorrect
matches may also affect the degree to which establishment matches agree when aggregated
to a firm definition. To address these issues, we apply the following rules when using the
2The primary sources of such ancillary evidence are clerical review of the matches, and additional parent
identifier matching evidence.
3The multinational status of firms from the UBP directories are more straightforward.
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DCA-based multinational indicators and aggregating to the (Census-based) firm level. There
are three potential cases:4
Potential 1: A Census-identified firm in which two or more establishments match to dif-
ferent foreign-country parent firms
1. Collapse the Census-identified firm employment based on the establishment-parent firm
link by country of foreign ownership
2. Calculate the firm employment share of each establishment match
3. If one particular link of country of foreign ownership yields an employment share above
0.75, apply that link to all establishments within the firm.
4. If one particular link of country of foreign ownership yields an employment share
above 0.5 and total firm employment is below 10,000, then apply that link to all
establishments within the firm.
5. All other cases require manual review.
Potential 2: A Census-identified firm in which one establishment is matched to a foreign-
country parent firm, and another establishment is matched to a U.S. multinational firm.
1. Collapse the Census-identified firm employment based on the establishment-parent firm
link by type of DCA link (Foreign vs U.S. Multinational)
2. Calculate the firm employment share of each establishment match
3. If one particular type of link yields an employment share above 0.75, apply that link
to all establishments within the firm.
4Some of these cases also apply to the UBP-BR bridge.
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4. If one particular type of link yields an employment share above 0.5 and total firm
employment is below 10,000, then apply that link to all establishments within the
firm.
5. All other cases require manual review.
Potential 3: A Census-identified firm in which one establishment is matched to a non-
multinational firm, and another establishment is matched to a foreign-country parent firm
(or U.S. multinational firm).
Apply same steps as in Potential 2.
B.2.2 Classifying Firm-Level Trade
The firm-level data on imports available in the LFTTD does not contain information
on the intended use of the goods.5 Disentangling whether an imported product is used as
an intermediate input for further processing — rather than for final sale in the U.S. — has
important implications for the nature of FDI, and the role of imported goods in the trans-
mission of shocks. Fortunately, the Census Bureau data contains other information that can
be used to distinguish intermediate input imports from final goods imports. Creating lists
of the principal products produced by firms in a given detailed industry in the United States
should indicate the types of products that, when imported, should be classified as a “final”
good – that is, intended for final sale without further processing. The products imported
outside of this set, then, would be classified as intermediate goods.6 Such product-level
production data exists as part of the “Products” trailer file of the Census of Manufactur-
ers. As detailed in Pierce and Schott (2012) (see page 11), combining import, export, and
production information at a product-level is useful for just such a purpose.
5This is one advantage of the survey data on multinational firms available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. There are, however, a number of critical disadvantages of this data source, as outlined in ?.
6To be more precise, this set will include a combination of intermediate and capital goods.
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B.2.2.1 Creating a NAICS-Based set of Final/Intermediate Products
As part of the quinquennial Census of Manufacturers (CM), the Census Bureau surveys
establishments on their total shipments broken down into a set of NAICS-based (6 digit)
product categories. Each establishment is given a form particular to its industry with a
list of pre-specified products, with additional space to record other product shipments not
included in the form. The resulting product trailer file to the CM allows the researcher to
understand the principal products produced at each manufacturing establishment during a
census year.
There are several data issues that must be addressed before using the CM-Products
file to infer information about the relative value of product-level shipments by a particular
firm. First, the trailer file contains product-codes that are used to “balance” the aggregated
product-level value of shipments with the total value of shipments reported on the base CM
survey form. We drop these product codes from the dataset. Second, there are often codes
that do not correspond to any official 7-digit product code identified by Census. (These
are typically products that are self-identified by the firm but do not match any of the pre-
specified products identified for that industry by Census.) Rather than ignoring the value
of shipments corresponding to these codes, we attempt to match at a more aggregated level.
Specifically, we iteratively try to find a product code match at the 6, 5, and 4 digit product
code level, and use the existing set of 7-digit matches as weights to allocate the product
value among the 7-digit product codes encompassing the more aggregated level.
We now discuss how this file can be used to assemble a set of NAICS product codes that
are the predominant output (final goods) for a given NAICS industry. Let xpij denote the
shipments of product p by establishment i in industry j during a census year. Then the total
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One might argue that the set of final goods products for a given industry should be defined
as the set of products where Spj > 0. That is, a product is designated as a “final good” for
that industry if any establishment recorded positive shipments of the product. The obvious
disadvantage of employing such a zero threshold is that small degrees of within-industry
heterogeneity will have oversized effects on the classification.
Acknowledging this concern, we set an exogenous threshold level W such that any p
in a given j with Spj > W is classified as a final good product for that industry. The
upper portion of Table B.3 documents the number of final goods products and the share of
intermediate input imports based on several candidate threshold levels. The issues of a zero
threshold are quite clear in the table; a small but positive threshold value (0.1) will have a
large effect on the number of products designated as final goods. This shows indirectly that
there are a large number of products produced by establishments in a given industry, but a
much smaller number that comprise the bulk of total value.
There are several advantages to using the CM-Products file rather than using an input-
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output table.7 First, within a given CM year, the classification can be done at the firm or
establishment level rather than aggregating to a particular industry. This reflects the fact
that the same imported product may be used as an input by one firm and sold to consumers as
a final product by another. Second, the CM-Products file is one of the principal data inputs
into making the input-output tables, and thus represents more finely detailed information.
Related to this point, the input-output tables are produced with a significant delay – the
most recent available for the U.S. is for year 2002. Third, the input-output tables for the
U.S. are based on BEA industry classifications, which imply an additional concordance (see
below) to map into the NAICS-based industries present in the Census data.
We now turn to the procedure to map firm-level trade into intermediate and final goods
using the industry-level product classifications calculated above.
B.2.2.2 Mapping HS Trade Transactions to the Product Classification
The LFTTD classifies products according to the U.S. Harmonized Codes (HS), which
must be concorded to the NAICS-based product system in order to utilize the classification
scheme from the CM-Products file. Thankfully, a recent concordance created by Pierce and
Schott (2012) can be used to map the firm-HS codes present in the LFTTD data with the
firm-NAICS product codes present in the CM-Products data.
A challenge of this strategy is that the LFTTD exists at a firm-level, while the most
natural construction of the industry-level classification scheme is by establishment. More
concretely, for multi-unit, multi-industry firms, the LFTTD is unable to decompose an im-
port shipment into the precise establishment-industry of its U.S. destination. 8 While
7Another option is to use the CM-Materials file, the flip side of the CM-Products file. Unfortunately,
the CM-Materials file contains significantly more problematic product codes than the Products file, and so
concording to the trade data is considerably more difficult.
8It is worth pointing out that the most obvious way that this would materialize is by vertical integration
of the firm in its U.S. operations. Provided that the industry designation of the firm pertains to its most
downstream operations, then this is would not serve to bias the firms’ classification of imported goods, as
the upstream products are not actually “final” goods for that firm.
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recognizing the caution that should be used in this regard, we adopt the approach that is
commonly used in such circumstances: the industry of the firm is defined as that industry
encompassing the largest employment share.
Once the firm-level trade data is in the same product classification as the industry-level
filter created from the CM-Products file, all that is left is to match the trade data with the
filter by NAICS industry. Thus, letting Mij denote total imports from a firm i (firm i is










where Pj = {p | Spj ≥ W} . (B.10)
The bottom section of Table B.3 shows some summary statistics of the intermediate share
of trade according to this classification system, by several values of the product-threshold
W . There are at least two important takeaways from these numbers. First, the share
of intermediates in total imports is roughly what is reported in the literature using IO
Tables. Second, the share of total trade occupied by intermediate products is not particularly
sensitive to the exogenous threshold level. While there is a small increase in the share when
raising the threshold from 0 to 0.1 (about 3 percentage points), the number is essentially
unchanged when raising it further to 0.2.
B.2.3 Sample Selection
B.2.3.1 Constructing the Baseline Dataset
This section will discuss the steps taken to construct the sample used in section 2.3.1.
Beginning with the raw files of the LFTTD export/import data, we drop any transactions
with missing firm identifiers, and those pertaining to trade with U.S. territories. Next, we
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merge the LFTTD files with the HS-NAICS6 product concordance from Pierce and Schott
(2012); if there is no corresponding NAICS6 code for a particular HS code, then we set
NAICS6 equal to XXXXXX. We then aggregate up to the level of Firm-Country-Month-
NAICS6, and then create extracts according to three sets of destinations/sources: Japan,
Non-Japan, and North America (Canada and Mexico). Then, assigning each firm to an
LBD-based industry (see below), we run the NAICS-based trade codes through the inter-
mediate/final goods filter discussed in Appendix B.2.2. The firms’ monthly trade can then
be split into intermediate and final goods components. We repeat this step for years 2009,
2010, and 2011.
Using the Longitudinal Business Database, we drop inactive, ghost/deleted establish-
ments, and establishments that are not in-scope for the Economic Census. To create the
sample of manufacturing firms in the U.S., we first create a firm industry code defined
as the industry encompassing the largest share of firm employment. We then drop non-
manufacturing firms. Next, we merge the LBD for each year with the DCA-Bridge (see
section B.2.1) containing multinational indicators. We then apply the rules specified above
for clarifying disagreements with the DCA-based multinational indicators. After creating
monthly copies of each firm, we merge by firm-month to the trade data. Missing information
of trade data is altered to represent zeros. We repeat these steps for years 2009-2011, and
then append the files together. Firms that do not exist in all three years are dropped from
the sample.
B.2.3.2 GIS Mapping of Earthquake Intensity Measures to Affiliate Locations
As part of the Earthquake Hazards Program, the U.S. Geological Survey produces data
and map products of the ground motion and shaking intensity following major earthquakes.
The preferred measure to reflect the perceived shaking and damage distribution is the esti-
mated “Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)” which is based on a relation of survey response
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and measured peak acceleration and velocity amplitudes. The USGS extends the raw data
from geologic measurement stations and predicts values on a much finer grid using standard
seismological inferences and interpolation methods. The result is a dense grid of MMI val-
ues covering the broad region affected by the seismic event. For more information on this
methodology, see Wald et al. (2006).
To utilize this information, we take all Japanese addresses from the DCA/Uniworld di-
rectories that correspond to any U.S. operation via an ownership link. We geocode these
addresses into latitude/longitude coordinates using the Google Geocoding API, and then
compute the inverse distance-weighted mean of the relevant seismic intensity measure based
on a 10km radius surrounding a given establishment. The firm identifiers within the cor-
porate directories allow us to create firm-specific measures (average and maximum values,
by manufacturing/non-manufacturing), which can then be brought into the baseline Census
dataset via the bridges discussed in appendix B.2.1.
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Table B.1: DCA Match Statistics: 2007-2011
# of DCA Matched Percent
Establishments to B.R. Matched
Total
2007 112,346 81,656 0.73
2008 111,935 81,535 0.73
2009 111,953 81,112 0.72
2010 111,998 79,661 0.71
2011 113,334 79,516 0.70
U.S. Multinationals
2007 22,500 16,396 0.73
2008 23,090 16,910 0.73
2009 22,076 16,085 0.73
2010 21,667 15,785 0.73
2011 21,721 15,557 0.72
Foreign Multinationals
2007 10,331 7,555 0.73
2008 9,351 6,880 0.74
2009 11,142 8,193 0.74
2010 11,308 8,181 0.72
2011 11,619 8,357 0.72
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Table B.2: Uniworld Match Statistics: 2006-2011
# of Uniworld Matched Percent
Establishments to B.R. Matched
Foreign Multinationals
2006 3,495 2,590 0.74
2008 3,683 2,818 0.76
2011 6,188 4,017 0.65
U.S. Multinationals1
2007 4,043 3,236 0.80
2009 4,293 3,422 0.80
1U.S. multinationals include only the establishment identified as
the U.S. headquarters.
Table B.3: Appendix Table Comparing the Results from Threshold Values W
Threshold Values
W = 0 W = 0.1 W = 0.2
Number of Final Good Products per Industry
Median 19 1 1
Mean 25 1.52 1.14
Min 1 1 0
Max 154 6 3
Implied Share of Intermediate Inputs
Imports 60.9 63.90 63.97
Exports 52.0 54.96 55.04
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B.3 Appendix: Other Results
B.3.1 Alternate Specifications for Treatment Effects Regressions
Our results from section 2.3.2 are based on a sample including all Japanese multinationals
in manufacturing, and therefore uses a levels specification to allow for zeros in the firm-
month observations. Because larger firms exhibit greater absolute deviations from trend,
this roughly amounts to weighting firms based on size, such that the results correspond to a
representative firm based on the aggregate effect of the group.
To see this, and to explore how the levels specification influences our interpretation, we
repeat the analysis on a subset of the firms for which we can view the percentage changes
directly. Specifically, we drop any firms with zeros in any month for intermediate imports
or N.A. exports during the sample, and then take logs and HP-filter each series to obtain
percentage deviations from trend for each firm.9 The results of this exercise are shown in
Panel A of Figure B.1. We suppress standard errors for the sake of clarity; the drops are
significant at the 95% level for between 2-4 months following the shock. If we rerun these
regressions while also weighting according to the pre-shock size of firms, we obtain a picture
that looks much closer to Figure 2.7, see Panel B of Figure B.1.
These results indicate that the larger firms appear to be affected the most from this
shock. This could be partly a result of our proxy being less effective for smaller firms that
may not engage in consistent exports to North America.
B.3.2 Probit Model of Import/Output Disruptions
We specify a simple probit model to understand the relative importance of various firm-
level characteristics in the import and output declines following the tsunami. The model
is
9We re-weight the control group as described in section 2.3.1.
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Pr(XDik = 1) = Φ [β1JPNik + β2Exposedik + β3MMIik + β4Portik + γk] (B.11)
where the dependent variable (XDik) is an indicator equal to one if the N.A. exports of
firm i in industry k are on average 20% below trend during the five months following the
To¯hoku event. The independent variables are also indicators: JPNik, for affiliates of Japanese
multinationals; Exposedik, for firms with an exposure to Japanese inputs above 0.05 of
total material; MMIik for firms with an elevated MMI value pertaining to their average
Japanese manufacturing locations; and Portik for firms that typically rely on imports via
ports damaged by the tsunami.10 The γk term allows for industry-specific intercepts. To
evaluate the determinants of an input disruption from Japan, we replace the dependent
variable with JDik , an indicator for a drop in Japanese imported inputs of 20% relative to
trend.
Panel A of Table B.4 evaluates firm characteristics predicting a drop in U.S. output (XDik),
as measured by our proxy. The columns (1)-(4) show the results from different specifications
with various combinations of the covariates in equation (B.11). Both Japanese ownership
and high exposure to Japanese inputs significantly increase the probability of an output
disruption, as expected. In columns (3) and (4), we demonstrate that Japanese ownership
is substantially more indicative of an output decline than high input exposure alone. In
Panel B, we replace the dependent variable with the binary measure of a drop in Japanese
intermediate inputs (JDi ). The results from these regressions indicate, unsurprisingly, that
high exposure to Japanese imports are highly predictive of a subsequent disruption following
the To¯hoku event. Apart from their exposure to imports from Japan, the Japanese affiliates
10Specifically, the MMIik = 1 if the average Japanese manufacturing establishment corresponding to a
U.S. firm is above the median (roughly an MMI of 5.2) of all firms with Japanese manufacturing locations.
The affected ports are: Onahama, Hitachi, Kashima, Haramachi, Shiogama, Sendai, Shimizu, Ishinomaki,
Hashinohe, Miya Ko, Kamaishi, Ofunato, and Kessennuma.
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are no more likely to suffer a disruption to these imports (see column 8).11 While the results
from Table B.4 are somewhat inconclusive, they nevertheless point to unique features of the
production function of Japanese affiliates that yields direct pass-through of Japanese shocks
to the U.S. economy. Our estimation procedure that follows should help to clarify this point
further.
B.3.3 Bootstrapping Standard Errors
We use bootstrapping methods to compute measures of the dispersion of our point esti-
mates. Using random sampling with replacement within each group of firms, we create 5000
new artificial samples and re-run the estimation procedure. The standard deviation of the
point estimates across these bootstrap samples is shown in Table 2.3. To gain a more com-
plete picture of the dispersion, we create density estimates for each sample of firms across
the parameter space for the elasticities. These densities are shown in Figure B.3.
B.3.4 Effects on U.S. Exports to Japan
Another dimension of the transmission of the To¯hoku shock to the United States is U.S.
exports back to Japan. To the extent that firms in the U.S. receive inputs from Japan
for processing and re-shipment back to Japan, one might expect the U.S. exports to Japan
may fall following the To¯hoku event. On the other hand, U.S. firms may have increased
shipments to Japan following the shock in order to offsett what were large production and
supply shortages within Japan. To evaluate this, we re-run the specification in equation
(2.5) but replace V Mi,t , the value of intermediate imports of firm i in month t, with V
JEXP
i,t ,
the value of Japanese exports of firm i in month t. The results are shown in Figure B.2. As
is clear from the figure, we do not see strong evidence to support either hypothesis regarding
this particular trade flow, at least as it pertains to Japanese multinationals in particular.
11The combined effect of the coefficients on Japan and JPN*Exp is -0.16, and not significant.
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B.3.5 Effects on Employment and Payroll
The Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL) contains quarterly employment and
payroll information for all employers (with some small exceptions) in the U.S. economy.
This list is held separately as a single-unit(SSEL-SU) and multi-unit (SSEL-MU) file. The
Report of Organization Survey (ROS) asks firms to list the establishments which report
under a particular EIN, and this information is then recorded to the firm identifier on the
Multi-Unit File. To build a quarterly employment series at the firm-level, we link the EIN
variables on the SU file with the firm-identifier linked with each EIN on the MU file. In
principle, the four quarters of payroll listed on the SSEL is combined by Census to create
an annual payroll figure for each establishment, which is the value recorded in the LBD.
Similarly, the employment variable corresponding to the 1st quarter (week of March 12)
from the SSEL is that used by the LBD.
Once we merge the SSEL-based data with quarterly employment and payroll to the LBD
for a particular year, we conduct a series of reviews to ensure that the annual payroll (and
1st quarter employment) roughly align. Any establishments with disagreements between the
SSEL-based payroll and LBD-based payroll such that the ratio was greater than 2 or less
than 0.6 were dropped.
After these modifications were made, the remainder of the data construction was similar
to that in section B.2.3. We merge multinational indicators from the DCA, drop non-
manufacturing firms, append the 2009, 2010, and 2011 files together, and keep only those
firms that exist in each year. Using the same set of firms as a control group as specified in







βiEiDj,i + uj,t (B.12)
where ∆empj,t ≡ ln(empj,t/empj,t−4), where empj,t indicates employment at firm j in
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quarter t. We also re-run the equation specified in equation B.12 using payroll payj,t as the
dependent variable (where ∆payj,t ≡ ln(payj,t/payj,t−4). The qualitative results are shown
in table B.5.
B.3.6 Effects on Unit Values (Prices) of Trade
The LFTTD contains information on quantities as well as values for each trade transac-
tion, recorded at a highly disaggregated product definition (HS 10 digit). This allows for the
construction of unit values (prices) for each firm-product-month observation, which allows
for an analysis of price movements surrounding the To¯hoku event.
The majority of the data construction is identical to that in section B.2.3, however there
are a number of modifications. First, we drop all transactions with missing or imputed quan-
tities in the LFTTD, and then aggregate to the Firm-HS10-month frequency, separately for
each type of trade transaction: 1) Related-Party imports from Japan; 2) Non Related-Party
imports from Japan; 3) Related-Party exports to Canada/Mexico; and 4) Non Related-Party
exports to Canada/Mexico. Next, we select only those firms identified as manufacturing in
the LBD. We keep the related-party and arms-length transactions separate as one may expect
these prices to behave differently following a shock. As above, we keep only manufactur-
ing firms, append the annual files together, and then select only those firms identified as a
multinational in either 2009, 2010, or 2011.
At the product level, there is little reason to suspect trends or seasonal variation over
this short of a time period. Moreover, there is no concern here about accounting for zeros
in the data. As such we take a firm j’s imports (exports) of product p in month t, and run
the following specification in logs (mp,j,t = log(Mp,j,t):






βiEiDj,i + uj,t (B.13)
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where αpj are firmXproduct fixed-effects, γi are monthly fixed effects (with the dummy
variable E ′is corresponding to each calendar month), and uj,t are random effects. The vari-
ables Dj,t are dummy variables equal to one if the firm is owned by a Japanese parent
company.
A qualitative version of the results is shown in Table B.6.
B.3.7 Ward’s Automotive Data
Ward’s electronic databank offers a variety of data products for the global automotive
industry at a monthly frequency. We obtain Japanese production (by model), North Ameri-
can production (by plant and model), U.S. inventory (by model), and North American sales
(by model) all for the period January 2000 to December 2012. The inventory and sales
data also contain the country of origin, so one can separate out these variables based on
whether a particular model was imported vs domestically-produced. The series cover the
universe of the assembly operations of finished cars and light trucks. Unfortunately, there is
no information on input shipments.
For the plant-level analysis of production, the base sample consists of 167 plants active
at some point during 2000-2012. We remove plants that were not continuously in operation
during the period 2009-2012, and combine several plants that are recorded separately in the
data, but are in effect the same plant. After these modifications, the sample reduces to 62
plants, 22 of which are owned by a Japanese parent. The average monthly production in the
three months preceding the shock is 12,904 for Japanese plants, and 14,903 for Non-Japanese
plants. The specification is identical to that in section 2.3.1:






βpEpJPNi,p + ui,t (B.14)
where here the variable Qi,t is auto production by plant i in month t, after removing
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a plant-specific trend though March 2011. Because these plants can be tracked with some
confidence back in time, it is reasonable here to remove seasonality directly, rather than
assume a shared seasonal component between the treated and control groups as in section
2.3.2. We use the X12-ARIMA model, provided by the National Bank of Belgium, and apply
it to each series before correcting for trend. The results for the Japanese plants are mostly
similar, as shown in table B.7.
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Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
These figures report the relative percentage deviations from trend of Japanese affiliates relative
to a control group of other multinational firms. The values are coefficient estimates taken from
an interaction of a Japanese-firm dummy with a monthly dummy – additional baseline monthly
dummies remove seasonal effects. These results reflect a reduced sample with no firm-month zeros
in imported inputs or N.A. exports. The data is logged, and HP-filtered using a monthly smoothing
parameter.
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Figure B.2: Dynamic Treatment Effects: Relative Japanese Exports of Japanese Firms
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
These figures report the Japanese exports of the U.S. affiliates of Japanese firms relative to a control
group of other multinational firms. The values are coefficient estimates taken from an interaction
of a Japanese-firm dummy with a monthly dummy – additional baseline monthly dummies remove
seasonal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table B.4: Predicting Japanese Import and U.S. Output Disruption by Firm Characteristics
Panel A: Disruption to U.S. Output (proxy) Panel B: Disruption to Japanese Imports
XDi = 1 J
D
i = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Japan 0.443*** 0.352*** 0.347** 0.707*** 0.310*** 0.686***
(0.0921) (0.117) (0.152) (0.0917) (0.115) (0.150)
Exposed 0.351*** 0.145 0.140 0.814*** 0.636*** 0.991***
(0.0886) (0.112) (0.149) (0.0880) (0.110) (0.144)
JPN*Exp -0.00771 -0.848***
(0.228) (0.222)
MMI -0.176*** -0.121* -0.178*** -0.178*** 0.346*** 0.389*** 0.341*** 0.306***
(0.0676) (0.0646) (0.0676) (0.0683) (0.0691) (0.0667) (0.0694) (0.0704)
Ports -0.174 -0.144 -0.197 0.248 0.217 0.168 0.174
(0.224) (0.225) (0.226) (0.211) (0.212) (0.213) (0.213)
Constant -0.674 -0.674 -0.674 -0.674 -4.672 -4.672 -4.672 -4.668
(0.681) (0.681) (0.681) (0.681) (85.78) (85.78) (85.78) (85.00)
Industry
Dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2451 2451 2451 2451 2451 2451 2451 2451
*** p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Source: LFTTD, DCA, UBP, and USGS as explained in the text. This table reports the results of a probit model prediction of
JPN import and N.A. exports (output) disruption based on firm characteristics. See section 2.3.1 for a definition of the variables.
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Figure B.3: Density Estimates of Elasticities Across Bootstrap Samples
A. Japanese vs non-Japanese Multinationals: Materials Elasticity (ω)
B. Japanese vs non-Japanese Multinationals: Materials-Capital/Labor Elasticity (ζ)
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Figure B.3: Density Estimates of Elasticities Across Bootstrap Samples
C. Non-multinationals and All Firms: Materials Elasticity (ω)
D. Non-multinationals and All Firms: Materials-Capital/Labor Elasticity (ζ)
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
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Independent Variables (1) (2)
Q2 2010 (t=-3) pos*** pos***
Q3 2010 (t=-2) pos*** pos***
Q4 2010 (t=-1) pos*** pos***
Q1 2011 (t=0) pos*** pos***
Q2 2011 (t=1) pos*** pos***
Q3 2011 (t=2) pos*** pos***
Q4 2011 (t=3) pos*** pos***
JPNxQ2 2010 (t=-3) neg neg
JPNxQ3 2010 (t=-2) neg neg
JPNxQ4 2010 (t=-1) neg neg
JPNxQ1 2011 (t=0) neg neg
JPNxQ2 2011 (t=1) neg neg
JPNxQ3 2011 (t=2) neg neg
JPNxQ4 2011 (t=3) neg pos
constant neg*** neg***
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations
R-squared
Source: SSEL and DCA as explained in the text.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the firmXProduct level) per-
taining to each sign coefficient are indicated by: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
This table reports qualitative features of firm employment and firm
payroll in the quarters surrounding the To¯hoku earthquake and
tsunami. The first set of coefficients correspond to quarter dum-
mies, whereas the second set (JPNx) correspond to the interaction
of a Japanese firm dummy with quarter dummies. See equation
B.12 in the text. The dependent variable is the four-quarter log
difference of employment (payroll).
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Table B.6: Dynamic Treatment Effects: Unit Values of Trade Surrounding To¯hoku Event
Log Unit-Value of:
JPN Imports: JPN Imports: N.A. Exports N.A. Exports
Related Party Non-Related Party Related Party Non-Related Party
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sep 2010 (t=-6) neg** pos pos* pos
Oct 2010 (t=-5) pos neg pos** pos
Nov 2010 (t=-4) pos pos pos** pos
Dec 2010 (t=-3) pos neg pos pos
Jan 2011 (t=-2) neg pos neg pos
Feb 2011 (t=-1) pos neg pos** pos
Mar 2011 (t=0) neg pos pos pos
Apr 2011 (t=1) pos pos pos pos
May 2011 (t=2) neg pos neg pos**
Jun 2011 (t=3) pos** neg pos** neg
Jul 2011 (t=4) neg neg pos neg
Aug 2011 (t=5) pos pos neg pos
Sep 2011 (t=6) pos pos pos pos**
Oct 2011 (t=7) neg neg pos pos
Nov 2011 (t=8) pos neg pos neg
Dec 2011 (t=9) neg pos pos** pos
JPNxSep 2010 (t=-6) pos** neg* neg** neg
JPNxOct 2010 (t=-5) neg* pos pos pos
JPNxNov 2010 (t=-4) neg pos neg neg
JPNxDec 2010 (t=-3) neg neg* pos pos
JPNxJan 2011 (t=-2) pos neg neg neg
JPNxFeb 2011 (t=-1) neg pos pos pos**
JPNxMar 2011 (t=0) pos pos neg neg
JPNxApr 2011 (t=1) neg pos neg neg
JPNxMay 2011 (t=2) pos neg pos neg
JPNxJun 2011 (t=3) neg pos* neg neg
JPNxJul 2011 (t=4) pos neg pos neg
JPNxAug 2011 (t=5) neg* neg* neg pos
JPNxSep 2011 (t=6) neg neg neg neg
JPNxOct 2011 (t=7) pos neg neg neg
JPNxNov 2011 (t=8) neg neg neg pos
JPNxDec 2011 (t=9) neg neg pos neg
constant pos neg neg neg
FirmXProduct Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations
R-Squared
Source: LFTTD, DCA, and UBP as explained in the text.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the firmXProduct level) pertaining to each sign coefficient are indicated
by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
This table reports qualitative features of the unit values of trade surrounding the 2011 To¯hoku earthquake
and tsunami. The first set of coefficients correspond to monthly dummies, whereas the second set (JPNx)
correspond to the interaction of a Japanese firm dummy with monthly dummies. See equation B.13 in the
text.
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Figure B.4: Automotive Production, Inventory, Sales by Firm Type, Distributed Lag Model
Source: Ward’s Automotive Database
This figure reports North American production, and U.S. sales and inventory data according to firm
type: Japanese and non-Japanese firms. The values are coefficient estimates taken from a distributed
lag model, exploiting time-series variation only. The underlying series have been seasonally adjusted,
logged, and HP-Filtered Standard errors are suppressed in the interests of clarity. The Japanese
automakers are Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Toyota, and Subaru.
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Table B.7: Dynamic Treatment Effects: N.A. Automotive Production
(1) (2) (1) (2)
VARIABLES Prod Prod VARIABLES (cont’d) Prod (cont’d) Prod (cont’d)
Nov 2010 (t=-4) 91.06 17.78 JPN x Nov 2010 (t=-4) -195.8 -341.7
(649.9) (608.8) (841.9) (799.2)
Dec 2010 (t=-3) -1,973*** 310.3 JPN x Dec 2010 (t=-3) -385.0 -408.3
(467.5) (497.5) (736.5) (706.4)
Jan 2011 (t=-2) -611.5 1,083* JPN x Jan 2011 (t=-2) 781.0 -1,092
(637.3) (618.7) (792.1) (804.6)
Feb 2011 (t=-1) 694.9* 756.3* JPN x Feb 2011 (t=-1) -1,142 -1,210*
(401.9) (394.7) (696.2) (666.8)
Mar 2011 (t=0) 4,356*** 1,483*** JPN x Mar 2011 (t=0) -3,515*** -2,592***
(524.9) (389.1) (812.0) (842.7)
Apr 2011 (t=1) -216.2 305.5 JPN x Apr 2011 (t=1) -6,239*** -6,099***
(707.7) (620.4) (1,303) (1,282)
May 2011 (t=2) 1,584*** 799.1 JPN x May 2011 (t=2) -7,244*** -6,625***
(525.4) (511.3) (1,651) (1,740)
Jun 2011 (t=3) 1,366** -499.3 JPN x Jun 2011 (t=3) -4,564*** -3,423**
(623.6) (594.9) (1,248) (1,320)
Jul 2011 (t=4) -4,512*** 123.3 JPN x Jul 2011 (t=4) -2,143 -3,723***
(878.4) (606.2) (1,430) (1,045)
Aug 2011 (t=5) 685.6 -1,323** JPN x Aug 2011 (t=5) -1,275 -1,108
(744.0) (648.1) (970.8) (1,012)
Sep 2011 (t=6) -836.5 -1,895*** JPN x Sep 2011 (t=6) -359.4 40.37
(663.7) (641.5) (930.7) (959.8)
Oct 2011 (t=7) -338.0 -1,434** JPN x Oct 2011 (t=7) 93.27 -265.4
(662.3) (632.4) (885.6) (785.8)
Nov 2011 (t=8) -1,393** -1,443** JPN x Nov 2011 (t=8) -1,318 -2,059*
(582.8) (601.2) (1,159) (1,183)
Dec 2011 (t=9) -4,511*** -1,619** JPN x Dec 2011 (t=9) 759.1 24.95
(774.4) (655.5) (1,105) (803.9)
Constant -1,535*** -1,683***
(89.30) (91.95)
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Remove Plant-Specific Pre-Shock Trend Yes Yes
Remove Seasonal Component No Yes
Observations 2,976 2,976
R-squared 0.260 0.272
Source: Ward’s Automotive Yearbook




C.1 Chapter 3: Data Appendix
We describe the algorithm used to construct a utilization-adjusted TFP series for Canada.
Our procedure is adapted from Imbs (1999), as the quarterly data necessary to construct a
series with the Fernald (2014) methodology are not currently available for Canada for the
requisite time period. The method in Imbs (1999) is in the spirit of Basu et al. (2006),
in that it also relies on identifying movements in unobserved (aggregate) utilization from
observed changes in inputs and output. Unlike Basu et al. (2006), this method does not
control for sectoral differences or non-constant returns to scale. We briefly describe the steps
of the algorithm here, using commonly seen relationships from a firm’s profit maximization
problem. For a detailed derivation of the equations that follow see Imbs (1999).
1. Construct a starting capital stock series using the perpetual inventory method from
official investment series It and a quarterly depreciation rate of 0.025. For the initial
value of the capital stock we chose K0 =
I1
r+gI
, where gI is the growth rate of investment
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in Canada. We tested our results with other choices for the initial capital stock and
found no substantive difference.
2. Construct an initial series for utilization ut using the capital stock series Kt, output







, where Y/K is the average period value.
3. Use the initial utilization series and the assumed relationship between depreciation and
utilization δt = δ¯u
1+r/δ¯
t to construct a time-varying series for δt.
4. Together with the official series for investment and the time-varying δt, construct a
new capital stock using the standard capital accumulation equation.
5. Using the new δ¯ and capital stock, return to step (1) and construct a new utilization
series.
6. Iterate until the capital stock and δ¯ converge. Then construct the final implied ut.





using data on consumption Ct, wages wt, and labor input Nt.
1




The only additional data series required for this procedure are data on investment and wages.
For consistency with the rest of our data, both series were taken from the Ohanian and Raffo
(2012) dataset, which in turn uses data from the OECD Main Economic Indicators along
with national databases.
1The derivation of this expression uses the household’s optimization problem and can be found in Imbs
(1999).
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C.2 Chapter 3: Robustness Appendix
This section presents responses of core U.S. and Canadian variables to the three identified
shocks, where the sentiment shock is identified using a measure of U.S. consumer confidence.
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Figure C.1: The Impulse Responses to the US Surprise TFP Shock, Using US Consumer Confidence












































































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of the core US variables to a surprise TFP innovation, identified in a VAR with
the Michigan Consumer Confidence indicator ordered fifth. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence
intervals.
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Figure C.2: The Impulse Responses to the US News TFP Shock, Using US Consumer Confidence










































































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of the core US variables to the news shock, identified in a VAR with the Michigan
Consumer Confidence indicator ordered fifth. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure C.3: The Impulse Responses to the US Sentiment Shock, Using US Consumer Confidence











































































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of the core US variables to the sentiment shock, identified in a VAR with the Michigan
Consumer Confidence indicator ordered fifth. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure C.4: The Impulse Responses of Canadian TFP to the Three US Shocks, Using US
Consumer Confidence


































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of Canadian utilization-adjusted TFP to each of the three shocks in
the US: surprise TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock, identified in the VAR with
the consumer confidence series. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure C.5: The Impulse Responses of Canadian GDP to the Three US Shocks, Using US
Consumer Confidence































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of Canadian GDP to each of the three shocks in the US: surprise
TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock, identified in the VAR with the consumer
confidence series. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
248
Figure C.6: The Impulse Responses of Canadian Exports to the US to the Three US Shocks,
Using US Consumer Confidence































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of Canadian exports to the US to each of the three shocks in the
US: surprise TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock, identified in the VAR with the
consumer confidence series. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure C.7: The Impulse Responses of Canadian Imports from the US to the Three US
Shocks, Using US Consumer Confidence































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of US exports to Canada to each of the three shocks in the US: surprise
TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock, identified in the VAR with the consumer
confidence series. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure C.8: The Impulse Responses of Canadian Hours to the Three US Shocks, Using US
Consumer Confidence































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of Canadian hours per worker to each of the three shocks in the US:
surprise TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock, identified in the VAR with the
consumer confidence series. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure C.9: The Impulse Responses of Canadian Utilization to the Three US Shocks, Using
US Consumer Confidence































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of Canadian capital utilization to each of the three shocks in the US:
surprise TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock, identified in the VAR with the
consumer confidence series. Standard errors are bias-corrected bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure C.10: The Impulse Responses of Canadian Consumption to the Three US Shocks,
Using US Consumer Confidence































Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses of Canadian consumption to each of the three shocks in the US:
surprise TFP shock, news shock about future US TFP, and US sentiment shock, identified in the VAR with the
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